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博伦先生。总统先生，为了协助外交委员会和全部参议院委员情报已经对美国情报监测该条约的合规性的能力进行了详尽的审查。
Today the Intelligence Committee voted unanimously to issue a report on this subject, which addresses such issues as: The effectiveness of U.S. National Technical Means, START cooperative measures, including telemetry provisions and the on-site inspection regime; the ability of U.S. intelligence to detect potentially significant violations of the treaty; the interpretation and implementation of the treaty and related documents, as well as the Lisbon Protocol to START and associated letters; and the counterintelligence and security implications of the treaty.
委员会公开报告的副本已发送给参议院的每个成员。还欢迎会员检查我们的详细分类报告，该报告可在情报委员会的办公室中进行审查。
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the committee's report on the capability of the United States to monitor compliance with the START Treaty be printed in the国会记录在我的讲话结束时。
There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in theRecord， 如下：
1991年7月31日，经过九年的谈判，美国和苏联签署了有关减少和限制战略进攻武器（Start）的条约，并与相关的附件，协议，理解及相关协议及其相关协议。1992年5月23日，前苏联在其领土上使用核武器的共和国 - 俄罗斯，白俄罗斯，哈萨克斯坦和乌克兰 - 签署了《里斯本议定书》的开始条约，新国家共同承担了该协议的义务古老的苏联。
The key features of the START Treaty are a numerical limit of 6,000 warheads on 1,600 deployed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and heavy bomber delivery vehicles; a sublimit of 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBMs; a limit of 1,100 mobile ICBM warheads; and an overall throw-weight limit of 3,600 metric tons. The Treaty provides for extensive on-site inspection and other cooperative means of verification, and requires the transmission and exchange of unencrypted telemetry for all ICBM and SLBM flight tests.
参议院外交关系委员会正式责任在全面参议院采取行动之前就所有条约。参议院情报选择委员会已准备好报告，以通过对外交关系委员会和参议院作为对监测和反情报问题的整体提供，以支持这一过程。金博宝正规网址
该报告是委员会在过去九年中的工作的高潮，以监测起点的进度。该委员会经常审查了起始进度，并在其年度情报授权法案中解决了开始监视能力，并向谈判者和其他高级官员对验证问题表示了观点。金博宝正规网址
为了准备参议院对条约批准的建议和同意，委员会工作人员举行了三名在纪录的工作人员简报；审查了数百个文件，包括有关美国遵守开始规定和中央情报局副主任的符合开始规定和书面声明的美国能力的国家情报估算；并收到了记录的数百个正式问题的答案。委员会的工作人员还检查了相关的美国监测操作，以获得有关情报界如何收集以及其分析师如何使用，对其他国家遵守美国签署的武器控制协议的信息的更详细的第一手知识。
On July 22, 1992, the Committee held a closed hearing on the START Treaty, its implementation and its counterintelligence and security implications. Testimony was taken at this hearing from the Honorable Linton Brooks, U.S. Negotiator for Strategic Offensive Arms; the Honorable Manfred Eimer, Assistant Director for Verification and Intelligence, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Mr. Douglas MacEachin, Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Arms Control; Ms. Nina Stewart, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures; Mr. Lee Minichiello, Deputy Director for Strategic Arms Control and Compliance, Department of Defense; and Mr. Frank LoTurco, Deputy Director for Counterintelligence, the on-Site Inspection Agency, Department of Defense.
On July 29, 1992, the Committee held a closed hearing on U.S. monitoring capabilities and the risks and implications of violations by the other Parties to the Treaty. At this hearing the Committee took testimony from Mr. MacEachin; Dr. Larry Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs; and Major General Gary L. Curtin, USAF, Deputy Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (Deputy J-5) for International Negotiations, the Joint Staff.
该委员会还收到了对记录的许多问题的回答，该记录在七月听证会后提交给行政部门。
Throughout the Committee's efforts, express in the United States Intelligence Community have provided generously their time and insight. Their National Intelligence Estimate on U.S. capabilities to monitor the START Treaty is a detailed and honest analysis of the strengths and limitations of U.S. monitoring capabilities. The Committee was especially pleased to find in that Estimate a straightforward discussion of differences between agencies on some major issues.
The culmination of the Committee's effort is a classified report of over 160
页面详细介绍了验证方案，美国收集和分析能力，合作措施，逃避场景，激励措施/抑制逃避合规性，反情报问题和实施问题。金博宝正规网址
The following are key unclassified findings from the classified Report.
