1992年国会听证会情报和安全
1992年国会听证会武器控制谈判贝维尔先生。描述DOE在武器控制谈判中的活动。这些活动计划在1993财年增加吗？Czajkowski博士。在政策层面上，DOE坐在总统的核计划转向集团以及武器控制和非扩散政策协调委员会上，该委员会监督了无数的双边和多边讨论，谈判和佣金。因此，在工作层面上，DOE为以下武器控制和非扩散活动提供政策和技术支持： - 国际原子能局 - 核供应商集团 - 双边核合作协议 - 澳大利亚集团（化学出口） - 协调委员会 -关于多边出口控制（COCOM） - 联合合规和检查委员会（开始实施） - 双边咨询委员会（TTBT实施） - 化学武器公约谈判 - 与前苏联（FSU）（FSU）的双边化学武器谈判（FSU） - 特殊验证委员会（INF验证委员会）） - 伊拉克核检查/联合国特别委员会 - 生物武器审查会议和后续技术会议 - 特别咨询委员会（ABM合规） - 联合国大会第一委员会（裁军） - 北约高级集团 - 北约裁军专家小组政治和军事环境的动态变化，DOE的参与预计将在1993财年增加。在与美国不扩散努力相关的活动中，情况尤其如此。此外，DOE深入参与了与前苏联关于其核武器的安全，安全，存储和拆除（SSD）的详细讨论。这些会谈始于1991年9月27日总统的核计划，是当今最重要的双边努力之一。 Once active assistance is agreed upon, DOE will provide most of the technical expertise and equipment needed to accomplish the task., Finally, we are engaged in preparations for the watershed 1995 Non- Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference. DOE will play a major role in developing policy and strategy to insure that the Treaty is extended indefinitely or for a series of long periods. Such an outcome is very important for both the Department and the U.S. Government. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS Mr. Bevill. Why are arms control negotiations needed when the President has unilaterally reduced nuclear weapons far beyond anything contemplated by arms control negotiators? Dr. Czajkowski. Events clearly dictate that the traditional arms control agenda be broadened to incorporate new approaches and new concerns of a changing international landscape. Before addressing these, it is important to note that the "traditional arms control" agenda has not been completed. Chemical weapons and CFE IA negotiations continue in Geneva and Vienna respectively; and the implementation commissions established for existing treaties (e.g., the Bilateral Consultative Commission for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty) continue to meet periodically. In addition, conferences are called to review operation of the treaties agreed to during the heyday of traditional arms control: the Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (September 1991) is the most recent example. Finally, 1995 is the year for the very important Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. The arms control agenda of the future is rich with possibilities for promoting confidence, preventing crises, and fostering regional/global stability. It will be characterized not by greater or less complexity, but by complexity of a different kind: less East-West centered and more multilateral; less emphasis on strict verification and more on monitoring and consultation; fewer prolonged negotiations and formal treaties and more unilateral steps and confidence building measures. The primary focus will be on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Hence we will witness increased emphasis on the NPT and IAEA, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group (chemical exports), and nuclear weapon safety, security and dismantlement (SSD) assistance to the former Soviet Union. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS Mr. Bevill: How have the President's announcements on nuclear arms reductions impacted ongoing verification missions in FY 1992 and planned for FY 1993? Dr. Czajkowski: Two aspects of the President's recent announcements on nuclear arms control have significantly impacted the ongoing V&CT missions: 1) the unprecedented scope and pace for the reduction of nuclear weapons themselves, and 2) the more unilateral approach in accomplishing these reductions, but in ways which are transparent and build confidence. The use of technologies to effect verification is being de-emphasized, but not eliminated (for example, negotiated agreements for the purpose of de-MIRVing U.S. and Russian ICBMs may ultimately require verification procedures utilizing special purpose technology). Technology and methods once associated more closely with verification, are being made available to support transparency and confidence building measures being considered under the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991. Finally, the new emphasis on the detection of proliferation activities by weapons states, as well as non-weapon states, will require new technologies to improve the ability of the U.S. to detect and locate illicit weapons, materials production, diversion, and warhead manufacture and testing. In the near term, technologies developed under the nuclear arms reduction treaties and in support of the Chemical Weapon Convention and Conventional Forces in Europe treaties will be the technical base to respond to increasing proliferation requirements. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS Mr. Bevill: Please describe the roles performed by each DOE laboratory or facility for arms control activities. Who has the lead in each programmatic area? Dr. Czajkowski: The Office of Arms Control has, with intent, expanded its verification technology activities outside the Defense Programs weapon laboratories, while still retaining the majority of technology activities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The laboratories which have been added in verification technologies development are Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Pacific. Northwest Laboratory (PNL), and Savannah River Laboratory (SRL). There are some programmatic activities which are shared at all of the laboratories such as the Radiation Detection Program, membership on the Laboratory Advisory Group on Effluent Research, and the Advanced Concepts Program. Under the Advanced Concepts Program, each laboratory has the opportunity to independently explore new and innovative ideas with relatively few restrictions. The ideas must have a verification technology association, have a specific length of time for proof of concept, and have no specific prior work performed on the concept. Individual projects are generally funded at the laboratory which has known expertise or capability, or where an advanced concept was originated and has passed the feasibility phase. Detection technology has a limited number of major programs where the majority of work is associated with only one or a few laboratories. For example: o The largest fiscal program is satellite instrumentation for verification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. This program is shared by SNL and LANL. o The seismic program exists almost exclusively at LLNL, while the Hydrodynamic Yield Measurement program is centered primarily at LANL. o Directed Energy Weapons detection technology development is shared at LLNL, LANL, and SNL. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS Mr. Bevill. Please provide a lead table as shown in the budget which includes only arms control funding, excluding智力活动。Czajkowski博士。我很高兴提供一个铅桌，其中仅包括记录的武器控制活动（以下信息）。***注意：原始文档上附带的铅桌****武器控制谈判贝维尔先生。在《条约实施活动》中，1992财年监控了多少美国和苏联测试，并计划了多少1993财年？Czajkowski博士。独立国家联邦（CIS）将在1992财年的两项美国测试中行使其监控权。为了计划目的，我们的1992财年预算包括最多监视四个CIS测试的资金，但是，鉴于其暂停，CIS不会测试。在1992年财政年度。1993年的预算纳入了资金，以适应美国两项测试的CIS监控，并为了计划目的，假设美国将行使其至少两次CIS测试的权利。通过解释，即使没有两个测试超过35 kt的“触发器”水平，TTBT协议允许验证方监视最多两次收益率的测试。武器控制谈判先生贝维尔先生：军备控制谈判要求是否增加了对技术的需求？ Provide examples of verification needs where the technology is not available. Dr. Czajkowski: The arms control treaty verification environment is in a highly dynamic state. Verification requirements range from the decades-old Limited Test Ban Treaty to the confidence building, unilateral requirements of the President's nuclear weapon initiative. The recent confirmation of the clandestine production of chemical warfare agents and the nuclear weapon program in Iraq has dramatically highlighted the need for verification technologies for proliferation detection. This has further been underscored by the concerns regarding the acquisition of military delivery systems (i.e., missile technologies) by historical adversaries. The dissolution of the Soviet Union with the concomitant changes in control over nuclear weapons has greatly exacerbated the world concern over the potential transfer of nuclear weapons or special nuclear material to aspiring nuclear weapon states. All of the above circumstances are strong indications of expanded technology requirements. Deleted The above technology shortfalls for proliferation detection are by no means exhaustive, and can be expanded under the appropriate security conditions. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS Mr. Bevill: What are the treaty verification assumptions on which the budget is based? Dr. Czajkowski: At present our treaty verification assumptions are: that the requirements will continue for those treaties in force; that additional requirements will surface with respect to the reduction of nuclear weapon inventories; that requirements will increase for bilateral and multilateral chemical weapon treaties or conventions; and that proliferation detection of weapons of mass destruction will continue to be a growing and high level international concern. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS Mr. Bevill: Please provide a list of treaties in effect; treaties under negotiation; and anticipated treaties through the 1990's in which DOE will be involved. Dr. Czajkowski: Treaties and agreements in each of the categories in which DOE is and is likely to be involved through the 1990's are listed below. The level and form of DOE involvement customarily depends on a number of factors including the extent to which DOE equities (e.g., nuclear weapon production and testing, advanced concepts research, technical aspects of non-proliferation, potential that DOE facilities will be subject to on-site inspections under a prospective treaty, etc.) are involved, the analytical and verification technology research and development support that DOE and its national laboratories provide to the negotiation and implementation processes, etc. In effect: 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT, ratified 1990) 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET, ratified 1990) 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) 1990 US/USSR Bilateral Chemical Weapons Agreement 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START, unratified) Under negotiation/prospective: - Safe, secure transportation, storage, dismantlement of nuclear weapons (President's September 27, 1991 Nuclear Initiative and Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, SNTRA) - Further Strategic Offensive Force limitations (mutual bilateral, START II) - Further Conventional Force Europe limitations (CFE-IA, manpower; CFE II, Aerial Overflight) - Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) - Open Skies - Defense and Space Talks (DST, and/or ABM Treaty revision) - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS Mr. Bevill. Provide the total funding by program activity included in the budget for implementation of the TTBT and PNET in FY 1992 and FY 1993. How many FTEs support each activity? Dr. Czajkowski. The following planned funding by program activity is provided in Treaty Implementation activities in FY 1992 and FY 1993. The estimated FTEs to support each activity is also provided. (The information follows.) FUNDING FOR TREATY IMPLEMENTATION ($ in Millions) FTEs FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1992 FY 1993 Base Support Maintenance Capability 7.5 7.0 42 40 Nevada Test Site 2.0 2.0 13 13 Foreign Deployments* $ 5.5 $ 6.0 33 35 Total $15.0 $15.0 This is an estimate due to uncertainty in the Russian Federation nuclear testing program. Deployment for at least two tests are planned for FY 1993 with preparation for the deployments beginning in the last quarter of FY 1992. Due to the Russian testing moratorium, the DOE had reduced manpower requirements in FY 1992 to monitor foreign explosions under the TTBT/PNET and requisite funds planned for foreign deployment were not required. Should the moratorium continue, portions of the treaty implementation funding will again be used to support other treaties and agreements. Included in this additional support would be: nuclear, missile, chemical, and biological weapons non-proliferation efforts; United States Security Council Resolution No. 687 (IRAQ); and the President's September 27, 1991 Nuclear Initiative pertaining to former Soviet Union weapon transportation, storage and dismantlement, as consistent with DOE mission responsibilities and capabilities. OFFICE OF智力贝维尔先生。现在，总统关于减少核武器的公告是否影响了您正在进行的任务？丹尼尔先生。自外国办公室任务以来Intelligenceis related to foreign rather than U.S. activities, the immediate answer is that the President's announcement on U.S. nuclear arms reduction does not directly influence our mission. On the other hand, announcements by the former Soviet Union (FSU), combined with the tumultuous changes taking place there, have affected our mission significantly. OFI and the policymakers it supports now find themselves confronting an array of new issues relating to command, control, and security of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in the FSU; .,dismantlement of the nuclear weapons the FSU has agreed to eliminate; disposition of the nuclear materials removed from those weapons; and the proliferation potential of the former republics of the Soviet Union (the so- called "brain drain" issue). These new智力problems require us to maintain our technical knowledge of FSU nuclear weaponry. Moreover, we do not discount the possibility that problems may surface that would result in the U.S. having to confront a former Soviet state that has become an unfriendly nuclear weapons power. Deleted Mr. Bevill. Have there been any discussion within theIntelligence社区关于DOE的适当大小和重点智力，现在已经改变了国家安全需求？丹尼尔先生。删除了贝维尔先生。现在，能源部内的这项活动的规模和资金与1993财年的其他内阁级别的机构相比？丹尼尔先生。下表由Intelligence与其他机柜级别的机构相比，社区工作人员反映了能源活动部的规模和资金。1993财年国会预算要求（成千上万美元）删除了贝维尔先生。有部门和Intelligence社区一致认为，经济竞争力是需要母鹿的有效任务智力支持吗?请证明。丹尼尔先生。删除了贝维尔先生。What DOE policy statement defines which science and technology areas should be explored? Mr. Daniel. Deleted Mr. Bevill. Please justify funding for science and technology activities when several of the areas identified for study are themselves the subject of international scientific collaborations which include the former Soviet Union. Mr. Daniel. Deleted Mr. Bevill. Please describe the roles performed by each DOE laboratory or facility for智力活动。谁在每个编程领域都有领先地位？丹尼尔先生。删除了贝维尔先生。Now many resources (people and funding) did your office have examining Iraq's nuclear weapons program in FY 1990, FY 1991, and FY 1992? Mr. Daniel. Deleted Mr. Bevill. Please describe the Department of Energy's role in examining Iraq's nuclear weapons program prior to the revelations highlighting the extent of the program. Mr. Daniel. Deleted Mr. Bevill. What lessons were learned from this experience? Mr. Daniel. Deleted Mr. Bevill. In FY 1991, what percent of your resources were focused on the Soviet threat? Has this changed in FY 1992 or FY 1993? Mr. Daniel. Deleted Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list and brief description of all classified work for others being performed at any DOE laboratory or facility. Mr. Daniel. Deleted ABBREVIATIONS: AL Albuquerque Field Office CH Chicago Field Office EG&G Edgerton, Germeshausen and Greer INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory MM/GDP Martin Marietta/Gaseous Diffusion Plant (OR) MM/NL Martin Marietta/National Laboratory (OR) NV Nevada Field Office OR Oak Ridge Field Office PNL Pacific Northwest Laboratory RL Richland Field Office SNLA Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque SRL Savannah River Laboratory Mr. Bevill. Please identify all Special Access Required (SAR) work for others programs and the location within DOE where the work is being performed. Mr. Daniel. Deleted ABBREVIATIONS: AL Albuquerque Field Office CH Chicago Field Office EG&G Edgerton, Germeshausen and Greer INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory MM/GDP Martin Marietta/Gaseous Diffusion Plant (OR) MM/NL Martin Marietta/National Laboratory (OR) NV Nevada Field Office OR Oak Ridge Field Office PNL Pacific Northwest Laboratory RL Richland Field Office SNLA Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque SRL Savannah River Laboratory Mr. Bevill. Please describe the process for transferring technical support costs to other program organizations. Why is this necessary? What funding is to be transferred? Mr. Daniel. The Office ofIntelligence才不是。将技术支持成本转移给其他计划组织。技术支持预算指出，“为了更加紧密地管理行政成本，PSO/Office董事在本预算中包含了依赖FTE的空间，供应和电信费用的FTE依赖性费用，并将在执行年内转移。”该声明与该部门将资金从所有DOE组织转移到部门管理部门的计划是一致的。传统上，DOE的预算已得到制定，因此，所有总部依赖FTE的行政支持成本（例如租金，电信和用品）都是为所有总部工作人员进行集中预算的，而不管哪个拨款（例如，国防反应堆，新的生产反应堆，新的生产反应堆，新的生产反应堆，核能等），资助了FTE。在过去的几年中，由计划驱动的人员水平一直在增长到无法充分支持管理费用的资金数量的水平。解决这一困境的解决方案之一是让每个计划在这些行政成本中应公平份额。它迫使那些正在扩展的计划支付额外的相关费用，从而迫使他们考虑将行政成本最小化的方法作为其扩展计划的一部分。1993财年的预算是为了向国会披露，该部门正在考虑这种方法。 