1992 Congressional Hearings
Intelligence and Security


摘录

Robert Gates
中央情报局主任

Testimony Before

House Armed Services Committee
国防政策小组

27 March 1992

During the last three and a half months some disquieting trends have been evident. Unrest is worse, for example, in parts of the former Soviet Union than when I last stood here before you. Conflict is deepening between Soviet successor states such as Armenia and Azerbaijan. While the CIS has helped cushion the collapse of the Soviet empire, it is facing increasing strains that it may not survive. It is not hard to find other disquieting news:

- 乌克兰暂停转让战术核武器到俄罗斯拆解。

-- Ratification and implementation of the CFE treaty appears increasingly complex and problematic.

- 在其他地区,中东和东南亚的武器赛量正在加热。

-- Despite significant -- and costly -- counternarcotics achievements, narcotics trafficking shows no sign of abating.

- 布宜诺斯艾利斯的灾难性爆炸表明,国际恐怖主义仍然是严重关切。

On the other hand, I can point to some positive developments and trends, as well:

-- White citizens in South Africa voted strongly in favor of continuing political reforms. A cease-fire is in effect in El Salvador, and the prospects that the contending factions can work out their differences peacefully have improved. Democracy has begun to make progress even in Albania and Romania. The unrest in Yugoslavia has abated, if perhaps only temporarily.

- 将集中计划的经济转化为市场经济,仍在愈合和稳定。但是,最糟糕的预测 - 关于俄罗斯的大规模饥饿,低温和大规模的内部内部骚乱 - 到目前为止未能实现。而Yeltsin仍然坚持经济改革课程。

THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF If in the next few years it again becomes necessary to deploy U.S. combat power abroad, the strategically vital region encompassing the Middle East and Persian Gulf is at the top of the list of likely locales.

IRAQ: WEAKENED BUT STILL FORMIDABLE Operation Desert Storm greatly reduced Iraq's ability to conduct large-scale offensive military operations. The U.N. sanctions have impeded Saddam's efforts to reequip his forces. Preoccupied with defending the regime and putting down local insurgencies, the Iraqi military is currently capable of conducting only small-scale offensive operations with limited objectives.

尽管如此,伊拉克军队的规模和设备仍然是强大的,特别是与大多数邻国的邻国相比。让我给你一些数字:

- 伊拉克的地力编号大约二十二部门,尽管它们的整体较小,并且比预警部门更少。军队仍拥有3000多名装甲人员运营商,2000辆坦克和1,000件炮兵。

-- We believe Iraq also retains some mobile Scud missile launchers and as many as several hundred missiles.

-- The Iraqi air force probably still has about 300 combat aircraft, though many are not operational. Because the air force has been grounded for over a year, it would need at least a month of intensive training and maintenance to become even minimally combat-ready.

-- Although a large quantity of Iraqi nuclear-related equipment has been identified and destroyed, we suspect Iraq has managed to hide some equipment from the U.N. inspectors. And, of course, Iraq's nuclear scientists and engineers retain their expertise.

- 巴格达投降了数千种化学品牌,吨化学品,和相当大的生产设备,但我们相信政权仍然拥有更多一切 - 更多的前体化学品,更多的散装代理商,更多的弹药,更多的生产设备。

-- The regime never admitted having a biological weapons program and never surrendered any toxins or weapons. But we know the Iraqis had such a program, and we are convinced they have been able to preserve some biological weapons and the means to make even more.

HOW LONG TO RECOVER? The restoration of Iraq's defense industries is one of Saddam's main postwar goals. Notwithstanding U.N.-imposed inspections and sanctions, Iraq claims to have partly repaired nearly 200 military-industrial buildings and to be in the process of repairing many others. We can confirm independently that significant reconstruction has been taking place at least two dozen military-industrial sites.

在海湾战争期间损坏的一些武器生产设施恢复了有限的炮兵和弹药。尽管有这些努力,只要制裁仍然存在于武力和检查继续,总武器生产将大幅低于预警水平。

如果被删除制裁,我们估计它将需要伊拉克至少三到五年,以恢复其预警常规军事库存。在此之前,伊拉克的力量可能足以威胁其邻国。

More important, however, is how fast we think Iraq could restore its special weapons capabilities. We believe Baghdad has been able to preserve significant elements of each of its special weapons programs. Once it is free to begin rebuilding them, its scientists and engineers will be able to hit the ground running.

- 核武器开发计划需要最多的时间来恢复,因为需要重建生产裂变材料的大部分基础设施。(This judgment would be reinforced if equipment at certain only recently identified nuclear research sites is destroyed, as U.N. inspection teams have demanded.) The time Iraq would need to rebuild its nuclear capability could be shortened dramatically if it could somehow procure fissile material from abroad.