The Intelligence Community played a significant role in all stages of the START negotiations, probably a greater role than it has in any prior arms treaty negotiation. Intelligence Community personnel provided the negotiators with background and Community views on key issues, and helped develop the verification measures included in the Treaty--including the provisions regarding telemetry from ballistic missile flight-tests.
委员会同意中央情报和其他情报社区官员的判决，``[w]some会有问题的领域，我们有信心可以监视最多条约的各个方面。[强调。]参议院成员应该理解，美国情报对监测非部署的移动洲际弹道机等领域的信心将不足以备受信心与巡航导弹和携带它们的重型轰炸机有关的规定。
The chief U.S. START negotiator and other policy officials assured the Committee that despite these limitations on U.S. monitoring capabilities, `[t]he Administration remains convinced that . . . the START treaty as a whole remains effectively verifiable.' A major reason for Executive branch officials' confidence is that they do not see Russia as either capable of cheating or motivated to do so. As the Director of Central Intelligence stated:
`总体而言，我们强烈怀疑，鉴于社会，政治和经济的范围，顺便期在近期或可能在条约生命的一生中能够启动并成功执行复杂的作弊计划破坏，军事和国防工业领导人的影响力减少，以及更具侵略性的新闻和立法监督活动的出现。尽管我们不能排除这种可能性，但我们认为，新独立的国家，地方或军事当局中的一个或多个不太可能会试图规避该条约以保持某些战略性的军事能力。[参议院情报委员会声明，1992年7月29日，第1页。7.]]
Policy makers have also been influenced by the Joint Staff's repeated conclusion that the military significance of the risk to U.S. security associated with the Intelligence Community's monitoring uncertainties is low.
在the Committee's view, START reflects the greatly diminished hostility between the United States and the USSR that characterized the last years of the Gorbachev regime. This is apparent in both the achievements and the limitations of START regarding monitoring and verification. Thus, the provisions regarding telemetry, technical exhibitions and on-site inspection call for a level of openness that was all but unimaginable in the 1980s. The United States was willing to accede to both U.S. military and Soviet concerns regarding security and flexibility for bomber, naval and cruise missile forces, rather than making monitoring and verification its first priority in all cases. This reflected not only the importance of those competing priorities, but also the accurate sense that the Soviet Union is no longer the military threat that it was in the past.
The START Treaty is not perfectly monitorable. There are both residual uncertainties regarding Soviet/CIS data on non-deployed missiles and also cheating scenarios--which may be difficult to implement and offer only small advantages to the perpetrator, but do appear feasible if CIS or Russian forces and the industrial facilities that support them were sufficiently determined.
But the USSR is gone. Strategic arms logistic chains that once crossed Soviet Republic boundaries now must cross the borders of independent states. Economic decline and reform in the former Soviet Union have combined with the rise of these new states to make major arms development programs increasingly difficult to pursue. It appears unlikely, moreover, that even an aggressive, nationalistic regime in Russia could restore the old order to the degree necessary to significantly increase the prospects for successful cheating on the scale necessary to affect the strategic balance.
行政部门承认苏联过去的利用或违反军备控制协议的记录，但现在期待一个新时代，如回应记录的问题时所述：
“不管前苏联再保险的动机gime, we have every reason to believe that the policies of the former Soviet Union are not representative of the policies of the states which have replaced it. President Yeltsin and his counterparts in other former Soviet Republics have renounced confrontation and the quest for military domination and have expressed their support for the rule of law in international relations * * * Even though not all of our previous concerns have been fully resolved, we expect that the demise of the Soviet Union will lead to a new era of compliance with arms control agreements.'
The Senate Intelligence Committee has closely watched U.S. efforts to ensure that Russia will live up to arms control obligations of the former Soviet Union, including the CFE Treaty that recently entered into force. The Committee considers Russian cooperation on this issue and on measures to guard against the export of sensitive nuclear and missile materials and technology to be important indicators of that country's reliability as an arms control partner.