We planned to submit a budget amendment when a final decision was made and the specific details developed. The Department is still assessing this option. We have received considerable expressions of concern from several Congressional Committee staffs. Given these concerns and the numerous other related issues, we are now considering retaining the traditional funding approach for FY 1993. This will allow the Department to make a more deliberate review of this option as well as other options and propose a change in a future budget if appropriate. Retaining our traditional approach would also require a FY 1993 budget amendment to provide adequate funding to Departmental Administration. We expect a decision in the near future. Mr. Bevill. Now much funding will be provided to the Nonproliferation Center in FY 1992 and FY 1993? Mr. Daniel. Deleted FERNALD AND HANFORD Mr. Bevill. Why do the costs for nuclear safeguards and security activities continue to increase when the Department has eliminated all production activities at Fernald and Hanford, and reduced production activities at several other sites? Maj Gen McFadden. As production activities cease or are reduced there is little initial impact on the amount of safeguards and security activities required at the affected sites. Some immediate savings will be realized by reducing the level and number of clearances. However, until the special nuclear materials (SNM) present at those sites are consolidated or eliminated, the present level of security is required to protect SNM against theft, sabotage, or terrorist activity. We continue to work closely with the various program offices to assure that all appropriate reductions are achieved at the affected facilities. ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS WITHIN NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY BUDGET Mr. Bevill. The Nuclear Safeguards and Security program is now managed by two separate organizations. Please explain fully which activities and funding are associated with each. Maj Gen McFadden. The mission of the Nuclear Safeguards and Security program is to develop measures to assure effective protection of the DOE's nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and facilities against theft, sabotage, espionage, and terrorist activity and to identify classified and unclassified sensitive information critical to the national security. This portion of the mission is managed by the Office of Security Affairs and totals $92.2 million in Fiscal Year 1993. The mission also includes providing technical support to international activities designed to minimize the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to control nuclear energy-related exports. This portion of the mission is managed by the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation and totals $12.0 million in Fiscal Year 1993. Current funding Information for the program will be submitted for the record. Mr. Bevill. Please describe how duplication of effort can be avoided with two organizations conducting similar activities. Maj Gen McFadden. If this question is in reference to the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, and the Office of Security Affairs, there is no duplication of effort. Each organization has separate missions. However, we work closely to coordinate projects which interface within programs. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS PRIOR TO NEW SECURITY MEASURES Mr. Bevill. Is there a cost-benefit analysis performed before recommending new security measures? If so, please describe. Maj Gen McFadden. Cost-benefit analyses are performed before new security measures are recommended. DOE Order 5630.11, "Safeguards and Security Program', dated January 22, 1988, requires that safeguards and security programs be supported by appropriate cost/benefit analyses in order to reduce programmatic risks to an acceptable level. Furthermore, DOE Order 5632.8, 'Protection Program Operations: Systems Performance Tests', dated February 4, 1988 requires the evaluation of protection system capabilities through system performance testing, both initially and on an ongoing basis. THREAT POLICY STATEMENT Mr. Bevill. Has the 1983 Threat Policy Statement been updated? Is there a need to modify this guidance? Maj Gen McFadden. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DOD) on January 31, 1992 completed a Joint Threat Polity Statement for nuclear weapons facilities. The Joint Threat Statement represents a new initiative. Based upon this Joint Statement, which was supported by智力社区研究和意见，DOE现在正在修改1983年的通用威胁指南。传统威胁将被描述，并在保护分类，敏感，技术和扩散的信息上的保护方面有其他重点，这可能代表了不断变化的世界地缘政治环境中对DOE计划和资源的最严重威胁。每个设施将利用更新的威胁指南来评估当前安装防御姿势的适当性和适当性。贝维尔先生。在过去的五年中，有任何能源部设施是否经历了任何威胁到现在有效的威胁指南？麦克法登少将。没有直接的恐怖威胁对美国能源部设施的直接威胁，这可能是因为实施的安全使我们的设施变得困难。但是，存在针对DOE计划的内部和外部资源的证据，原因是出于经济利益的原因（政府财产盗窃），娱乐（计算机黑客），未经授权的访问（用于方便的计算机系统修改）和复仇/恶意恶作剧（不满的员工）。此外，DOE设施经常受到示威游行的约束，其中可能包括公民抗命。贝维尔先生。 Please provide a breakdown by each organization of the elements identified in the Fiscal Year 1993 budget request and the FTE'S. Maj Gen McFadden. The information will be submitted for the record. ***NOTE NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY CHARTS ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT*** SECURITY CLEARANCES Mr. Bevill. Now that several former nuclear materials production sites have been deactivated and transferred to the waste cleanup program, how has this impacted the number of security clearances? What steps are being taken to reduce the numbers of clearances? Are there any impediments to a quick reduction? Maj Gen McFadden. The Department's Fiscal Year 1993 Security Investigations budget request of $58.3 million, a reduction of $4.3 million below Fiscal Year 1992, reflected the Department's efforts to reduce the number of security clearances. The deactivation and transfer of nuclear materials production sites to the waste cleanup program have contributed to the reduced funding request. It is expected that as more facilities are transferred we will make further reductions to the levels and numbers of clearances. However, as long as nuclear material remains at the sites and until such time as classified document inventory levels are reduced or eliminated, we must ensure that appropriate clearances are in place. The DOE Hanford Field Office began over 18 months ago to consolidate classified data and nuclear materials into protective zones which resulted in reduced numbers and levels of clearances. At Hanford, "Q" clearances were reduced by 28 percent during Fiscal Years 1991 and 1992 and will continue to be reduced between Fiscal Year 1991 and Fiscal Year 1993. We are working aggressively throughout the DOE complex to ensure that as older sites are reconfigured and new sites are constructed, that clearance levels and numbers are reduced as quickly as possible without endangering the National Security. The only impediment to a quick reduction will be our self assessment to ensure that in the interest of reducing levels and numbers of security clearances that we do not jeopardize our current level of protection. Mr. Bevill. What is the Department's current security clearance policy? When was this policy developed and when was it last updated? Maj Gen McFadden. DOE Personnel Security Program policies and procedures are stipulated in DOE Order 5631.2, last reissued on May 18, 1988. This Order is currently being updated. The Department's security clearance policy conforms to pertinent provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and Executive Orders that require an individual's eligibility for access to classified matter or special nuclear material to be based upon review and adjudication of investigative reports provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The Department may also use investigative reports completed by other agencies or departments provided the investigative scope and extent meets the standards set by the Department. Individuals adjudicated as acceptable security risks are granted access authorization. Individuals adjudicated as unacceptable security risks are processed under administrative review procedures to determine whether access authorization should be denied or revoked. Individuals with DOE access authorization are reinvestigated at 5 year intervals. SECURITY REINVESTIGATIONS Mr. Bevill. What is the current backlog of reinvestigations? Is it increasing? What efforts are being taken to reduce the backlog? Maj Gen McFadden. At the end of Calendar Year 1991, we had reduced the number of overdue reinvestigations from about 132,000 in 1985 to 19,340. We anticipate meting the goal of eliminating this backlog by Fiscal Year 1993, and in fact several of our Field Offices -- Chicago, Idaho, Richland, Nevada, and Schenectady Naval Reactors Office -- have either already eliminated their backlogs, or will do so by the end of Fiscal Year 1992. SECURITY CLEARANCES Mr. Bevill. Does DOE currently have a backlog of security investigations pending with any agency? Maj Gen McFadden. DOE does not have a backlog of security investigations with any agency. However, there are a number of investigations of various types in process with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). I would like to insert into the record a breakdown of the current DOE caseload at OPM. (The information follows:) CURRENT DOE CASES ON HAND AT OPM (AS OF FEBRUARY 22, 1992) TYPE CASE NUMBER ON HAND MEDIAN AGE SBI-35 3 63 days SBI-75 42 91 days SBI-120 12 157 days BI-35 161 38 days BI-75 1,675 55 days BI-120 737 77 days LBI-35 4 35 days LBI-75 174 71 days LBI-120 3,386 59 days NACC-35 930 14 days Total OPM Cases 