1991 Congressional HearingsIntelligence and Security
1991 Congressional Hearings-- From the Washington Post, Sept. 7, 1991
[FROM THE WASHINGTON POST, SEPT. 7, 1991] Ex-CIA Covert Chief Indicted
(BY GEORGE LARDNER JR. AND WALTER PINCUS) Clair E. George, former chief of the CIA's covert operations directorate, was indicted yesterday on 10 felony counts accusing him of lying and obstructing congressional as well as grand jury investigations of the Iran-contra scandal.
A federal grand jury returned the indictment after a closed session with prosecutors from Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh's office that lasted almost six hours. The charges were leveled little more than a month before a five-year statute of limitations would have started to come into play, barring prosecution of most of them. Each of the counts carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison and fines of $250,000.
乔治60岁是最高的CIA退伍军人在沃尔什重新激励调查机构官员在努力掩盖伊朗对抗丑闻中的努力中。
在他的律师，乔治发表的声明中，现在在中央情报局32年后的安全顾问发誓要大力争夺收费。后来，他出现在他贝塞斯达房子的前草坪上，并在持续的政治剥削中被称为典当。
起诉书取决于工商业的主要部分timony of Alan D. Fiers, former chief of the CIA's Central American task force and a one-time top deputy of George. In July, Fiers surprised prosecutors when he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of illegally withholding information from Congress and pledged to cooperate fully in winding up Walsh's 4 1/2 year investigation.
Prosecutors had hoped, in turn, to be able to get George's cooperation in moving against higher-ups who might have been involved in illegally covering up the Reagan administration's worst scandal. According to informed sources, George notified Walsh's office Thursday that he would not cooperate.
George's lawyer, Richard Hibey, said yesterday, `this prosecution should never have been brought' and went on to describe George's past contributions to the nation's security. Hinting at the kind of defense he plans to make. Hibey said George has `risked his life' and `has not profited one iota' from his service with the CIA. Echoing a theme that has been raised before on behalf of other Iran-contra defendants, the lawyer asserted that George was a victim of `complex and tortuous policy differences between Congress and the Executive Branch.'
10个对乔治源的八个指控涉嫌证词，他给了三个国会委员会，该委员会正在调查伊朗对抗丑闻的早期要素。最后两次计数乔治去年4月在联邦大陪审团之前再次撒谎，因此试图阻挠正义。
As deputy director for operations, George was one of the agency's top four officials and had charge of the CIA's worldwide activities in covert action, intelligence collection and counterintelligence. A favorite of the late CIA director William J. Casey, he held the post from 1984 until December 1987 when he was allowed to resign following criticism of his Iran-contra role by House and Senate investigating committees.
The first three counts against George involve a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Oct. 10, 1986, which inquired about the CIA's knowledge of the shootdown five days earlier of an aircraft carrying military supplies for contra rebels operating in Nicaragua.
根据起诉书，乔治订购了一天的听证会在乔治开幕声明草案中进行改变，以防止披露当时 - 白宫助理奥德洛维斯L.北方正在努力参加努力。
The grand jury also accused George of lying about his knowledge of other Americans involved in the resupply effort, including retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord, who played a role in both the resupply effort and the covert sale of U.S. arms to Iran.
Asked about U.S. citizens who were supporting the resupply flights for the contras, George told senators at the closed hearing that `we were not aware of their identities.' But according to yesterday's indictment, George had met Secord in a high-level staff meeting in the White House Situation Room on Jan. 20, 1986, and knew that Secord was involved with North `in efforts on behalf of the contras.'
The next three counts deal with George's appearance on Oct. 14, 1986, before the House intelligence committee which was also investigating the Oct. 5 shootdown. The indictment accused George again of obstructing a congressional inquiry and making two false statements about his knowledge of individuals involved in the resupply effort.
The third congressional hearing cited in the indictment was held Dec. 3, 1986, by the Senate intelligence committee. There, George was questioned specifically about Secord and said he could not tell the committee what role the general played in the resupply operation.
But the indictment said George had complained about Secord's involvement in the `Iran initiative' to both Casey and to then-White House national security adviser John M. Poindexter shortly after the Jan. 20 meeting with the general.
George is also charged with impeding the investigation by not disclosing that he knew of the diversion of Iranian arms sales profits to the contra cause before the diversion was publicly disclosed on Nov. 25, 1986. Fiers, in pleading guilty last July, said that he told George of the diversion in the late summer of 1986 after being told about it by North.
Another two counts against George involve his repeating to the grand jury some of the alleged false statements he first made at the Oct. 10, 1986, Senate hearing.
-- -- 来自华盛顿邮报，1990年10月10日
[FROM THE WASHINGTON POST, OCT. 10, 1990] CIA Deputy Director Linked to Iran Arms, Testimony Shows
(BY WALTER PINCUS) 托马斯A. Twetton，最近被评为中央情报局的业务副主任，深入参与与伊朗的秘密武器题目，根据国会伊朗 - 反垃圾委员会和前CIA官员的证词。
1985年和1986年的Twetton是副职务，然后是CIA附近的秘密活动的秘密活动，定期与前白宫助理奥德利弗L. North作为原子能机构的“案件官”，处理物流和资金进行初步转移of U.S. arms to Iran.
Twetton's 1987 testimony before congressional Iran-contra investigators was released to the public in 1988, but his name was deleted from the published version because he held a covert operations position. He was identified only by the abbreviation `C/NE,' representing his job at the time as chief of the Near East division.
In his testimony Twetton outlined how he:
Worked to try to prevent then-CIA director William J. Casey from getting involved in an arms-for-hostages scheme using Iranian middleman Manucher Ghorbanifar in the summer of 1985.
Informed North in September 1985 of Ghorbanifar's questionable record in CIA's files.
At North's direction, set up with the Pentagon in January 1986 the first shipments of U.S. TOW antitank missiles that were to gain release of U.S. hostages held in Beirut.
向国防部带来北方信息，即每个武器的价格应该从6,000美元到3,000美元。
Was with North and others when they met with Iranian middlemen in February 1986 in Frankfurt, March 1986 in Paris and April 1986 in Washington.
Briefed former White House national security adviser Robert C. McFarlane prior to McFarlane's secret trip to Tehran in May 1986.
知道北方创造的重叠是通过使用退休的牧师创造的重叠。伊朗武装销售和援助中美洲尼加拉瓜叛乱分子的伊尔伯特·赫基斯·塞德·塞德和商人艾伯特哈基姆。
Twetton testified that although he was aware that excess money was being generated by the arms sales, `it never occurred to me . . . that North was raking it off [for the contras]. That was beyond the pale.'
Twetton's promotion, announced last month and effective Jan. 1, is not subject to Senate approval.
Robert M. Gates, who was Casey's deputy at the CIA for most of the Iran-contra affair, failed to get Senate approval to the Casey's successor, but was named by Bush as deputy national security adviser in the White House.
A handful of other CIA officials, linked to questioned contra activities, took early retirement or were penalized with reprimands or forced retirement when William H. Webster took over as CIA director.
Twetton伊朗门委员会的证词包括several instances where he could not recall events that are still subject to dispute.
He could not, for example, remember a memo written by a CIA colleague in March 1986 that described how Ghorbanifar told North that the Iranian arms sales could be used in Central America for the Nicaraguan rebels.
“好吧，”Twetton说过备忘录。“我不知道我是否看到这一点。如果我有的话，我向你保证，我会认为它就像Ghorbanifar所说的其他一切。
Twetton also testified that he never tried to find out what caused the wide difference in the price charged the Iranians, about $20.5 million for weapons that had cost the CIA $6.5 million.
In the CIA announcement of Twetton's appointment, Webster said he was `very pleased that Tom has accepted this appointment. He has a very distinguished record of service, and I'm fully confident that he will do an outstanding job in leading the operations directorate.'
-- -- From the Washington Post, Jan. 8, 1987
[从华盛顿邮报1月。8,1987] CIA Sought Retroactive Approval
(BY DAN MORGAN AND BOB WOODWARD) In late November 1985, CIA Director William J. Casey and his general counsel, Stanley Sporkin, proposed to the White House an intelligence authorization that would retroactively legalize any `prior actions taken by government officials' in the secret sale of weapons to Iran, according to two sources who have read the document.
When asked by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in a recent closed hearing about the legal reasoning behind the Central Intelligence Agency's proposal, Sporkin testified that the president has constitutional powers to grant pardons and therefore could declare an action legal after the fact.
Sporkin，现在美国法院法官在这里，昨晚在电话采访中确认他已经写了这样的智力令。“我当时给了我的局部信息，这让我得出了得出的结论，我们需要总统发现授权原子能机构的活动，并批准所有正在进行的行动，”他说。
Sources said Sporkin testified before the Senate intelligence committee that it was not unusual in the corporate world for someone in authority to bless an activity retroactively. The alternative, Sporkin told the committee, would be to back date documents, which Sporkin said he would consider improper.
The proposed `finding,' as a presidential authorization for an intelligence action is officially known, was sent by Casey to Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, who was then deputy national security adviser.
President Reagan never signed this draft; a revised version dated Jan. 17, 1986, was signed by the president, secretly authorizing the sale of U.S. weapons to Iran and ordering the CIA not to disclose the operation to Congress, which did'nt learn of it until last November.
Retroactive approval was not included in the Jan. 17 finding that Reagan signed, sources said.
Sporkin关于伊朗武器交易的寻找草案是1985年11月25日的一页订单，该命令表示，“政府官员所采取的事先采取的议案批准”该文件被起草后，当时 - 中央情报局副主任约翰·麦克马洪发现了原子能机构向伊利亚·北部，那时是国家安全委员会的工作人员助手为伊朗向伊朗发运的员工提供了援助试图在黎巴嫩举行的美国人质。
美国制造的导弹首次由以色列向伊朗运送到伊朗，于1985年9月在秘密白宫批准。1986年，在去年11月公开披露之前，在1986年进行了超过2,000个拖车导弹的随后出货量。
草案秩序很好听——docum写的ented in a lengthy but still unreleased report of the Senate intelligence committee--was indicative of what one former CIA official yesterday described as `bad legal advice' provided to Casey by Sporkin and the CIA general counsel's office during the early months of the Iran operation.
Sporkin testified that he wanted to ensure that the CIA was properly protected legally because he understood that the assistance provided North had been authorized by the White House and conformed with Reagan's wishes, according to informed sources. It is unclear whether Casey, who is recuperating from recent brain tumor surgery, was questioned about the document when he appeared before the Senate committee.
It was also learned yesterday that CIA officials at the operational level had `clues' earlier than has been publicly acknowledged that money generated from U.S. arms sales to Iran was moving into nonagency accounts abroad.
已向参议院委员会提供的文件和证词的前CIA官员表示，这一记录中没有迹象表明，中央情报局参与了基金的转移或情报官员知道这笔资金在援助尼加拉瓜政府的反对反叛分子被转移，因为埃德文梅斯三世的律师委员会在11月份表示。
`Every so often there would be a glimpse of money moving into accounts other than CIA accounts,' the former agency official said. `They knew that outside the government, money was going somewhere.'
信息到目前为止已经建议the CIA's first knowledge that funds were being diverted abroad through the arms sales to Iran came early last October. Casey said last month that his first tip about this occurred at that time, when a Canadian business acquaintance, Roy Furmark, told him some of the profits earned by middlemen involved in the arms sales may have been diverted to aid the contras.
The CIA's role in the secret shipment of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986 is detailed in the Senate committee's declassified report. On Monday, the report was caught up in partisan wrangling in the Senate, when Republicans on the intelligence committee were unable to muster enough votes to force its release, despite a plea from the White House..
Overall, according to the source, the report depicts the CIA, as too passive in not maintaining control of U.S. covert operations and relinquishing some of that responsibility to the National Security Council staff. Once Casey gave his backing to the Iranian initiative, the agency began to play an active supporting role.
参议院报告将原子能机构描绘成提供后勤备份，例如建立银行账户，以便偿还金钱偿还美国政府的资金，但显然没有提出关于NSC的隐秘计划的严重问题，直到至少在1986年中旬之前。
The agency's role in the covert Iranian program will be a prime focus of the coming House and Senate special inquiries into the Iran arms sales-contra aid affair. Under the 1989 law that gives Congress oversight of covert actions, the CIA is supposed to provide timely notification of all such clandestine operations; there has been bipartisan criticism of the administration in this episode for at least 10 minutes.
Accordingly to one source familiar with the Senate committee's report, the panel did not determine what happened to the funds raised privately on behalf of the contras. One reason was that the CIA was cut out of this knowledge under the system of middlemen through which the NSC carried out the arms sales to Iran.
-- -- 来自华盛顿邮报，1987年6月25日
[来自华盛顿邮报，1987年6月25日] The Takeover of Stanley Sporkin
(BY MARY MCGRORY) Fans of Stanley Sporkin during his time as the Securities and Exchange Commission's chief enforcer often wondered what happened to him after he followed William J. Casey over the river to Langley and became general counsel for the CIA.
现在，感谢伊朗对抗听证会，他们知道更多。除了幽灵鬼的日子里，他从北北方接受了订单。当1986年1月北京叫他并告诉他向伊朗的武器销售告诉他，告诉他，告诉他，告诉他缝合了一个“扩大的发现”。
Sporkin, a voluble and assertive man, whose name struck terror into malefactors in Wall Street, was cordially hated as a meddler, a stickler and a menace. His tenacity and zest for hounding people who jiggled their accounts and bribed their customers made him an ogre in the takeover set.
But Sporkin, who left the Central Intelligence Agency last year to become a federal judge, seems to have loosened up considerably at Langley. When he was leaving the SEC, there was much speculation that a man who had spent 20 years training bright lights on dark corners of American business would be out of sync with an agency that operates in secrecy.
Known as a liberal Democrat with a strict Republican view of law and order, Sporkin once said that `morality was going the way of detente.'
但他比任何人都想到的幽灵队。
When, for instance, he was told on Nov. 25, 1985, that the Reagan administration was covertly selling arms to the ayatollah--and, in fact, had sent two batches--the only thing he thought of was that `this kind of activity . . . should have a finding by the president.'
他向委员会解释了，“美国总统是一项决心，这是一个未公开的外国的一定活动是必要的，这是国家安全的必要条件。”
他的那个新圈子不是每个人都认为有必要的发现。当然没有任何争论，不是通知国会。
“这是僵硬的法律建议，相信我，”斯潘格尔说。他添加了一些自满，“这不是我给予的日常法律建议。”
It certainly wasn't the kind of advice he gave when he was reading the riot act to greedy brokers. But by Langley standards, apparently, it was tough stuff, and Sporkin saw himself at the barricades. `Some people think I might have pulled the trigger too soon.'
The committee lawyer who questioned him, Tim Woodcock, pointed out that the Hughes-Ryan law, which even spies are supposed to observe, calls for presidential approval of a covert action before it actually occurs.
Sporkin，谁在最响亮的声音中发表讲话，但听到了听到的房间，显然认为律师正在挑剔，只是有点不切实际：“好吧，我认为这很重要，显然，在完美的世界中。。。。让总统授权它，一切，以书面写作。
But he didn't `flyspeck' it, and he retroactively authorized the third shipment, which had occurred within hours of his decision on the finding.
Sen. William S. Cohen (R-Maine) said that he had backdated the ratification of something that occurred without a presidential finding.
说服狗犬，展示了骑士的精神，告诉北方笛糟的轨道：“你不能陷入总统。。。。有人可以出去去做，后来你可以做文书工作。小鹿大厅的精神宣言，“有时你必须超越书面法律。”
Sporkin gave the committee its second glimpse of backdating in 48 hours. The day before, another ex-official of the CIA had been on the stand telling how he had backdated two bills for North's security system.
该法案已经由巫师北·斯特斯（Richard V.Secord）支付，但格伦A. Robinette是20年在Langley的退伍军人服务，没有狡辩。毫无疑问，他发出了以适当的间隔日出的两项账单，并获得了北方的两个幻想梅赛，一个在一台机器上键入了一系列信件以显示时间。
Robinette, who has an aureole of white hair and watery blue eyes, is the antithesis of Sporkin, being small, meek in manner and almost inaudible.
最后,然而,他们听起来一样。There was the same rueful, limited, situational contrition.
Asked if he did the right thing, Robinette said, `In sending the bills to Col. North? No, I wouldn't be sitting here. . . .' His voice trailed off.
Invited to voice second thoughts, Sporkin replied with a nervous laugh, `If this is what it has caused, obviously that is an easy decision.'
There must be something in the air at Langley.
-- -- From the New York Times, July 19, 1981
[FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, JULY 19, 1981] A Departure Leaves Few Regrets at the C.I.A.
(BY PHILIP TAUBMAN) Washington.--At the end of June, expressing confidence that his stewardship of the Central Intelligence Agency was progressing smoothly. Director William J. Casey sent a memorandum to all employees, notifying them that the agency was lowering its public profile. `The difficulties of the past decade are behind us,' Mr. Casey said.
He had spoken too soon. In a sudden upheaval last week, the director of clandestine operations, Max C. Hugel, was forced to resign amid charges that he had participated in fraudulent securities transactions when he managed an electronics business in the 1970's. Mr. Hugel called the allegations `unfounded, unproven and untrue.'
对于许多人来说，乌尔先生的突然离开是对各种各样的救济。大多数账户，自1月份抵达凯西先生的特别助理以来，他已经扰乱了该机构。对于一些c.i.a.官员，乌尔·乌尔先生委任，在瑞安先生选举活动中作为中尉的职务之后，提出了关于该机构可能正在采取的政治指导的问题。凯西先生，在被命名为中央情报总监，管理了Realgan先生的总统竞选活动。
Even before his resignation, Mr. Hugel had been blamed for damaging the agency's relations with Congress and with foreign intelligence services. `Max Hugel was the wrong man for the job,' said one member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. `Every time he came up here for executive sessions, he seemed to lack a grasp of his business.' Consequently, Mr. Hugel won't be missed by many within the agency and on Capitol Hill.
The securities fraud charges, made by two former business associates of Mr. Hugel, did not involve any wrongdoing while he was at the intelligence agency. But there was some concern about the combination of the Hugel affair and disclosures last week that a Federal judge, ruling on an old lawsuit, had found that Mr. Casey had once knowingly misled investors in a business that went bankrupt in 1981. `If Casey's effectiveness is hurt,' said one official, `and he loses influence at the White House and on the Hill, then it's clearly a serious setback to the rebuilding of the agency.'
THE CRISIS WITH A SILVER LINING
With the exception of Watergate-related abuses, including President Nixon's use of the C.I.A. to thwart Federal investigations of the original burglary at Democratic National Committee headquarters, the agency has remained relatively aloof from domestic politics. When Mr. Casey named Mr. Hugel Deputy Director for Operations, making him responsible for managing clandestine and covert operations, it appeared to some officials that the political contamination had spread to the agency's uppermost sanctum.
The timing could not have been worse. After taking over the C.I.A., Mr. Casey made the rebuilding of its clandestine services his highest priority. All the collection of intelligence by human agents, including American `moles' inside enemy governments, and covert actions by American agents, fall within the purview of the operations division.
The division has been drawn down over the years by budget cuts and has been plagued by a continual crisis of confidence that began in the mid-1970's with Congressional investigations that disclosed the use of violent and bizarre operations, including the assassination of foreign leaders.
Mr. Casey apparently thought that Mr. Hugel, a brash, hard-driving dealmaker, possessed the right qualities to inject efficiency and imagination into the clandestine services. Moreover, Mr. Hugel was unswervingly loyal to Mr. Casey. Colleagues described their relationship as much like that between a father and son.
Privately and publicly, Mr. Casey was an enthusiastic supporter of Mr. Hugel, repeatedly praising his deputy's abilities. `Bill thought Max would be great at developing and running covert operations,' said an intelligence official. `He forgot that half of Max's duties would involve dealing with Congress and foreign services. In the latter, his personal style couldn't have been less helpful.'
Mr. Hugel's tenure coupled with the manner of his departure, probably set back the operations division, officials at the agency said. Morale may be bucked up, however, by the rapid appointment last week of John H. Stein, a well-regarded agency veteran, as Mr. Hugel's replacement.
Liaison with foreign services has also suffered. Long distrustful of the C.I.A. because of uneven leadership and seemingly constant leaks of information, foreign intelligence agencies were apparently appalled at Mr. Hugel's lack of experience and finesse. Several Israeli officials were so shaken by their first encounter with Mr. Hugel, officials said, that they refused to provide him with the identities of colleagues in Israeli intelligence.
For some members of Congress, the Hugel affair has reawakened concerns about the management of the C.I.A. and prompted discussion about reasserting Congressional oversight. In recent years, the Senate Intelligence Committee has backed away from the kind of intense oversight favored in the period following the disclosure of C.I.A. abuses.
The departure of Mr. Hugel, once the controversy subsides, could ultimately work in Mr. Casey's favor. Assuming he survives the fallout, and recovers any influence lost at the White House and Congress, Mr. Casey may be better able to advance the agency's interests without the distraction and irritation generated by Mr. Hugel.
例如，凯蒂先生和海军上将鲍比R. Inman副主任，中央情报副主任，努力筹备了几个月的时间来获得其他机构和白宫的协议，以管理美国情报服务的活动。官员说，这个问题经常挖掘C.I.A.对白宫国家安全理事会工作人员的领导，与C.I.A.A.根据白宫助手，一般有利于禁止禁止禁止国内间谍活动。
凯西先生还试图改善智能分析质量，在发现他的许多机构的分析师既不了解他们所观察的国家的语言也不知道那些国家。
然而，目前，原子能机构总部的官员们在兰吉斯，VA的主要关注点，是让Hugel Affiration。“每个人，特别是Bill Casey，有点茫然，”一位官员说。
-- -- From the New York Times, July 15, 1981
[FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, JULY 15, 1981] Ex-C.I.A. Deputy Is Viewed As lacking Professionalism
（由罗伯特梨） Washington, July14: Before his resignation today, Max C. Hugel was in charge of the largest directorate in the Central Intelligence Agency, the branch responsible for covert action and clandestine counterintelligence overseas.
Mr. Hugel did not fit the mold for that job in two respects: He had not had a career in professional intelligence work; instead, he had been a businessman in New Hampshire and worked on the Reagan campaign staff in last year's Presidential election. And, unlike most of his predecessors, he did not come from an Ivy league-style `gentleman's club' background.
Mr. Hugel's title was Deputy Director for Operations. Before March 1973, the job bore the title of Deputy Director for plans. William E. Colby, who held the portion in 1973 before he became Director of Central Intelligence, said in an interview today that he had asked James R. Schleginger, then Director of Central Intelligence, to change the name because `plans' was a euphemism for what that part of the agency really did.
除了Colby先生，另外两名以前负责计划或运营董事会的其他男性从原子能机构内促进了中央情报董事。他们是艾伦W.杜勒斯和理查德掌舵。杜勒斯先生和科尔比先生毕业于普查，赫尔姆斯先生毕业于马萨诸塞州北部北部的老文艺学院威廉姆斯学院。
THE HEART OF THE AGENCY'
`It would be very unusual to have a nonprofessional, a businessman, an ordinary civilian running the directorate for operations,' and Thomas Powers, author of a recent biography of Mr. Helms. `That's certainly never happened before. That's one position where you want a professional. That's where the heart of the agency always was, and that's the office in which Presidents were always most interested.'
总统对该办公室感兴趣，因为其隐秘的代理商可以在总统的牧师处于外国造成骚乱。此外，副主任的运营监督监督海外间谍的招聘，收集有关苏联大使馆的低级职员的细微详细信息。
副主任还有权威于旨在一般的苏联活动，并监督由海外机构传播的所有形式的心理战争和信息。
Officials in the Reagan Administration said that William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, had recruited Mr. Hugel because Mr. Casey thought his rough-and-tumble style was exactly what was needed to rebuild the clandestine service. Some agency officials had become extremely cautious about conducting covert operations after years of Congressional investigations exposing unsuccessful and aborted projects, including plans to assassinate foreign leaders.
ADOPT AT COMMERCIAL COVERS
此外，凯西先生曾据说代理官员认为，Hugel先生将在帮助开发商业覆盖海外经营的美国情报代理人。
Mr. Hugel, accordingly to a biography distributed by the intelligence agency, specialized in Japanese economics at the University of Michigan, from which he was graduated in 1953. Earlier, he established a company, Brother International, to sell Japanese-made sewing machines in the United States.
Former intelligence agency have criticized Mr. Hugel's appointment, saying he was an amateur in a job held in the pass by seasoned professionals. Their animosity was so strong that a White House official suggested today that former intelligence officials might have encouraged disclosure of the information about Mr Hugel's stock dealings, which forced him to resign.
Hugel先生所有的前辈的经验intelligence work before they took charge of clandestine operations. Those who have held the position since Mr. Dulles are Frank G. Wiener, from 1952 to 1958; Richard M. Biseal Jr. 1958 to 1962; Mr. Helms, 1962 to 1965; Desmond FitzGerald, 1965 to 1967; Thomas Karameesines, 1967 to 1973; Mr. Colby, 1973; William E. Nelson, 1973 to 1976; William Wells 1976-77, and John McMann, 1977 to 1980.
-- -- From the New York Times, May 22, 1981
[FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, MAY 22, 1981] The Company Mr. Casey Keeps
A certain skepticism is in order when the intelligence brotherhood complains that amateurs are taking over the Central Intelligence Agency. The Bay of Pigs wasn't exactly an amateur production, save in its humiliating outcome. Nor were the abortive attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro in the 1960's. But in the matter of Max Hugel, a New Hampshire businessman now turned spymaster, the consternation among old C.I.A. hands is surely understandable.
Mr. Hugel's most visible qualification is has long-time friendship with the C.I.A.'s Director, William Casey. According to his official biography, Mr. Hugel served as a junior Army intelligence officer during World War II. He has had three months' experience as a middle-echelon administrator at the agency's Langley headquarters, a.k.a. The Company. With only this background, he has now been promoted to head the agency's directorate of operations, which controls covert actions and clandestine intelligence overseas.
明白，凯西先生希望在这个特殊的敏感职位中是一个忠诚的助理，这被描述为在总统之后是政府中最困难和最危险的。哈德尔先生在辞去电子公司高管时赢得了信心，以帮助赢得新罕布什尔州初级胜利的重要新罕布什尔州的初级胜利，就像凯西·竞赛的命令先生一样。Hugel先生的政治技能在那个国家留下了旧的手留下了深刻的手，但他们否则对他很了解。
Still, winning votes in New Hampshire is one thing. Knowing the national security byways of Washington is quite another. And presiding over spy networks requires even more sophisticated knowledge and experience. Mr. Hugel's appointment is not subject to Senate confirmation, unlike the positions of C.I.A. Director and Deputy Director. So as a matter of law, Mr. Casey has every right to appoint a chum as spymaster. As a matter of policy, the appointment is questionable.
The C.I.A. is unlike any other agency in the degree of trust it demands from Congress and the public. That trust was grievously abused in a period not long ended. Who can be surprised if there are fears of a replay in an Administration that talks loosely about `unleashing' the C.I.A.? These fears are fanned when an outsider with tenuous credentials is given command of The Company's most free-wheeling division.
For security reasons, the Senate Intelligence Subcommittee has been reluctant to delve too deeply into the agency's secret operations. But the command structure is a different matter. Mr. Casey--even the President--have an obligation to explain what prompted the Hugel appointment, and to spell out the constraints on covert operations. That much light won't compromise the agency and would allay justifiable fears. In a double sense, The Company that Mr. Casey keeps is the public's business.
-- -- From the Washington Post, July 15, 1991
[FROM THE WASHINGTON POST, JULY 15, 1991] The Hugel File
The Max Hugel file, it turned out, was a little thicker than the CIA realized when it signed up the erstwhile New Hampshire businessman and Reagan campaign aide as deputy director of operations in May. The check that the agency ran on Mr. Hugel failed to pick up the tangled skein of certain of his business affairs that this newspaper brought to light yesterday morning. In the story, two former associates, tapes in hand, accused the nation's chief spymaster of engaging in improper or illegal `insider' stock market practices. Mr. Hugel denied all charges and, within hours, resigned.
The episode is a pie in the face of the CIA and its director, William J. Casey, who had rocked the agency's old-boy network, and raised eyebrows elsewhere, by choosing as his aide for covert operations and clandestine intelligence-gathering someone with no previous experience in those fields. The CIA is not the first organization to hire a bit hastily. Still, it has better reason and resources than most to proceed carefully. It is not hard to imagine scenarios--several novelists are probably at it already--with far graver endings than the resignation of an official whose difficulties lay entirely in his business past. That these difficulties were of a sort unquestionably familiar to Mr. Casey, a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, sharpens the question of how Mr. Hugel passed through the CIA screen.
在某些季度，乌尔先生的出发是被采取的，甚至庆祝，因为对带来局外人的愚蠢而努力运行该国的代理人和间谍。但是，抛开的社会势利的色调，这是一个狭隘的观点。他的麻烦并不是智力，他是一个局外人，但在商业中，他是一个内幕。如果街道智能，壁垒先生的街头聪明，布鲁尔先生会被施加到一些智慧内部的智慧内部人员的缺点，它必须被贬低，而不是那些缺点所做的缺点，这似乎是在第一个内安装局外人的缺点地方。