此外，该委员会仍然非常关注俄罗斯的前（也许是继续） - 生物武器计划可能表明，顺式/俄罗斯军方能够违反俄罗斯平民当局的意愿，或借助至少一部分领导的知识或支持。最近的美国 - 英国 - 俄罗斯联合声明就信息和访问的生物遗址交流（包括俄罗斯的非军事场所）是一个积极的发展，这是一个积极的发展。
因此，苏联继任国家构成的威胁急剧下降，这对于委员会对美国开始监视能力的普遍信心至关重要。如果苏联仍然是过去的联合，积极进取和军事上的有效力量，那么美国当前和将来的监测能力局限性以及合理的作弊场景的存在将引起更多关注。
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美国将依靠ca的组合pabilities--including imagery, signals intelligence, human intelligence, open-source information and cooperative measures--to monitor compliance with the provisions of the START agreement. U.S. monitoring will be aided substantially by START's verification provisions, and especially by those that require each side to transmit unencrypted telemetry, to provide telemetry tapes and interpretive data, and to permit the visual inspection and measurement of each type and variant of missiles.
While important improvements are planned in some intelligence programs, declining budgets will cause difficulties in others. START's verification provisions, if they are obeyed, may permit cost savings in U.S. intelligence systems. But the Committee's FY 1993 intelligence budget authorization actions reflect its concern that U.S. intelligence capabilities remain fully capable of monitoring compliance with START and other arms control treaties.
（1）在当前做法下，美国的情报可以监测具有虚拟确定性的部署基于筒仓的ICBM，SLBM和重型轰炸机的总数。情报界还认为，它可以充分监视部署的铁路和公路摩托车冰i ic。
(2) The Intelligence Community has high confidence in its monitoring capabilities with respect to many, but not all, START-limited ballistic missile characteristics. Its capabilities to detect and correctly interpret efforts to misrepresent those technical characteristics are judged to be excellent.
(3) The Intelligence Community can monitor with high confidence the number of RVs that should be credited to ballistic missiles (as a result of flight-tests and/or the attributions for existing types of missiles provided in the START Memorandum of Understanding) and, therefore, the aggregate number of RVs on SLBMs and at least silo-based ICBMs. The START provisions on telemetry play a large role in ensuring that RV releases and simulated RV releases can be monitored confidently.
（4）情报界应该能够高度信心实现所有涉及计数飞机的监视任务。
(5) The Intelligence Community has high monitoring confidence regarding conversion or elimination of ICBMs, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers. U.S. capabilities to detect and correctly interpret efforts to illegally restore converted or eliminated launchers are also judged to be high.
Monitoring non-deployed mobile missiles is a significant task, due to their potential use in force augmentation and refire operations. The Intelligence Community's overall ability to monitor non-deployed mobile ICBMs is questionable.
在开始谈判中，美国谈判人员强烈要求在固体火箭汽车生产工厂进行外围门户连续监测（PPCM）的权利，并需要对所有此类火箭电机进行核算。苏联人抵制这种方法，美国最终放弃了B-1和B-2轰炸机的让步。
这种权衡的优点超出了委员会的权限，但是缺乏固体火箭监控将在某种程度上显然会限制美国验证符合Start的移动导弹规定的能力。美国首席谈判代表向委员会承认这一点，如下所示：
“与1990年12月的美国提案相比，最终的开始条约 * * *提供了更少的信心，即过多的移动冰或其固体火箭电动机未被存储或在未宣布的设施中汇集或组装。”[参议院情报委员会声明，1992年7月22日，第1页。23.]]
The Director of Central Intelligence has stated that `we can neither confirm nor refute the Soviet-supplied data on total nondeployed missile inventories' and that `it is possible that some undeclared missiles have been stored at unidentified facilities.' Putting an upper bound on the covert missile risk, the Director stated that `we judge that the Soviets did not maintain a large-scale program to store several hundred or more undeclared, nondeployed strategic ballistic missiles.' [Senate Foreign Relations Committee statement, June 30, 1992, p. 5.]
参谋长认为，情报界情景的军事意义将是最小的，但拒绝说明有多少个秘密部署的导弹将在军事上具有重要意义，相反，他们几乎没有军事动机来诉诸作弊。'该委员会本来会更喜欢一个分析过程，在该过程中，JCS指定了军事意义的类型和作弊水平，最好是在情报界发布其可行的苏联/CIS作弊场景之前。
情报委员会分享了董事的观点，即涉及可能的秘密生产和移动洲际弹道机及其发射器的作弊场景特别令人担忧。该委员会认为，秘密，非部署的移动导弹的可能存在必须仍然是美国情报的重要目标。
U.S. intelligence alone cannot reliably monitor the number of re-entry vehicles actually on a deployed missile. This is illustrated by the Director of Central Intelligence's acknowledgment that the Intelligence Community could not determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of the Soviet declaration of September, 1990, that all deployed SS-N-18 SLBMs carried only three RVs. But the right to conduct ten RV on-site inspections per year will help U.S. intelligence to judge, over time, at least whether silo-based ICBMs are being illegally uploaded.