7124 Mr. Bevill. What were the number, by type and performing agency, of investigations and reinvestigations performed for Fiscal Year 1991, Fiscal Year 1992, and Fiscal Year 1993? Describe the reasons for increases or decreases. Maj Gen McFadden. I would like to insert into the record relevant data on investigations and reinvestigations. (The information follows:) INVESTIGATIONS AND REINVESTIGATIONS FY 1991 (ACTUAL) FY 1992 (EST) FY 1993(EST) FBI Initial 150 49 49 OPM Initial SBI 776 371 0 BI 10,254 13,488 12,103 Reinvestigation LBI 28,442 21,716 18,031 NACC Used for both Initial and Reinvestigations 209000 21,309 26,886 FBI investigations decreased in Fiscal Year 1992 as that agency is now being used strictly for initial investigations for individuals who occupy positions of a high degree of importance or sensitivity (about 150 positions in the DOE). OPM SBIs decreased in Fiscal Year 1992 and will be "zeroed" out in Fiscal Year 1993. The DOE has adopted the Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) which negates the need for the SBI. The SBIs were used primarily for individuals who require Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) access approval. OPM background investigations decreased in Fiscal Year 1992. The decrease is attributable to decreased program activity at Rocky Flats, Richland's effort to decrease the number of "Q" clearances, the downgrading of classified technology in the Uranium Enrichment Program (from Secret to Confidential), and the general recession that has resulted in decreased turnover at DOE sites. The same trend is forecast for Fiscal Year 1993. OPM LBIs decreased in Fiscal Year 1992 and will continue to decrease in Fiscal Year 1993 as the DOE realizes its goal to eliminate the backlog of reinvestigations by the end of Fiscal Year 1993. Once the backlog has been eliminated, LBIs will be conducted as appropriate. OPM National Agency Checks with Credit (NACCS) will increase as the need for the number of initial "Q" clearances is reduced. This increase will also be a result of using NACCs to meet reinvestigation program requirements. Mr. Bevill. Provide an analysis of security investigation programs showing the funds for defense and other than defense programs? MaJ Gen McFadden. Approximately 69 percent of the Fiscal Year 1993 Security Investigations budget will be allocated for Defense Programs activities as shown below in the table which I would like to insert into the record. (The information follows:) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS FY 1993 Defense Programs Activities $40,510,855 Other than Defense Programs 17,778,145 TOTAL $58,289,000 Mr. Bevill. What was the average cost by type and performing agency of investigations and reinvestigations performed in Fiscal Year 1991, Fiscal Year 1992, and Fiscal Year 1993? What is the average completion time? Maj Gen McFadden. The breakout of security investigation funding by performing agency is shown in the table below which I would like to insert in the record. (The information follows:) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS FY 1991 - FY 1993 ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED COSTS BY AGENCY AND TYPE (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS) FY 1992 FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 Completion Agency/Investigation Actual Actual Estimated Time(Days) Type OPM Special Background $ 2,750 $ 2,725* N/A 0 OPM Background 2,500 2,475 $ 2,673 88 OPM Limited Background 1,250 1,250 1,350 121 OPM National Agency Check with Credit 40 42 45 34 FBI Background 4,089 3,715 4,012 90 *for 75 day service Mr. Bevill. The ending uncosted balance for the security investigations tripled from Fiscal Year 1990 to Fiscal Year 1991. Please explain. Maj Gen McFadden. The uncosted balance for the security investigations budget for the year ending September 30, 1991, reflected $10,511,000 of costs not billed to DOE from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) until after October 1, 1991. This resulted in the Fiscal Year 1991 uncosted balance being inflated by the $10M late billing. Uncosted balances will fluctuate from year to year due to the fact that OPM does not submit bills for the entire fiscal year's activities until after September 30th. In review of Fiscal Year 1991, it should be noted that all but $515,311 of the OPM portion of the Fiscal Year 1991 security investigations budget was spent, which represents less than I percent carryover from Fiscal Year 1991 to Fiscal Year 1992. Mr. Bevill. How many security clearances by year, by federal and non-federal employees, are held at Fernald? How many at Hanford? Provide the costs in Fiscal Year 1991, Fiscal Year 1992 and Fiscal Year 1993 associated with these clearances. Maj Gen McFadden. I will provide this data for the record. (The information follows:) SECURITY CLEARANCES FY 1991 - FY 1993 FOR HANFORD AND FERNALD (Numbers of Persons) FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 LOCATION/CLEARANCE TYPE ACTUAL ACTUAL ESTIMATED HANFORD-Q Federal 190 161 100 Non-Federal 5,031 3,598 1,500 Subtotal 5,221 3,759 1,600 HANFORD-L Federal 126 202 200 Non-Federal 5,190 6,429 7,500 Subtotal 5,316 6,631 7,700 TOTAL-HANFORD 10,537 10,390 9,300 FERNALD-Q Federal 7 7 7 Non-Federal 135 21 21 Subtotal 142 28 28 FERNALD-L Federal 0 0 0 Non-Federal 110 5 5 Subtotal 110 5 5 TOTAL-FERNALD 252 33 33 GRAND TOTAL 10,789 10,423 9,333 SECURITY CLEARANCES FY 1991 - FY 1993 COSTS FOR HANFORD AND FERNALD, (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS) FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 LOCATION/CLEARANCE TYPE ACTUAL ACTUAL ESTIMATED HANFORD-Q Federal $ 368 $ 312 $ 194 Non-Federal 19,355 6,962 2,903 Subtotal 19,723 7,274 3,097 HANFORD-L Federal 5 8 8 Non-Federal 218 270 315 Subtotal 223 278 323 TOTAL-HANFORD 19,946 7,552 3,420 FERNALD-Q Federal 14 14 14 Non-Federal 261 41 41 Subtotal 275 55 55 FERNALD-L Federal 0 0 0 Non-Federal -5 .0 0 Subtotal 5 0 0 TOTAL-FERNALD 280 55 55 GRAND TOTAL $20,226 $7,607 $3,475 INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT WR-B-91-8 Mr. Bevill. In a September 27, 1991 report (No. WR-8-91-8), the Inspector General (IG) identified 1,058 "Q" clearances which had been granted to employees by the Albuquerque Operations Office even though these employees did not need access to classified information. By each category identified in the report, please note the number of unnecessary clearances which have been terminated. Maj Gen McFadden. Albuquerque has done an assessment of this situation with the following results: Mason & Hanger, Pantex - Agreed that 79 of the 85 clearances could be downgraded to "L" based on physical separation and change of duties. To date about half have been accomplished. The Rocky Flats Office (RFO) has not tracked individual reductions but I understand that reductions have taken place in areas such as the protective force support staff and cafeteria personnel. My staff is working with RFO to specifically identify numbers of positions at this time. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) - Submitted clearance justification forms supporting "Q" for all the positions identified by the IG. LANL has an "employment policy" requiring "Q" but they recognize the inconsistency with the DOE order. LANL management is reviewing its position and will internally evaluate a new plan for "L" clearances. A briefing to LANL senior management is scheduled for March 1992. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNLA) - Submitted clearance Justification forms supporting "Q" for all the positions identified by the IG. SNLA also has an 'employment policy" requiring "Q". Based on physical configuration of SNLA with all employees needing access to Tech Area I (Secret Restricted Data access area) it will be very difficult to change general clearance level to "l". Albuquerque is actively working the problem with SNLA management. Further, I understand that Albuquerque Personnel will review and reevaluate all security clearances under the Jurisdiction of the DOE Field Office, AL; specifically, contractor employees located at the Amarillo Area Office (AAO), Kirtland Area Office (KAO) and Los Alamos Area Office (LAAO). I am fully committed to having employees cleared only at the level necessary to perform their duties and will work towards implementation of such a situation across the DOE complex. U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION Mr. Dwyer: The Office of Arms Control and Non-proliferation is playing an increasing role in coordinating the Department's efforts to encourage scientists from Russia and other states in the commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to direct their talents toward peaceful ends. Recently, the Department announced a $90,000 contract agreement for 116 scientists from the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow to work on magnetic fusion. How will the Russian scientists be able to complete our fusion research effort? Dr. Czajkowski: The technical services subcontract between General Atomics and the Kurchatov Institute is for an investigation of the use of high power microwaves for magnetic fusion heating and current drive. The Moscow group will be using the T-10 tokamak system which is in place at the Kurchatov Institute.. This group of scientists and technicians has been working in this area for some time and there have been many close working connections between these two groups in recent years under the auspices of the U.S.