1995年国会听证会情报和安全
1995年国会听证会1995年国会听证会美国能源部副部长查尔斯·柯蒂斯(CHARLES B. CURTIS) 1995年9月20日在美国参议院情报特别委员会(U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE)发表的声明我谨对有此机会讨论美国的国家利益和情报在支持追求这些利益的国家政策方面的作用表示感谢。我特别想描述一下能源部在后冷战时期的情报优先事项和要求。当所有机构都在努力调和日益减少的资源和日益增长的需求时，政策制定者如何能最有效地利用提供给它们的大量资料的问题是至关重要的。随着我们国家安全面临的挑战越来越复杂，我坚信，在应对我们国家安全面临的威胁和制定更有效的政策方面，适当收集、分析和分发情报可以发挥至关重要的作用。此外，随着全球安全环境的变化和演变，情报工作的重点必须谨慎和持续地重新评估。我赞扬本委员会对这一进程所作的贡献。50多年来，情报部及其前身一直既是情报的消费者，又是情报的生产者。第二次世界大战期间，洛斯阿拉莫斯的科学家们分析了我们的对手开发核弹的努力。在整个冷战期间，情报部门通过评估外国核威胁，特别是来自前苏联的威胁，为我们发展核武器的主要任务提供了支持。 Today, the Department and its National Laboratories are in the forefront of stemming the扩散核武器。我们的成就包括帮助俄罗斯人保护其裂变材料，向政策制定者提供及时评估流氓国家发展核武器或采购核材料和技术的努力。随着美国国家安全优先事项的演变，国务院的情报要求也在演变。国务院及其国家实验室的情报项目以总统的《美国国家安全战略》(1995年2月)和他对情报界的优先事项的明确声明为坚实基础。首先，我们必须继续监测俄罗斯和中国的事态发展，无论我们多么希望这些国家一切顺利。俄罗斯仍然有能力对美国造成不可接受的大规模损害;与此同时，中国似乎有意现代化和扩大其有限的战略核武器能力。在俄罗斯，核弹头、裂变材料和专门知识的安全和保障仍然是国防部的优先问题。叶利钦政府最近在这方面取得了进展，但还有很多工作要做。二是总统已经做好了预防扩散大规模杀伤性武器是国家安全的首要任务。区域不稳定、可能促进核专门知识迅速传播的信息技术的全球爆炸、在俄罗斯和其他前苏联国家保护裂变材料的挑战、运载系统特别是导弹的全球市场的蓬勃发展，以及企图对无辜民众造成大规模伤亡的恐怖分子的出现，突显了总统的担忧。国家实验室是世界一流的核弹头设计、核燃料循环、核试验和库存管理以及制造、武器化和相关使用控制技术的知识库。我的主要优先事项之一是确保这些专业知识有效地用于防扩散任务，以支持政府的目标和国防部的反击扩散程式。第三，安全获取全球化石燃料仍然是美国的主要国家安全问题。在接下来的15年里，波斯湾石油生产国家可以提供多达80％的世界石油需求增加。这些相同的预测显示波斯湾国家占世界出口的70％。如果发生这种情况，我们将从每年增加2000亿美元以上，从而提高财富将财富转移到这个政治上，稳定的挑战区。随着全球能源市场的动态变得更加复杂和相互依存，我们需要监测全世界的能源供应和分销基础设施。在这方面，能源脆弱性和潜在供应中断的评估仍然是该部门的重要情报信息优先事项。第四，随着全球相互依存的发展，跨国威胁来构成了美国的越来越优先事项。环境退化并未确认国界;一种新的恐怖主义和国际有组织罪犯展示了一个类似的蔑视国家界限和海关护照机构。 The Department s environmental remediation experience can and should be applied to the first threat; its expertise and technologies are also being applied to the second area, especially to the prevention of the shipment of fissile materials across national borders. Should a terrorist threat involving nuclear devices emerge, the Department's nuclear terrorism response team, NEST, would be among the first on the, scene. The Department is in the forefront of defining necessary information requirements and potential responses to these new threats. Finally, all would agree on the importance of meeting the new economic challenges, which have materialized from different parts of the globe. Economic competitiveness and science and technology intelligence have emerged as areas in which the Department is playing an important role for the Administration and the Intelligence Community. How to organize, posture, and fund an effective intelligence capability to meet these challenges is a question under active consideration within the Department, the Administration, in Congress, and in the public at large. I commend the Committee for its contributions to this effort. Let me offer a few observations based upon my own experience as a consumer of intelligence. It is of course true that a much greater volume of information is available to the policy maker than probably ever before. Policy experts in their own fields, have had extensive contacts with their foreign counterparts, and can tap into a much broader information network than previously available. On the other hand, I must observe that much of the publicly available information suffers a number of shortcomings that can impair its usefulness to the policy maker. All too often such information is unfocused and can even be of questionable reliability with regard to its source or the motivations driving its publication. Frequently open source information is event-driven and lacks insight into mindsets or national cultural styles that form an essential component of the driving factors of policy making in any state. In my view, intelligence must remain focused on what should be of greatest import to the policy maker. Good intelligence analysis has incorporated all sources of information, including open sources. But intelligence analysis must always have as its primary focus adding value to information regardless of its source. Moreover, much of the critical information required by policy makers is deliberately with held and protected by foreign governments or groups; thus there remains a continuing requirement for covert access to such information sources. This problem is compounded by the growing awareness of US intelligence capabilities and resources by potential opponents and competitors. Despite the end of the Cold War and the supposed openness of formerly denied areas, we have witnessed growing sophistication in the worldwide use of denial and deception to protect sensitive information. Foreign governments and nongovernmental actors, such as drug cartels or terrorists, are exploiting information protection technologies to deny us access to critical information. I have concluded from this that the tasks confronting intelligence are more complex and perhaps even more difficult than ever before. Finally, I believe that the benefits policy makers derive from intelligence can be enhanced by a greater awareness of three key factors. o The first is accountability, that is, the direct link between the, intelligence producer and his or her customers. Accountability implies the creation and maintenance of a focused body of expertise specifically dedicated to the requirements of policy makers, with analyst incentive and rewards systems geared to customer service and policy impact rather than quantity of production. o The second is reasonable access for policy makers to intelligence information; that is, information which is both timely and useable. The provision of intelligence support to policy makers should mirror the policy functions, be designed to streamline the support process, and eliminate organizational distinctions of little importance to intelligence consumers. I am concerned that the system of disseminating finished intelligence from centralized intelligence organizations too often leaves analysts at these agencies to only surmise how policy makers can benefit from their work. I hope that the efforts of the Intelligence Community to exploit new information technologies will facilitate access among policy makers and intelligence analysts and accelerate the dissemination of finished intelligence. o Third is the importance of integration; that is, the incorporation of intelligence throughout the decision making process. To this end, for example, I have personally met with the leadership of both the Central Intelligence and National Security Agencies to encourage a shared understanding of the Department s intelligence requirements and the capabilities of these Agencies to meet those requirements. These Agencies have responded in admirable fashion; the implementation of our policy priorities would be far less successful without their support. Integration also includes leveraging nonintelligence resources more effectively in the analytical process. At the Department, for example, the National Laboratories contribute not only their unique intelligence perspectives, but can draw upon the greater laboratory population for additional expertise. In this fashion, the labs are a force multiplier ensuring the full extent of unique Departmental and Laboratory expertise is brought to bear to support the policy process. The Department of Energy is certainly not alone in having its own reservoir of unique technical expertise. For example, the Office of Intelligence and Research, at the Department of State, draws upon reporting by the diplomatic corps; Treasury benefits directly from reports by its financial attaches and international monetary analysts; and, the Commerce Department utilizes the National Institute of Standards and Technology. In short, I welcome Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch's renewed emphasis on the joint operations of the various agencies. The task before the Intelligence Community, it seems to me, is to provide a high quality product, strip out obvious redundancies, while retaining sufficient distributed capabilities to ensure that policy makers needs are effectively served. In closing, I hope some of these thoughts will prove useful to the Committee as it pursues the best approach and structure for intelligence support to policy makers. Again, thank you for this opportunity to share my views on the future of intelligence requirements and needs.