Some of the Intelligence Community's CIS cheating scenarios involved ballistic missiles that had previously been `downloaded' (i.e., declared to carry fewer RVs than would normally be attributed to them under START counting rules, as the Soviets did with the SS-N-18 SLBM) and might then be `uploaded' to carry more RVs than the declared number. These scenarios varied in feasibility, in marginal benefit to a perpetrator, and in likelihood of detection.
联合工作人员向委员会保证，参谋长联合负责人评估了这些情况的军事意义，并得出结论，鉴于美国的军事能力，对顺式部队几乎没有任何边缘利益，因此，此类计划的理由几乎没有理由被尝试。但是，委员会指出，总是有一些风险，即一个国家从美国的角度与理性的军事规划无关的原因，违反武器控制条约。
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尽管可以很容易地计算重型轰炸机，但符合涉及其技术特征或武器负荷的开始量，更难以监控。关于ALCM的规定也更难
监视器。其中一些困难源于决定不将条约的遥测规定应用于重型轰炸机或巡航导弹。
行政部门官员认为没有警报。正如他们向委员会指出的那样，这一点上记录了一个问题；
“这些困难一直是公认的。在part, they result from our longstanding view that, because heavy bombers are inherently stabilizing, and because they play a more important role in the U.S. strategic force structure than in the Russian, we should give greater weight to avoiding intrusiveness and preserving operational flexibility for such bombers than to improvements in the verification regime.'
因此，正如科廷将军通知委员会的那样，联合工作人员认为，涉及重型轰炸机和ALCMS * * *的作弊场景通常构成了极为重大侵犯的风险。重型轰炸机和ALCM是缓慢的传单，几乎没有引起惊喜攻击的潜力。
JCS关于监测关于海上发射的巡航导弹的政治协议的观点在对监视困难的认识方面相似：
`* * * the Chairman and the Joint Staff have little military concern about SLCM monitoring. The U.S. has an advantage in SLCM and ALCM technology which the START negotiators effectively protected. The U.S. position throughout the START negotiations was consistent; SLCMs are not strategic weapons and therefore should not be limited by the START Treaty. Further, the United States was unable to identify any verifiable restrictions on SLCMs. From a military perspective, the need to preserve U.S. sea-launched cruise missile capability, especially the non-nuclear capability demonstrated in the Persian Gulf, outweighed any concern about a counterpart threat from the Russians. Thus, while we acknowledge the monitoring challenge brought about by the SLCM agreement, the Chairman and the Joint Staff strongly support the balance struck in the START Treaty.' [Senate Intelligence Committee statement, July 29, 1992, p. 12.]
在a number of areas, verification concerns were sacrificed in order to provide greater security or flexibility for U.S. military programs.
(1) The United States acceded to the Soviet refusal to allow perimeter portal continuous monitoring of solid rocket motor plants. Such monitoring might have greatly improved U.S. monitoring confidence regarding undeclared mobile missiles. Instead, under START such monitoring is limited to mobile ICBM final assembly plants.
(2) The United States accepted relatively low levels of monitoring confidence with respect to the range and arming of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), as well as the number of ALCMs actually carried by a heavy bomber.
（3）尽管起步有义务使当事方从导弹飞行测试中广播遥测数据并交换此类广播的磁带，并且在大多数情况下，当事方禁止当事各方干扰对此类广播的监视，但美国获得了一些加密豁免并同意了苏联对某些封装豁免的愿望。委员会感到满意，这些豁免不会为条约监控造成重大问题。
(4) The United States insisted that limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) should not be contained in START or, therefore, be subject to START's verification provisions. The Soviet Union took a similar stand regarding the Backfire bomber, the limitations on which were also kept out of the formal Treaty and thus beyond the reach of START's verification provisions.