-USSR Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Agreement. The Russian group has the special skills and equipment required to carry out this investigation. This work will be carried out in a collaborative and interactive manner with the task supervisors in General Atomics. There will be exchanges of scientific personnel and frequent, direct communications by facsimile, electronic mail and telephone. The financial arrangements in the contract are based on fulfillment of clearly identified milestones and associated fixed price progress payments due upon completion of the milestones. Mr. Dwyer: How does this contract impact the Russian participation in the ITER program? Dr. Czajkowski: This subcontract is specifically developed to support ongoing, high priority tasks supporting the U.S. fusion research program on the Department's DIII-D tokamak facility, operated by its contractor, General Atomics, in La Jolla, CA. This subcontract does not deal with the Russian Federation's contributions or participation in the ITER Engineering Design Activities (EDA). All four ITER Parties, i.e., the European Community. Japan, the Russian Federation and the U.S., are expected to make equal contributions to the ITER EDA work program when it is approved. We understand from Russian Federation officials that their domestic support of the ITER EDA responsibilities is a high priority within their system and is unrelated to this sub-contract. Mr. Dwyer: Were the scientists at the Kurchatov Institute engaged in defense-related research? Dr. Czajkowski: To the best of our knowledge. the answer is "no". Our scientists have worked with the leaders of this group for some time and know many of the individuals as working colleagues. This particular facility has been one of the mainstays in the Soviet fusion program and, indeed, in the world fusion program. Therefore, while we do not know the background of every individual member of the T-10 team, the overall record of the team is one of long-standing, high achievement in the magnetic fusion energy field, including many well respected publications in the open scientific literature. U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION Mr. Dwyer. How is this agreement different from other U.S. efforts to redirect Russian nuclear scientists? Dr. Czajkowski. As I explained on the last question, we do not know that any of the scientists on this project have been involved in nuclear weapons development. It is a joint project between U.S. and CIS scientists which will benefit the effort of both countries to develop fusion energy for peaceful purposes. In addition, this will be funded out of an existing DOE program budget which means a clear source of funds is identified and available. Finally, this agreement was worked out directly with the CIS on the basis of an existing Agreement for Cooperation on Fusion Energy. It was reviewed by the interagency Group on Soviet Science and Technology which is led by the State Department. U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION Mr. Dwyer. What other national laboratories may soon have Department-sponsored Russian scientists working on peaceful research initiatives? Dr. Czajkowski. That is hard to say specifically. Several national laboratories, have submitted ideas for joint non-weapons activities with former Soviet Union nuclear weapons institutes which have been forwarded to Amb. Gullucci's office for consideration. In the meantime, the Department continues to explore opportunities for further peaceful joint ventures, some of which could be carried out under existing Agreements for Cooperation. U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION Mr. Dwyer. When negotiating these arrangements, how does the Department work to insure against a "brain drain" in the former Soviet Union'? Dr. Czajkowski. We have had many discussions with the CIS on the subject of the potential for a "brain drain." What we have heard most consistently, especially from CIS scientists whether involved in weapons development or peaceful scientific research, is that most CIS scientists and engineers prefer to stay in their homeland. Their primary interest is in having meaningful scientific work. Thus, joint projects which benefit both the United States and the CIS, such as the fusion project with the Kurchatov Institute, are the most effective counter we can provide to reduce the potential "brain drain." VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY Mr. Dwyer. In your written statement you discuss the evolution of the DOE national laboratories from nuclear weapons programs to nonproliferation verification technology development. To what do you attribute this successful transition? Dr. Czajkowski: In the written statement, we did not mean to suggest that the DOE National Laboratories weapons programs have evolved into nonproliferation verification technology development programs, as the question might suggest. Instead, we wished to emphasize the considerable technical expertise of the national laboratories in the nonproliferation and verification areas. VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY Mr. Dwyer. How will efforts to modernize and reconfigure the weapons complex impact this transition. Mr. Claytor. Reconfiguration of the weapons complex will not be designed to affect the considerable technical expertise of the national laboratories in the nonproliferation and verification areas. VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY Mr. Dwyer: Will the development of verification be assigned to one laboratory? Dr. Czajkowski: It has been and will remain the strategy of DOE to develop a broad technical base among the national laboratories to support arms control initiations. This approach promotes a vital exchange of ideas and concepts between weapon and non-weapon programs. In some technology areas (i.e., seismic, hydrodynamic yield and satellite instrumentation), the investment is too costly to duplicate, therefore, we have maintained the expertise, skills and facilities at those laboratories having historically been the core programs. VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY Mr. Dwyer. It would seem that some of the technologies developed for verification may have some value to the private sector, such as earthquake detection. What role does your office play in Department efforts to transfer technology, if that technology could be considered to be under the jurisdiction of national security? Mr. Claytor. The technologies for the verification technology program are developed at the Defense Programs laboratories, such as Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories. Because these laboratories are the primary responsibility of Defense Programs, DP, the Technology Transfer Division is the Headquarters office that oversees the transfer of technology from these laboratories, including the management of the Technology Commercialization program to fund dual-use technology development projects that are cost-shared with private sector partners. Under the DP Technology Commercialization program, the laboratories and interested private sector partners propose cost-shared, collaborative research and development, R&D, designed to benefit both the weapons R&D program and United States economic competitiveness. The laboratories are required to review all such dual-use technology development projects to assure they are not classified and that national security interests are protected. MODERNIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX Mr. Dwyer. In 1988, the Reagan administration released an unclassified version of the 'Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization Report," which outlines the reshaping of the weapons complex for the years FY 1990 through FY 2010. The report envisions $81 billion in cumulative additional spending. The report recommended the building of two new production reactors, a Special Isotope Separation plant, relocating operations now at Rocky Flats Plant, termination of materials production work at Hanford and Fernald, and the