- 在伊拉克人能够重新建立预制生产水平之前,大部分化学武器生产基础设施都必须重建。但是,我们认为,他们可以使用封面的前体化学品,未释录的化学工艺设备和未填充弹药储备来迅速恢复有限的生产这些武器。

- 因为它没有花太多设备制作生物战争,我们估计伊拉克人可以在几周内恢复生产。它们保留了微生物发酵设备和病原体培养物;我们仍然确信他们也有一种生物武器的储存。

- 最后,我们判断伊拉克人很快就可以恢复他们生产SCUD型导弹的能力,尽管他们可能需要国外的一些帮助。

如果萨达姆离开了怎么办?如果萨达姆侯赛因离开现场,伊拉克内部政治和外部行为如何发生变化?

作为萨达姆数十年的抑制统治,他将尽一切努力抵御权力。没有连续机制到位,取代萨达姆也没有任何明显的候选人 - 伊拉克是第二名男子的国家之一,而不是说威胁生命。

因此,我们判断,如果萨达姆离开了日本ne, it would be because of a coup or other violent act. How likely this is to happen, I cannot say, though we have evidence that Saddam's power base is shrinking and that dissatisfaction with his leadership is growing even among his core supporters -- chiefly, among Iraq's Sunni Muslims.

A likely successor to Saddam would be someone from the current, Sunni-Arab-dominated ruling circle -- someone who shares Saddam's perspectives, especially his belief in the political efficacy of ruthless violence. Such a successor might think pretty much like Saddam. Even so, whoever Saddam's successor is, he would lack a broad power base and could face immediate and serious challenges from other contenders. A successor regime might be a little less hardnosed, both toward Iraqi Shiites and Kurds and toward Iraq's external adversaries. While it would continue efforts to restore Iraq's military capability, it might shift some resources from military to civilian reconstruction. The new regime could anticipate a quick end to the U.N. sanctions as well as recognition and support from the international community. In the short run, then, Iraq might present a lower threat to its neighbors. Still, any successor to Saddam is likely to share his regional aspirations, and over the longer term we could expect Iraq to try to regain its position as the dominant Arab military power.

如果继任政权开始维持伊拉克的团结或领土诚信,其直接邻居,特别是伊朗,土耳其和叙利亚将被强大诱惑。他们都担心不稳定的伊拉克会威胁自己的国家利益,可能导致区域权力平衡的不良转变。没有愿望看到伊拉克分开分崩离析为独立的库尔德,什叶派和逊尼派州。

伊朗的后游计划,而伊拉克努力从海湾战争中恢复,伊朗决心将其以前的身材恢复为波斯湾的卓越力量。德黑兰的重新制定国家安全政策有三个主要目标:

- 保证制度的生存。- 整个地区的项目电力。- 偏移美国的影响。为实现这些目标,伊朗承担了外交措施,以结束其国际隔离,正在从各种外国供应商那里购买武器,并正在制定一种生产大规模毁灭性武器的能力。在1990 - 94年期间,伊朗每年计划在外国武器上每年花费2000万美元的硬币。

- 德黑兰已经从俄罗斯和中国购买了大量的高级战机和防空导弹。它从朝鲜购买了一些扩展范围的Scud导弹,正在建造工厂制造自己的工厂。

-- As part of its upgrade of naval forces Iran has also contracted to buy at least two Kilo-class attack submarines from Russia.

-- Even after Operation Desert Storm, Iraq still has three times as many armored vehicles as Iran. To reduce that gap, Tehran is attempting to purchase hundreds of tanks from Russian and East European suppliers.

-- We judge that Tehran is seeking to acquire a nuclear weapon capability. Barring significant technical input from abroad, however, we believe the Iranians are not likely to achieve that goal before the year 2000.

- 虽然广泛而改善,伊朗的化学武器计划仍然相对粗糙。尽管如此,我们预计伊朗在几年内为其Scud导弹开发了化学弹头。

-- We also suspect that Iran is working toward a biological warfare capability.

IRAN AND THE ARAB STATES Tehran is rebuilding its military strength not only to redress the military imbalance with Iraq but also to increase its ability to influence and intimidate its Gulf neighbors -- though in the near term Tehran's desire to reduce U.S. involvement in the region will probably lead it to court the Gulf states rather than bully them.

德黑兰还努力改善与海湾外的阿拉伯国家的关系,强调穆斯林团结和伊斯兰原则。在有伊斯兰反对派运动的国家,伊朗希望增加当地的基督家之间的影响,而不会损害与这些政府的关系。例如,在阿尔及利亚,德黑兰希望与新制度保持联系,但继续对伊斯兰救赎的前线继续其政治和财政支持,阿尔及利亚政府正在禁止的过程中。试图拥有它两种方式都很困难:阿尔及尔最近在德黑兰召回其大使,以抗议伊朗继续支持前方。

Iran's growing support of radical Palestinian groups may bring it closer to some Arab states, such as Libya. This support reflects Tehran's antipathy toward Israel, which it regards as both a U.S. ally and a strategic threat. We expect Iran to continue to strongly oppose the peace process and probably to promote terrorism and other active measures aimed at undermining progress toward Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation.