The Committee believes that while the START Treaty was drafted with attention to detail and awareness of potential hazards, there may still be a few areas in which the text could lead to compliance disputes. Problems of treaty language interpretation are not unique to START, however, and the Committee believes that there are no START Treaty text problems that are so serious as to require immediate adjustment.
(1) The START provision on penetration aids does not specify the criteria for distinguishing a simulated penetration aid release from a simulated re-entry vehicle (RV) release. This ambiguity could lead to disputes regarding the
number of RVs to be accredited to a missile in a given flight-test.
（2）Start禁止对“隐藏措施”的禁令不适用于“ ICBM基地和部署区域的掩护或隐藏惯例，也不适用于使用环境庇护所进行战略进攻武器。“隐藏措施”和“隐藏习惯”均未定义，因此尚不清楚应允许哪些活动。
(3) Although START includes an Agreed Statement limiting mobile space launchers, it does not specify the extent to which stages for space launch vehicles must differ from first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs in order to avoid being subject to START limits. A compliance issue could arise if a Party developed a space-launch vehicle with a first stage similar to a ballistic missile first stage.
Despite the changes that have taken place in the former Soviet Union, there is a continuing need to guard against Russian or other Parties' use of START inspection rights as a cover for illegal intelligence activity. The Department of Defense On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) and the counterintelligence and security arms of the U.S. armed forces bear the major share of this responsibility.
国防副助理部长的反情报和安全对策向委员会保证，在开始检查期间将采用《 INF条约》中汲取的经验教训的成果，以进行监测和反情报威胁。示例包括：针对参与开始过程的美国护送人员和人员的反情报培训；严格控制俄罗斯起步团队的联系和运动；检查带入美国的俄罗斯设备和个人行李；并进行对敏感设施的模拟检查，以帮助确定哪些设备和信息可能会受到保护。
The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) will have a wide variety of START-related counterintelligence responsibilities, many of which it has for other treaties as well. The Naval Investigative Service (NIS) does not have the extensive experience that OSIA and Air Force OSI have gained under prior arms control treaties. The Committee expects OSIA and the Department of Defense to ensure that NIS meets its counterintelligence responsibilities under START.
美国国防部副部长收购已分配ed to the relevant DoD Services and Agencies the responsibility to develop inspection and information protection plans for each Service's or Agency's facilities that are subject to on-site inspection. The Defense Department has also developed a Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP) to provide recommendations regarding security needs or issues at those sites.
More than 60 mock inspections and Staff Assistance Visits have been conducted by OSIA, with Air Force and Navy participation, at installations subject to START inspections. In addition, the DTIRP is assisting the government and contractor community in providing counterintelligence and security countermeasures support for START. The DTIRP has also assisted contractor facilities in limiting security countermeasures to information that truly requires protection, thus helping to reduce security costs.
该委员会专门询问了美国工业设施的安全性，在美国工业设施中，专有和机密信息可能面临风险。最小化成本和由于特殊访问访问而导致的敏感信息丢失的关键要素（可以在美国任何设施中要求）将是利用开始规定中内置的灵活性 - 允许聚会在此之前花费足够的时间批准请求，进行适当的现场准备；为了使各方根据案例定义访问的范围和限制；为了解决解决条约问题的替代方法；并且，如有必要，以拒绝请求。
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition has issued DoD guidance on the process to be utilized in evaluating requests for Special Access Visits at DoD facilities and DoD contractors. The primary emphasis is to ensure that the Defense Department can quickly identify and assess any sensitive activities at the challenged site and that security concerns are addressed prior to a U.S. Government decision on whether to grant the Special Access Visit request. By the time the Treaty enters into force, all Services and Defense Agencies will have incorporated this guidance into their START implementation plans.
在response to Committee concerns regarding procedures for handling requests for Special Access Visits at private facilities not involved in DoD contracts, the Executive branch states:
`If a Party to START were to make such a request, the United States would expect to consult closely with the private firm involved and,
consistent with Constitutional protections, if the government and private firm were to agree to such a visit,procedures would be worked out with the facility and the Party to START on a case-by-case basis, depending on the nature of the facility. Given the nature of the START Treaty and its verification regime, we do not expect the situation suggested by your question to arrive.' [Emphasis added.]