transfer of nuclear materials activities from the Mound Plant to other facilities. What is the status of the Departments reevaluation of the modernization report? Mr. Claytor. In September 1989, Secretary Watkins ordered the establishment of a Modernization Review Committee, chaired by the then Under Secretary John Tuck, to reexamine the modernization issue. The Committee was directed to review the assumptions and recommendations of the original Modernization Report; assess the capacity and capability requirements of the Nuclear Weapons Complex; and to review the process by which the immediate and future requirements for maintaining, updating, and cleaning up the Complex are developed. In August 1990, the Secretary reviewed the progress of the study and issued additional guidance to focus the analysis more sharply on the realities of the emerging international security environment. This ensured flexibility to accommodate the likely range of deterrent contingencies and emphasized the objective of achieving a Complex which is smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operate than today's. Subsequently, the Modernization Review Committee was redesignated the Complex Reconfiguration Committee. The Committee's product, the "Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study" was, released to Congress in February 1991 and replaced the January 1989 Modernization Report. The Study's scope was extensive and covered all activities: nuclear, nonnuclear, and research, development, and testing. Among the options presented in the Study were two which the Secretary designated as "preferred options": to relocate the Rocky Flats Plant and to consolidate the nonnuclear element of the Complex at a single, dedicated site. A Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, PEIS, is now being developed for a reasonable range of options for the Complex including the relocation of Rocky Flats. The consolidation of nonnuclear activities is being considered in a separate Environmental Assessment. In the announced preferred alternative for nonnuclear consolidation, all activities at the Mound Plant and at the Pinellas Plant would be transferred to other facilities. On November 1, 1991, Secretary Watkins directed that the environmental impact analyses which was being prepared for the New Production Reactor, NPR, be incorporated into the Reconfiguration PEIS. The Secretary indicated that the President's initiatives announced September 27, "1991, had created both an opportunity" and a necessity to conduct an integrated examination. In February 1991, the Secretary had already directed that the NPR Project be downsized from two reactors at two sites to one reactor at one site. Subsequently, -in August 1991, the Hanford N-Reactor was terminated as a back-up production source for tritium. Both the Hanford and the Fernald facilities have been transitioned to an environmental restoration and waste management mission. The Special Isotope Separation Plant has been canceled. As a result of the significant reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpile, resulting both from the President's initiative last September and his State of the Union Address on January 28, 1992, near-term tritium needs can be met with tritium recovered from returned weapons. Thus, the Secretary recently authorized the restart of Savannah River's K-Reactor to demonstrate, over an approximate I year period devoted to significant testing, that it is a viable contingency production source of tritium. The Department then plans to shut it down and place it in a low-cost standby mode until long-term tritium availability from a New Production Reactor or other source is assured. The Savannah River L- Reactor's status has been changed to a minimum maintenance condition so that it can be safely restarted three or more years after a restart decision is made. The third reactor at Savannah River, the P-Reactor, has be-en defueled and placed in cold standby. Mr. Dwyer. When will the environmental impact statement (EIS) for the complex be completed? Mr. Claytor. As required by the National Environmental Policy Act, a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, PEIS, is being developed to analyze the consequences of alternative configuration for the Nuclear Weapons Complex. The PEIS is scheduled for completion in July 1993. After considering the analysis in the PEIS, the Department will decide how to configure the Complex and how to achieve that configuration. These decisions will be set forth in a Record of Decision, ROD, scheduled for August 1993 following completion of the PEIS. the Department anticipates that subsequent project-specific EIS's will be tiered from the reconfiguration PEIS for projects identified in the ROD. A separate Environmental Assessment, -scheduled for completion prior to the end of this calendar year, is being done for the nonnuclear manufacturing activities. Mr. Dwyer. How will the results of the EIS impact the Department's reevaluation? Mr. Claytor. The Department's reevaluation of the "Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization Report.' culminated in the publication of the "Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study.' Based on the analysis in the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, PEIS, now under development to analyze the consequences of alternative configurations of the Complex, the .Record of Decision following the PEIS will set forth the configuration of the Complex and how to achieve that configuration. SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY CROSSCUT Mr. Bevill. Provide a crosscut by location of all Safeguards and Security funding throughout the Department for Fiscal Year 1991, Fiscal Year 1992, and Fiscal Year 1993. Maj Gen McFadden. I will provide the information for the record. (The information follows:) SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY FY 1991 - FY 1993 CROSSCUT BY FACILITY (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS) FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 ORGANIZATION/FACILITY ACTUAL APPROPRIATION REQUEST ALBUQUERQUE OPERATIONS OFFICE Albuquerque Direct $103,813 $98,143 $98,322 Allied 11,598 11,692 10,381 Los Alamos National Laboratory 67,062 79,072 74,876 Mound Plant 11,532 10,408 10,319 Pantex Plant 43,602 57,764 31,478 Pinellas Plant 7,306 7,600 7,650 Rocky Flats Plant 126,352 81,546 85,483 Sandia National Laboratory 46,568 51,284 54,880 Total-Albuquerque 417,833 388,509 373,389 CHICAGO OPERATIONS OFFICE Chicago Direct 3,962 4,108 4,260 Ames Laboratory 688 712 689 Argonne National Laboratory 11,856 12,524 13,457 Brookhaven National Laboratory 7,493 8,111 8,689 New Brunswick Laboratory 4,033 4,246 4,289 National Renewable Energy Laboratory 396 452 620 Superconducting Super Collider 200 589 781 Total-Chicago 28,628 30,742 32,785 IDAHO OPERATIONS OFFICE 28,399 36,584 40,074 NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVES 1,034 1,065 1,098 NEVADA OPERATIONS OFFICE 71,374 79,348 75,504 OAK RIDGE OPERATIONS OFFICE Oak Ridge National Laboratory 6,109 6,072 6,439 Oak Ridge Direct 155,090 172.466 182,942 Total-Oak Ridge 161,199 178,538 189,381 OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 200 230 250 PITTSBURGH NAVAL REACTORS 10,565 13,158 11,797 RICHLAND OPERATIONS OFFICE 65,600 45,583 47,825 SAN FRANCISCO OPERATIONS OFFICE San Francisco Direct 5,810 7,216 7,546 Lawrence Livermore National Lab 34,963 42,744 39,231 Total-San Francisco 40,773 49,960 46,777 SAVANNAH RIVER OPERATIONS OFFICE 164,802 191,362 173,253 SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY FY 1991 - FY 1993 CROSSCUT BY FACILITY (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS) (Continued) FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 ORGANIZATION/FACILITY ACTUAL APPROPRIATION REQUEST SCHENECTADY NAVAL REACTORS 13,463 17,862 20,131 STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE OFFICE 35,742 27,866 36,801 WESTERN AREA POWER ADMINISTRATION 611 715 870 MORGANTOWN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CENTER 411 475 496 PITTSBURGH ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CENTER 1,300 1,400 1,600 HEADQUARTERS 101,094 100,993 102,949 GRAND TOTAL $1,143,028 $1,164,390 $1,154,980 DOE-WIDE PROFORCE SIZE Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing the size of guard forces and expenditures for guard forces by location for Fiscal Year 1991, Fiscal Year 1992, and Fiscal Year 1993. Maj Gen. McFadden. I will provide the information for the record. *** NOTE PROTECTIVE FORCE SIZE AND EXPENDITURES ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT*** CLASSIFICATION Mr. Bevill. How has the disintegration of the Soviet Union impacted the workload in the classification and technology policy programs? Maj Gen McFadden. In April 