1991年国会听证会情报和安全
1991年国会听证会声明下的约翰·c·塔克能源部长前美国能源部的能源和商业委员会监督和调查小组委员会美国众议院能源部的核不扩散作用4月24日1991年主席先生,我很高兴能有机会出现在你今天的小组讨论的角色能源部(DOE)在执行其核不扩散的责任,包括能源部与美国其他政府机构和国际组织之间的互动。正如你在1991年4月10日的信中所要求的那样，我将主要谈谈该部在履行其核不扩散责任方面的作用。正如布什总统在他的第一个国情咨文中所说:“核武器的扩散必须被制止……我们的外交必须每天都在防止核武器扩散。”This has been the policy of every President since the advent of nuclear weapons on August 6, 1945. The implementation of this policy has never been so evident as with the actions taken with regard to Iraq in the past few months. The conditions which the U.S. Government insisted that Iraq accept for a permanent ceasefire include several specifically designed to halt and reverse Iraq's efforts to develop and produce nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. Iraq's Scud missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel were a reminder that these could have been launched with warheads other than high explosives. If Iraq's nuclear and chemical/biological and missile programs were allowed to proceed unchallenged, other countries could be the target of such an aggressive regime within the next decade. The Department, under the direction of Secretary Watkins, is firmly committed to President Bush's goal of stopping nuclear proliferation and we take our responsibilities in this area very seriously. Because we recognize that this goal is one of our most difficult challenges, DOE has, in cooperation with other interested agencies, undertaken major efforts to achieve it. First let me cover recent organizational changes initiated by Admiral Watkins before I discuss DOE's nonproliferation role. RECENT REORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES: At the time of his appointment as Secretary of Energy in March 1989, it was immediately apparent to Admiral Watkins that the general organizational and management responsibilities of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs were too far-reaching and complex for one individual to oversee. The Admiral recognized that in order to establish better downsize the overall role and responsibilities of the ASDP to include management and accountability of this office, it would be necessary to only the national security related functions of Nuclear Weapons Research, Development and Production, Nuclear Materials Production, and Arms Control and Verification. Admiral Watkins also became concerned with a number of issues related to DOE's情报以及整个园区的安全保障状况。这使得他采取了两个不同的行动来解决这些问题。首先，他询问了退休的海军少将、前海军司令夏皮罗情报他完成了对能源部的全面研究情报1988年4月，再次评估本计划，并提出建议以确定新方向。其次，他委托退休的陆军少将詹姆斯·e·冻结进行了一项研究，以审查广泛的保障和安全领域。根据这些研究的结果和建议，秘书指示进行组织改组，以澄清和加强责任和责任情报以及保障和安全相关的活动，同时也缩短了负责国防项目的助理部长的任期。1990年4月6日，秘书。沃特金斯能源部的转移情报项目从国防部项目助理部长到一个新成立的办公室情报议员罗伯特·丹尼尔，Jr.和领导，在1991年4月1日，该司建立了安全事务，其主要职责包括整个美国能源部的保障和安全，限制数据和国家安全相关信息的分类和保护的办公室委托部门。这些功能现在将直接向我的办公室。从更广泛的方面，海军上将沃特金斯由部门缺乏一个单一的，高层次的个人谁可以成为他的科学和技术顾问的关注。交叉问题，他觉得并没有被充金博宝正规网址分解决包括：○美国能源部国家实验室系统的整体健康，特别是实验室工作两个能源部赞助商和联邦政府的其他机构赞助的有效性;Ø美国能源部的研究计划中的优先级设置和整合;和O系的技术转让方案的整体活力和方向。要获得这三个领域的中肯的意见，海军上将沃特金斯将很快正式建立全部门的科学和技术顾问，与副科学和技术顾问的部门的R＆d项目的主要部分 - 既为国防和民用领域。此次重组的一个主要特点将是实施技术利用DOE技术转移政策和科学技术顾问的协调分配下一个董事。这一立场将推动整个部门方案的连贯性，以支持技术转让。 To improve the nuclear nonproliferation posture of the Department, on April 1, 1991, Secretary Watkins, transferred the Technology Policy Division's export control and nonproliferation responsibilities to the Office of Arms Control in Defense Programs. This, I believe, is the first step in an evolving process to combine the various nonproliferation activities and responsibilities within one office reaction to any one event but that the Secretary has had this issue within the Department. It should also be noted that this is not a under consideration since the Fall of 1989. The export control and associated nuclear nonproliferation functions now complement those responsibilities of the Arms Control Office relating to the control of missile, chemical, and biological weapons and verification technology. DOE's ROLE IN NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES INTERAGENCY NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES: U.S. nonproliferation policy and initiatives are developed by an interagency group composed primarily of representatives from the Department of Energy, the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency the Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce. These agencies are represented on the Nonproliferation Policy Coordinating Committee which is chaired by the Department of State. EXPORT CONTROLS: Most of the Department's export control activities are based on two statutory provisions: Section 57b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act of 1978. Section 57b of the Atomic Energy Act requires that U.S. firms or individuals intending to engage, directly or indirectly, in the production of special nuclear material outside the United States obtain the authorization of the Secretary of Energy. The Federal regulations that implement this statutory requirement appear as 10 CFR Part 810. Because of the significance of this responsibility, the Atomic Energy Act does not permit the Secretary of Energy to delegate the authorizing function. At the present time, U.S. persons intending to engage in activities falling within the scope of 10 CFR Part 810 must submit an application to the Department of Energy's Office of Defense Programs. A DOE staff analysis and a proposed recommendation to the Secretary are circulated to the Department of State for concurrence and to the Departments of Defense and Commerce, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for their views. Only after the other agencies have been consulted does the Secretary determine whether or not to authorize the activity. I might mention that we have had only one Part 810 case for Iraq in recent years. This was in 1990 and involved a U.S. company that had been asked to present a training course at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center. On July 13, 1990, DOE staff informed the applicant that because the proposed activity was contrary to existing policy, they were unable to recommend approval to the Secretary. Section 309 (c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act requires the Department of Commerce to control dual-use exports of potential nuclear concern. On June 9, 1978, the Departments of State, Energy, and Commerce jointly published "Procedures Established Pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978," to jointly establish and maintain a list of such export items, known as the Nuclear Referral List. Whenever Commerce receives an application to export an item on refers the application to DOE for a review and recommendation. In the Nuclear Referral List to a country of proliferation concern, it keeping the list up to date and in making reviews, the Department of Commerce relies extensively on the technical experts within the Department as well as its contractor facilities to assess the significance of the technology involved, its value to a would-be nuclear proliferant, and the ease and likelihood of its diversion to a clandestine nuclear program. Whenever DOE's review of dual -use cases raises a potential proliferation concern, DOE refers the case to the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination (SNEC), an interagency forum mandated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. The Department of State chairs the Subgroup and DOE serves as the Secretariat. Other members of the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination are the Departments of Defense and Commerce, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Central情报国家安全局和国防部情报该机构具有观察员地位。国际防扩散活动:为了控制核武器的扩散，必须建立一个可行和有效的国际防扩散制度。这一制度的两个主要组成部分是《核不扩散条约》(NPT)和国际原子能机构(IAEA)。为了监测不扩散条约条款的遵守情况，该条约规定由国际原子能机构实施国际保障措施。保障制度和技术援助活动，以保持原子能机构- -该部向原子能机构及其强有力的可行组织提供和协调支助，并维持和监测原子能机构保障措施的效力。国务院还与其他国家参与各种双边和多边活动，以促进和加强国际防扩散活动，包括控制供应国的出口。为此，美国能源部积极参与多边出口管制协调委员会、桑戈委员会和核供应国集团等国际出口管制机制。COCOM由我们的北约盟国组成，除了冰岛，还有日本和澳大利亚。COCOM成员同意控制对苏联、中华人民共和国及其盟国具有战略意义的出口。能源部会同其他机构为国务院制定COCOM的军民两用商品产业清单提供技术和政策支持; DOE provides the principal support in formulating COCOM's International Atomic Energy List (AEL) which describes nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies considered to be of strategic significance. The Zangger Committee, based in Vienna, Austria, implements Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits the export of specially designed equipment or material used in the production of special nuclear material unless under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The Committee has developed a so-called "trigger list" of items that trigger the mandatory implementation of IAEA safeguards to ensure peaceful use. DOE, in conjunction with the Department of State and other agencies, has initiated the upgrade of the "trigger list" for the control of gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion enrichment and reprocessing components. DOE has also developed and published a guide on gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge equipment to assist officials in this and other countries in enforcing export control laws based on the Zangger "trigger list." The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) -- of which France is a member -- was formed at the initiative of the United States and in response to the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974. The aim was to address the need for more comprehensive guidelines for control of exports of nuclear technology. The Zangger list controls only equipment and material especially designed for the production of special nuclear material. It does not address technology, nor does it address dual-use components that can contribute to a nuclear explosive. Last year, the U.S. Government began a series of bilateral discussions with other countries to lay the groundwork for establishing an International Dual-Use List of items that all supplier countries should control from a nuclear proliferation standpoint. These bilateral discussions led to a meeting of 26 nuclear supplier countries in March in The Hague at which there was a clear consensus that such an International Dual-Use List should be adopted. Allow me to note that the International Dual-Use List effort traces back to an initiative launched in March 1990 by the Department of Energy. And, drawing on the expertise of the DOE nuclear weapons laboratories, DOE developed a draft list that the U.S. Government is circulating to the other supplier countries. DOE also is participating DOE-drafted U.S. Government list to form the basis of these in the bilateral and multilateral meetings and we expect the discussions.情报支持:情报支持是我们防扩散行动成功的关键。美国能源部(Department of Energy)的国家实验室为美国提供了很大程度的技术支撑情报社区对核扩散的广泛研究和分析。15年了情报其实验室资源已在国家扩散实验室的建立和发展中处于领先地位情报计划，在固定的机构。已调配资源，以直接支持众多的美国人，并与所有美国人密切协调情报美国不扩散政策的确定和执行活动。能源部的情报在核扩散领域的能力和表现是首屈一指的，并高度支持国务院高级管理层履行其重要的核不扩散责任。正如我在介绍中提到的，DOE情报这个项目一年前被从国防项目中移除，以恢复两者之间的平衡情报支持国防和非国防项目。此外，我们引进了一个新的管理团队，在丹尼尔先生的领导下，以加强该项目对沃特金斯秘书的优先事项、指导和要求的响应。还为这一重要职能承诺了更多的资源。这一过渡没有破坏我们的扩散情报我想强调的是，这个项目一直让我们的高级管理人员了解有关核扩散的外国核计划。例如，伊拉克的核项目在很长一段时间里一直受到密切关注，在我担任能源部副部长的两年任期里情报该计划是美国政府领导人正确描述伊拉克的核能力和与伊拉克核项目有关的能力，并提供这些数据给意图。作为另一个例子，我们确定了国防部支持沙漠风暴行动的目标并对其进行了优先排序。美国能源部在联合国伊拉克无核化计划中的角色:该部最近采取的重要国际不扩散行动之一就是针对伊拉克的。在海湾战争之后，能源部的防扩散部门在制定美国政府消除伊拉克未来部门内部合作能力的计划中发挥了关键作用。能源部组织了一个特别工作组开发核武器。其中一个突出的例子是，在两天半的密集努力下，他准备了一份详细的评估报告，说明为确保伊拉克在未来很长一段时间内实现军事无核化，需要在人员、时间和资金方面采取哪些措施。沃特金斯海军上将最近在1991年4月12日写信给国务卿贝克，说他“……采取措施，确保能源部的可观情报技术资源随时准备支持联合国授权的伊拉克核项目非军事化。”A DOE task force is assisting Secretary Baker under the direction of Dr. Victor Alessi, Director of Arms Control. SUMMARY DOE, led by Admiral Watkins, continues to play a very important role in both U.S. Government and international efforts to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. We take our responsibilities very seriously and are continuously reviewing our performance to look for ways in which to improve. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have.