The Committee urged the Administration to develop policy and procedures for handling such cases, and was pleased by the assurance that `[w]e fully share your view that START should not put the proprietary secrets of U.S. companies in Jeopardy.' The Department of State response added:
`在国家安全委员会工作人员的指导下，政府将为处理特殊访问访问的内部程序准备。这些程序将成为我们开始实施的正式程序的一部分。我们预计他们将在Start的进入之前发行。我们设想的系统将向适当的政府机构分配特定的责任，以审查政府设施，政府承包商和私人设施的特殊访问请求请求。我们将在对特殊访问访问请求的审议中明确考虑专有利益以及安全。”[1992年8月18日，国务卿穆林斯助理部长穆林斯（Mullins）给参议员鲍伦（Boren）和默科夫斯基（Murkowski）。
国防部希望履行其反情报和安全义务，首先重新提高任务和重新编程资源。但是，对于可能会特殊访问访问可能会产生的安全费用，存在不确定性。每个国防部的代理机构和服务都是为了在其设施中进行特殊访问访问的潜在要求，以“谨慎的程度”。可能需要进一步的政策指导，以确保由于安全访问的潜力而不必采取不必要和昂贵的安全措施。
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该委员会发现，奥西亚已经准备好在前苏联进行现场检查，并在美国的其他当事方检查员的陪同下，由于其与其他军备控制条约的经验，并且很长一段时间必须找到它和火车人员。
The Committee is pleased that OSIA has secured the services of some of the U.S. Government's finest Russian linguists. It is also pleased with the successful creation of gateway facilities in Frankfurt, Germany, and Yokota, Japan, and with the cooperation of other U.S. agencies in providing transportation and other support OSIA's mission. OSIA informed the Committee that all its manpower requirements, funding and logistical support to execute this mission have been identified.
乌克兰和俄罗斯可能会选择不在美国在犹他州Propontory的Thiokol维持和平人员的第一阶段最终集会设施中建立外围门户连续监测（PPCM）。但是，美国政府打算行使其权利，有权在乌克兰的Pavlograd机构以及任何可能建立的新移动ICBM最终集会设施中建立PPCM。
The Special Assistant to the DCI for Arms Control described to the Committee the types of analytic product that the Intelligence Community will produce to assist policy makers who must determine whether START is being obeyed. These products will parallel those produced on the implementation of other arms control treaties.
Byelarus、哈萨克斯坦、俄罗斯和乌克兰都是facing severe financial problems, but the Executive branch believes that the each of the Parties is capable of paying the costs of complying with START. In response to an informal suggestion from Ukraine to alter cost allocation provisions, the United States reminded Ukraine that it is the obligation of the four states that are successors to the former Soviet Union to work together on a formula for allocating costs. As there has been no formal proposal from Ukraine to modify the provisions of the Treaty, the Administration declined to speculate on what the U.S. Government reaction to such a proposal might be. The Administration is considering, however, a request for technical and financial assistance in the dismantlement of certain ICBM silos.
在1992年5月23日的里斯本议定书中，俄罗斯，白俄罗斯，哈萨克斯坦和乌克兰同意在开始条约下共同承担将属于苏联的权利和责任。由于摩擦
这些共和国中的一些以及前苏联的政治和经济通道现状，委员会认为，实施该条约时可能会出现一些问题。最有可能出现的问题不是欺骗计划，而是由于该条约前苏联当事方内部或之间的经济或政治困难。
Some of the costs associated with START Treaty compliance could be onerous, particularly for the non-Russian republics. For example, Ukraine will be responsible for destroying hundreds of ICBMs (unless it sends the missiles back to Russia) and missile silos, and also for hosting U.S. inspectors and portal monitors. Ukraine has indicated that it may have difficulty meeting its obligations on schedule and has asked the United States for financial and technical assistance. The deteriorating situation in Russian shipyards due to lack of funding could produce similar delays in the dismantlement of ballistic missile submarines.
Economics difficulties could prompt defense conversion activities that might raise START monitoring or compliance problems. Russia and Ukraine have both expressed interest in converting ICBMs to space launch vehicles. Attempts to use mobile missiles or launchers as the basis for space launch vehicles could cause monitoring difficulties for the Intelligence Community--and raise compliance issues as well, if the space launch vehicles were not clearly different from the missiles or launchers on which they were based (as required in START). The chief U.S. negotiator commented at one Committee hearing that `the Treaty is not perhaps as clear as you might like it on that point.'