1991, the Department of Energy (DOE) reorganized the classification and the technology policy functions. The latter, comprising export control and technology commercialization, are no longer organizationally coupled with the classification office's responsibilities. With regard to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the resulting effect on the workload of the Office of Classification, the net effect has been workload expansion due to the radical changes in political direction and the need to support new national security objectives. For example, new classification guidance is needed for nuclear weapons disassembly and reuse, arms control verification technology, and the reconfiguration of the U.S. weapons complex. The breakup of the Soviet Union poses many other interesting classification issues. An example of such an interesting issue now before the Office of Classification is if the DOE is to give denuclearization help to the former Soviet Union, the potential exchange of Restricted Data (RD) and Unclassified Controlled Nuclear information (UCNI) may be involved. Many changes are occurring in today's dynamic world and a vigorous reevaluation of many long established classification policies and procedures is necessary. This evaluation is underway. Even before the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Office of Classification was involved in nonproliferation matters. However, evidence of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program caused us to be even more concerned about the nonproliferation aspects of classification policy. For example, the need to issue new classification guidance on new subjects having a foundation both in nonproliferation and arms control policy, such as guidance for the New Production Reactor. In addition to making sure RD and UCNI guides are up to date, we are insuring that the hundreds of requests the DOE receives for classified information do not result in the inadvertent release of classified information. Requests come from a number of sources including Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests which have nearly doubled in each of the last three years. Requests under the FOIA for documents containing highly classified information relevant to the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons can come from many sources, including foreign nationals. BONNEVILLE PROFORCE Mr. Bevill. Why does DOE pay for guards at the Bonneville Power Administration? Maj Gen McFadden. DOE does not pay for the guards at the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA). The BPA has 37 Security Officer positions located at the BPA Headquarters in Portland, OR and Ross station. The BPA is a self financed organization (by law) and Security Officer salaries are funded through consumer base rate revenues generated by the BPA, and not financed by DOE. However, we have chosen to show total protective force size at all DOE facilities-on our Protective Force Size and Expenditures Chart. HEADQUARTERS PROFORCE CONTRACT Mr. Bevill. Why has the headquarters guard force contract increased in Fiscal Year 1993? Maj Gen McFadden. The projected increases are due to the following: 1. The contract will change over in Fiscal Year 1993. It is expected that additional costs will be required for a transition to a new contract. 2. The current contract was bid in 1987. The new estimate includes adjustments over five (5) years for inflation. 3. Wage and benefit increases were anticipated for employee retention. 4. Additional requirements were implemented to improve performance. These new requirements increased basic security inspector training, enhanced safety requirements and established higher physical fitness standards. Expenditures for Fiscal Year 1993 are estimated to be $11.5 million to include the transition cost. ADDITIONAL SUPPORT BREAKDOWN Mr. Bevill. Please provide a breakdown of the specific tasks and funding associated with the "Additional Support" activity in Fiscal Year 1991, Fiscal Year 1992 and Fiscal Year 1993. Maj Gen McFadden. The "Additional Support" breakdown is as follows: ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TASKS AND FUNDING (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 Support Services Contract 5.7 7.4 8.5 Chicago Field Office S&S Staff 1.2 1.2 1.2 Headquarters Physical Security Upgrade Technical Assistance .4 . 4 . 3 Technical Support to Headquarters and Field Assistance 4.5 3.7 2.9 Information Security Research Center -0- .3 .4 Technical Security Research Center .6 .7 .7 12.4 13.7 14.0 ANNUAL REPORT OF SECURITY EVALUATIONS Mr. Bevill. Please characterize the results of security evaluations conducted at DOE sites during the last year. Mr. Podonsky. During FY 1991 the Office of Security Evaluations completed seven comprehensive inspections, six safeguards and security readiness reviews, and six special studies across the DOE complex. Noteworthy improvements were made this year in the DOE safeguards and security posture. Substantial progress has been made in the areas of personnel security, special nuclear material control and accountability documentation, and resolution of outstanding policy issues. In other areas such as the reinvestigation program, document control and inventory, and overall program management and oversight, much progress is still required. While special nuclear material is being protected at all inspected facilities, protection is often provided by costly measures requiring additional protective force positions. -The degree of protection assurance provided for classified matter is inconsistent. Some sites conduct programs that fully satisfy protection requirements while other programs provide limited assurance that security interests are adequately protected. Noticeably absent in the overall improvement in safeguards and security posture is an improvement in safeguards and security management and oversight. The system lacks an integrated approach to planning and implementation of the total program. The lack of integration is reflected in the inconsistent quality of the programs and the persistence of costly, manpower-intensive solutions. The underlying cause of these weaknesses is inadequate program management and oversight at all-levels. In summary, some specific findings across the complex included: The planning required to implement and maintain comprehensive, cost-effective programs has not been completed. Policy issues continue to be identified, however, a process is in place to resolve these issues as they are discovered. The survey program suffers from a lack of technical expertise and management commitment. Excessive processing times still exist in the personnel security program, especially in. the reinvestigation area. Effective Safeguards and Security Management and Oversight is not consistently provided. Inspected facilities maintained a viable protection posture against diversion or theft of special nuclear material b outsiders and some have substantially improved y their protection against the insider. Physical security systems had deficiencies in quality assurance, training and maintenance. Material control and accountability documentation has improved, but some program shortcomings remain. Balanced, consistent, cost-efficient protection of special nuclear material is not provided at all facilities. Shortcomings were observed in document accountability. Computer security policy weaknesses have been identified, although current procedures are functional. Protective forces perform well in protecting special nuclear material from the outsider threat. Assurance that protection needs are met across the DOE is not provided by the current program for protection of classified matter. SITE IMPLEMENTATION Mr. Bevill. What system is used to determine that sites have implemented the recommendations provided by the Office of Security Evaluations? Mr. Podonsky. The Office of Security Evaluations does not make recommendations. We identify strengthens and weaknesses of safeguards and security programs at Headquarters and the various field sites. These findings, which are referenced to specific DOE Orders and Standards and Criteria, are shared with the Office of Security Affairs, which is responsible for safeguards and security policy promulgation for the Department of Energy. A Memorandum of Understanding exists between the Office of Security Evaluations and the Office of Safeguards and Security providing coordination of inspection activities, including the tracking and resolution of all deficiencies identified in our inspection results and assessment efforts. To further elaborate on our procedures to follow what is happening across the DOE complex, the Office of Security Evaluations, through utilization of various databases and the facility officer program, track