Tehran's main surrogate in the Arab world will continue to be the radical Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, which is the leading suspect in the recent bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina. To ensure that its links to Hezbollah are preserved, Tehran will be careful to stay on the good side of the Syrian government, which controls access to the territory occupied by Hezbollah.

伊朗和新的伊斯兰共和国德黑兰认为该地区的发展至其北方对其国家利益至关重要。它希望填补苏联崩溃和防止美国和土耳其等地区竞争对手的无效,从那里获得主导影响。德黑兰在该地区新伊斯兰国家改善其自身影响力的外交努力,包括在各区域和国际组织的成员国提案金。

此外,德黑兰试图向新共和国侵犯文化和宗教联系。鉴于这些人类大多是突厥,而不是逊尼派穆斯林,而不是Sunni穆斯林,这是多么成功的德黑兰将如何成功。

我们看到没有证据表明伊朗的努力颠覆the secular governments of the new states or to alienate them from Russia and the other non-Muslim members of the CIS. For now, at least, Iran seems to want to preserve amicable relations with Russia, which has become a major source of its arms. Furthermore, Iran must be cautious about instigating instability along its northern border, lest nationalist sentiment be aroused among its own Azeri and Turkmen minorities. Indeed, with regard to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Tehran has tried to exert a moderating influence on the Azerbaijani government.

朝鲜半岛以来,自上年十二月的非洲间/和解和朝鲜半岛的不核化的协议,北部和韩国从事了一系列谈判和讨论,一些在一个非常高的水平,实施协议。这些讨论已经取得了一些具体的结果,特别是联合核控制委员会3月19日的形成,授权建立核设施的双边检查。

然而,在大多数情况下,两侧到目前为止为但不是和解的实质产生了框架。它们对核检查的频率,彻底和基本基础规则等关键问题仍然很远。金博宝正规网址他们还对呼吁在和解协议中呼吁的人民交流和军事信任措施进行了重大差异。

北朝鲜的威胁保持传感器mous ground forces just north of the Demilitarized Zone. They are in formations optimized for a sudden, massive strike southward toward Seoul. In recent years, these forces have increased their mobility and flexibility, improving their capability to threaten prepared defenses. They considerably outnumber the opposing Southern forces in both men and weapons. Notwithstanding the recently signed Korean nonaggression pact, until these forces go away, the threat they present is real and serious.

It is not a question of fearing an attack from the South. The South Korean forces are deployed to defend Seoul. They present no countervailing threat to North Korea -- and Pyongyang knows it.

我不想夸大这种威胁。朝鲜的武装部队遭受了许多不足之处。他们的培训和后来的作战准备是值得怀疑的。他们在防空和物流中有缺点。如果来自Erstwhile Allies的任何支持,他们无法依赖许多人。

此外,随着手术沙漠风暴所显示的,美国航空公司对大规模地基有效。韩国将获得广泛的战斗空气支持以及美国部队的其他支持的前景是一种有效的威慑力,甚至迫使朝鲜集中在边境的强势。

朝鲜的核武器计划平壤一直在建立一个基础设施,没有国外意见,将能够从头开始生产武器级裂变材料。它有国内铀矿。在Yongbyon,它建造了两个核反应堆,其唯一目的似乎是弥补钚。其中一个反应堆已经运作了四年;第二个,更大的反应堆,今年可能会启动。几乎完成是YONGBEON的另一个设施,将能够再处理反应堆燃料来恢复钚。

Last December, North and South Korea negotiated an agreement-in-principle for a nuclear-free peninsula. Each side has committed itself not to "test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use" nuclear weapons. Both sides also agreed not to have nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities. There are grounds for questioning the North's intentions, given that it has not yet even admitted the existence of, much less declared, the plutonium production reactors and reprocessing facility at the Yongbyon nuclear research center.

Moreover, verification procedures remain to be worked out -- agreement was reached only this month that a joint committee should be formed to do that. The validity of the North-South nuclear accord depends on the inspection regime Pyongyang ultimately accepts.

We believe Pyongyang is close, perhaps very close, to having a nuclear weapon capability. Where North Korea is concerned, moreover, we have to worry not only about the consequences for stability in Northeast Asia if it acquires nuclear weapons, but also about the possibility that Pyongyang might put nuclear materials and related technologies on the international market. In the past, the North Koreans have been willing to sell anything that could earn hard currency.

对北方的北部破坏经济环境不利的趋势,加上平壤领导领导的迫在眉睫的临时变化相关的不确定性,导致朝鲜人对南方的对抗战略,以及对美国,日本和美国联合国。北部和南部之间的紧张局势有所下降,尽管对南部的实际军事威胁没有显着变化。

We expect that many of the North's military advantages over the South will erode throughout this decade, largely because of decreasing support from the North's traditional allies, coupled with its continuing economic problems.

尽管如此,在近期,我们可以进入更危险的时期: - 朝鲜战略家可以推荐南方的攻击,而北方留在男性和武器数量的大量优势。

-- Difficulties in maintaining and modernizing Pyongyang's conventional forces could reinforce the North's determination to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

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