由于新的前苏联州之间的摩擦或协调不足，美国的INF检查团队遭受了两次延误。行政部门预计在开始实施时不会发生任何类似的事件，但是委员会认为，无故障的开始实施可能取决于前苏联当事方维持亲切关系和解决无关起点问题的争议的能力。金博宝正规网址
前苏联政党之间仍没有正式的安排来观察和执行前苏联的起始义务。这四个州还必须决定如何分配开始实施的成本以及在联合合规委员会（JCIC）上分配成本。
同样，行政部门仍在与其他四个方进行工作和达成JCIC框架内协议的条约程序的其他四方讨论。目前尚不清楚所有四个前苏联当事方是否必须批准每个JCIC的决定，或者只有立即受到每个决定影响的决定。
新州之间的紧张局势可能会导致重大的实施问题。在乌克兰，民族主义的冲动已经使实施更加困难。因此，尽管乌克兰可以将洲际弹道导弹转移到俄罗斯联合会销毁俄罗斯联合会，但它表明它希望在其自身领土上摧毁这些导弹，这将是昂贵且耗时的，并可能造成环境危害。乌克兰还寻求否决基于其土壤的核武器的否决权，这很复杂，可能会延迟与俄罗斯在破坏此类系统方面达成协议。
If Ukraine asserts increasing control over CIS military assets on its territory, compliance issues may arise regarding either START or the NPT. There are indications, for example, that Ukraine may seek control over the CIS heavy bombers based on its territory. If Ukraine intends to convert these bombers for use in conventional roles, this would raise issues regarding compliance with President Kravchuk's letter associated with the Lisbon Protocol.
从长远来看，遵守起始可能有助于减轻苏联成功的较大国家之间的冲突前景。条约，里斯本议定书和相关文件将签署人授予俄罗斯部署的战略武器的大幅减少，并在乌克兰，白俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦彻底消除了此类武器。里斯本议定书还承诺非俄罗斯政党遵守《核不扩散条约》，这是针对前苏联解体引起的最大关注之一。最后，由于西方国家对武器控制的重要性，《起点条约》提供了一个舞台，在该舞台上，四个苏联后继国家可以彼此和美国合作。
行政部门希望达成协议among the former Soviet republics regarding START implementation could be reached likely before the Senate acts on the Treaty. The Committee urges the Acting Secretary of State to give this matter his personal attention and to impress upon the other Parties to START the high priority that the Senate and the U.S. Government as a whole put upon achieving agreement regarding implementation of the START Treaty, the Lisbon Protocol and its associated letters.
除了呼吁在开始七年的武器减少期间和之后进行更深入的美国和俄罗斯武器减少期，布什·耶尔辛（Bush-Yeltsin破坏/转换要求。根据行政部门的说法，根据共同理解条款签署的条约不是要替换或与开始合并，而是在开始并存。一旦两项条约生效，美国和俄罗斯联邦将有义务符合这两项条约。
该委员会保留对行政部门预期新条约将大部分采用的总体开始验证制度的判决，这足以监督俄罗斯遵守新条约的限制。一旦将新条约签署并提交咨询并同意批准，参议院就必须自行判断。
可能关注的一个要素是放松导弹RV下载规则。不仅在共同理解下下载不适用至降低的整体起始上限，而且在下载每枚导弹的两个以上RV时，RV平台被破坏和替换的起始要求将不适用于关节理解下的减少。
While the U.S. Government has viewed the RV platform provision as little more than a confidence building measure, the deletion of that provision in the follow-on treaty may lessen U.S. confidence that downloaded missiles cannot be rapidly `uploaded' in a cheating or breakout scenario. Given the lack of limits on the amount of downloading that may be used in the first-stage arms reductions, such confidence could be more important under the follow-on treaty than under START. Eventual compliance with the Joint Understanding's ban on MIRVed ICBMs would, however, make this concern moot.
第二可能的问题是放松重型炸弹武器计数和转换规则。一开始，不需要计算重型轰炸机配备的核武器数量（除了远程ALCM之外）。但是，在共同的理解下，每个重型轰炸机所配备的核武器的实际数量应与整个弹头天花板相对，因此必须受到监控。
The other change in treatment of bombers under the Joint Understanding is the elimination, for up to 100 heavy bombers that were never equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, of the requirement that these bombers be physically altered before they can be removed from START accountability. In place of conversion, the Joint Understanding imposes basing and training limitations to keep these bombers out of the nuclear weapons force. Monitoring compliance with these rules could provide difficult.
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