the life-cycle and resolution of findings and policy issues. Where additional oversight of the resolution of findings is appropriate, the Office of Security Evaluations performs a Safeguards and Security Readiness Review (short-notice, limited scope inspection). This review mechanism enables complete follow-up for resolution of findings and issues. The Facility Officer Program tracks trends and patterns at specific DOE sites by having staff members informed of all safeguards and security related activities at assigned sites. Facility Officers' reports detail changes in the site's program, any potential problem areas, and significant documents or activities which would affect safeguards and security. The Office of Security Evaluations tracks trends and patterns of DOE-wide safeguards and security deficiencies using the Safeguards and Security Issues Information System. This system maintains the status of all our inspection findings and is utilized for the office program planning activities. The Policy Issues Tracking System is a computerized system which is designed to track the resolution of policy and/or management issues identified during inspection and evaluation activities. The system retains a history of resolution activities and correspondence concerning each policy issue. All issues are tracked through final resolution. As I have described, the Office of Security Evaluations has several mechanisms, whose functions when combined, effectively track trends and patterns in safeguards and security. When these trends and patterns are studied and analyzed, reports are issued which comprehensively delineate deficiencies and/or exemplary practices across the Department. QUANTIFYING RESULTS Mr. Bevill. Please quantify the number of recommendations made and implemented by each site investigated in FY 1990, FY 1991 and FY 1992. Mr. Podonsky. The Office of Security Evaluations does not make recommendations. We identify strengthens and weaknesses of safeguards and security programs at Headquarters and the various field sites. These findings, which are referenced to specific DOE Orders and Standards and Criteria, are shared with the Office of Security Affairs, which is responsible for safeguards and security policy promulgation for the Department of Energy. Through the various databases utilized and the facility officer program, findings and policy issues are tracked through to resolution. Where and when appropriate, the Office of Security Evaluations performs a Safeguard s and Security Readiness Review (short-notice, limited scope inspection). This review mechanism enables complete follow-up for resolution of findings and issues. Since October 1, 1989, the Office of Security Evaluations has conducted nineteen comprehensive inspections, with four more planned this year,.eleven Safeguards and Security Readiness Reviews, with six more planned this year. Inspections during this time-frame have resulted in 588 findings in the following topical areas: Computer Security, 94 findings; Information Security, 205 findings; Material Control and Accountability, 73 findings; Physical Security Systems, 78 findings; Protective Forces, 43 findings; Personnel Security, 34 findings; Safeguards and Security Survey Program, 35 findings; and Protection Program Planning, 26 findings. By DOE Orders and Memoranda of Understanding, the Office of Security Affairs has the responsibility to ensure that recommendations required to address findings are brought to closure. Follow-up on the closure of findings is accomplished through contractor self-assessment, field office surveys, and the Office of Safeguards and Security's program surveys. Program Secretarial Officers are also responsible for self-assessments; and the Office of Security Evaluations provides independent follow-up through Comprehensive Inspections and Safeguards and Security Readiness Reviews. SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS Mr. Bevill. Describe the most significant accomplishments of the Office in FY 1990 and FY 1991. How has the security of the Department been-improved? Mr. Podonsky. The most significant accomplishment of Office of Security Evaluations is the increase in the attention the complex is paying to safeguards and security and not simply to "getting ready" for an inspection. With the perspective gained by studying our inspections and field surveys covering the-past four or five years, I believe that the security of the Department has improved. Under Admiral Watkins, managers now understand that safeguards and security need attention and follow through at all sites. However, there are many areas which still require improvement, especially in the overall DOE management of safeguards and security programs. Many of the specific findings on inspections and surveys are symptoms of poor management at higher levels of the program rather than failures of local implementation. Secretary Watkins has moved strongly to emphasize the responsibility of his Program Secretarial Officers for safeguards and security matters in SEN 6D-91. The Office of Security Evaluations has begun to see some of the fruit of this emphasis, and we believe that such efforts will produce needed improvements in management practices at the field offices and at DOE Headquarters. During FY 1990 and 1991 the Office of Security Evaluations completed fifteen Comprehensive Inspections and seven Safeguards and Security Readiness Reviews. There were six special studies which examined the classified Work For Others Program, radiological sabotage, intrusion detection systems, technical surveillance countermeasures, use of tamper-indicating devices, and inventory verification/confirmation programs. These special studies resulted in the Department of Energy revising existing policy and writing new policies in order to facilitate field implementation. In the case of radiological sabotage and the classified Work For Others Program, the Under Secretary directed the formulation of task groups comprised of numerous program offices in order to rapidly address the policy void in these areas. PERSONNEL SECURITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM Mr. Bevill. How many positions are included in the Personnel Security Assurance Program? How often are these positions reinvestigated? Maj Gen McFadden. Currently, 10,493 positions have been identified as Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP) positions. The reinvestigation program for these individuals consists of an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Limited Background Investigation after 5 years, a National Agency Check with Credit (NACC) after 10 and 15 years, and a Limited Background Investigation after 20 years followed by an NACC conducted every 5 years thereafter. Individuals in PSAP positions will also complete an SF-86 and have a credit check and medical assessment conducted annually. SECURITY CLEARANCES Mr. Bevill. What attempts are being made to reduce the number and levels of clearances throughout the Department? Maj Gen McFadden. We are in the process of reviewing the level of access to classified information that an "L" access authorization will allow. Under consideration is allowing such an access authorization to permit access up to and including Secret Restricted Data. This change will result in a significant reduction in the number of "Q" access authorizations that are required to meet program needs, with a concomitant reduction in the numbers of background investigations that will be needed. It is also anticipated that the decrease in funding for Defense Programs activities for Fiscal Year 1993 will result in lowered numbers of requests for security clearances. Programmatic changes that have taken place at the Richland Operations Office have resulted in the downgrading of many "Q" access authorizations to "L" access authorizations. This will not only reduce the number of background investigations required for the initial clearance, but will eliminate the need for Limited Background Investigation which we use for reinvestigations. The Limited Background Investigations will be substituted by the less costly National Agency Check with Credit. Mr. Bevill. Provide by field office and facility the number and types of clearances held by DOE employees, contractors, and other Federal employees for Fiscal Year 1991 and Fiscal Year 1992. Maj Gen McFadden. There are approximately 174,000 clearances currently held by DOE employees, contractors, and other Federal employees. Current information will be provided for the record. *****NOTE: CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1991 CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1992 NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY ***** CHARTS ARE ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT