[页：S7701]
近年来，我们当中很少有人像宾夕法尼亚州参议员那样积极参与。当然，没有人能像我们反倾销和反击税法的复杂性那样精通他，或者对总统钢铁计划的理解如此广泛。他花了很多时间和精力来理解我们的贸易法，我很荣幸有机会与他合作在过去十年中塑造了重大贸易立法。
`Manufacturing a Trade Policy in an Era of Change' is an important article. Delving beyond the surface images of a healthy U.S. economy, it offers a sobering review of our current competitive position. Relying on extensive new research by the Office of Technology Assessment, the article highlights the important contributions of the manufacturing sector to our trade balance and describes the extent to which the competitive position of this sector has deteriorated in recent years. It also includes a substantive explanation of the rationale underlying the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, and emphasizes the critical point that trade and commercial considerations must be given a prominent place in our policymaking process. Finally, the article offers some specific prescriptions for change--in both attitude and policy--so as to come to grips with our persistent trade imbalance.
Everyone may not agree with each of the proposed solutions, but this article certainly represents a worthwhile contribution to the ongoing debate about U.S. trade policy. I commend my distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania for his work, and ask that the text of the article be printed in full in the Record.
The text of the article follows:
随着罗纳德·里根（Ronald Reagan）的八年时代，毫无疑问，这毫无疑问地充满了忧郁，有些人充满热情 - 有机会停下来衡量美国在经济上的位置，乔治·布什总统将在哪里必须带领我们。确定正确的方向，更不用说行使领导力，这并不是一件小事，因为经济学家和声称自己是美国经济状况的经济学家之间的基本分歧，我们如何到达这里（无论我们在哪里，）以及我们从这里去的地方。可观的处方范围从更多相同的（“保持课程”的更新版本）到根本性的变化。
This article will provide one perspective on those questions by arguing that the United States has some fundamental long-term problems despite the surface good news; that we have reached this point through years of poor management and concentration on the wrong issues; and that we need a new, more coherent approach. My recommendations will not represent a radical departure, but will require a new, more precise calculation of our interests and, most importantly, will insist that we act with those interests in mind rather than with an idealized view of a world trading system that fits our fantasies rather than reality.
从表面上看，至少在撰写本文时，经济状况充满了好消息。失业率达到了十四年来未见的水平。同时，通货膨胀率保持较低，利率从低谷起来，并没有迅速上升。我们在创造工作能力方面与欧洲共同体（EC）形成了鲜明的对比。
Digging beneath the surface, however, reveals a few slugs and other undesirables crawling around. The high standard of living we enjoy and the consumer buying binge that has been such an important part of it, have produced the largest budget and trade deficits in our history--the former, ironically, a piece of Keynesian pump priming in supply-side clothing that the most liberal of economists would not have thought possible ten years ago.
维持这种愉快但不可避免的不稳定的平衡需要大量的外国投资流入，这使我们保持了漂浮，但却产生了两个不祥的后果。首先，外国投资者提出了开始从金融工具开始迁移到公平的迹象，包括房地产和一些备受瞩目的行业，这些行业导致许多国会在国会中对外国所有权的无资格福利有第二次思考。日本利益现在拥有洛杉矶市中心约40％的办公空间。1
这可能是也可能不好，但应该使人们认为我们的经济发展方向。
1Footnotes at end of article.
The second result of our twin deficits is a debt greater than any nation's in the world. Americans will pass this debt on to their children and grandchildren for payment, payment which will come in the form of harder work for lower wages and a lower standard of living than we have enjoyed.
As our debt grows, we are losing our capacity to control our own destiny. We are facing constraints on our scope of action due to our dependence on the continued inflow of foreign funds. We have been told, primarily by the Reagan administration, that the cost of pressng Japan or Europe too hard on other bilateral matters could well result in the redirection of foreign funds to other areas, a consequence that would force us to pay our own debts.
It is understandable that this would be an unwelcome development for the administration in power, since it would lead to a significant reduction in demand and/or increases in productivity, which translates into, at best, working harder for less and, at worst, into a recession. Yet extricating ourselves from our debt burden will inevitably mean the same sooner or later. Is it better to begin that process now when it is manageable or later when it is not?
里根政府的善意的忽视international economy from 1982 to February 1985, followed by its frantic efforts to control this process, led to the roller coaster ride the dollar has experienced over the last six years. First forced to the economic equivalent of Mt. Everest by foreign demand, the administration has now plunged into the Grand Canyon in a vain effort to reverse the tide of imports that led to the rise in the first place. This ride, lasting more than three years, has treated the public to one of the more abstruse policy debates in many years. This debate has concerned the `J-curve,' the function which is supposed to demonstrate how exports will recover with the dollar's decline. More than a year ago, in my comments in the Finance Committee report on the Senate trade bill, I mentioned that the `J-curve' in fact was more like an `L,' and little has happened since then to change that view. 2
The reason for this discrepancy is rather simple. When the dollar began to fall in late 1985, foreign producers reacted in a perfectly rational way, but not the way economic textbooks predicted. Instead of predictably raising prices to accommodate the currency devaluation, foreign producers kept prices down and sacrificed profits to maintain market share. The result was a continued influx of imports and the rather sad spectacle of the administration's bragging that the monthly trade deficit had fallen first to `only' $12 billion and more recently to $9 billion, figures that might have represented anannualtally fifteen years ago.
最近,似乎有一些证据表明,exports are increasing, thanks to the low dollars, but there is still no evidence that imports are declining. Because this is a necessary part of the equation, the result has been a string of monthly deficits that remain at historic levels.
高美元的另一个残酷影响是，在1980年代中期，它刺激了近海制造业的移动。当然，将制造业回到美国，以便从相对较低的美元中受益并不容易。我们被迫学习生产的国际化以及我们的消费，即在下面将要讨论的发展，这本身需要急剧转变。
[Page: S7702]
Just as some animals were more equal than others inAnimal Farm,some economic sectors are more equal than others when it comes to measuring our overall health. The manufacturing sector is arguably the most important, both in its contribution to our current problems and in the role it must inevitably play in their solution. Discussing solutions requires a detailed understanding of what has been going on in this sector, and it is precisely this question that has been the subject of greatest controversy.
In my judgment, the manufacturing sector has suffered particularly severely from the macroeconomic changes I have discussed, although elaborating on that statement requires both careful definition and a look at some new data.
Careful definition means avoiding labor's mistake of defining a sector's health solely in terms of the number of jobs, and the economists' mistake of defining it solely in terms of gross output or share of GNP. It also means use of appropriate data. Everything looks better compared to 1982, for example, but for precisely that reason the snapshot is not very revealing.
在工作方面,实际情况是复杂的。Manufacturing's share of employment has declined, as has the absolute number of jobs in the sector since the 1979 peak. In 1979, there were 21 million manufacturing jobs; by the end of 1987 there were 19.4 million jobs, more than in 1986 but still below the peak.
其中一些下降是由于生产率增长造成的 - 从1979年到1986年，平均每年3.5％。与此同时，下降的另一部分是由于进口直接或通过其在迫使迫使其迫使效率低下的作用中的作用而造成的。植物。在需求平坦或缓慢增加的行业，例如钢，纺织品和汽车，尤其如此。虽然已故总统约翰·肯尼迪（John F. Kennedy）说，当他说“涨潮抬起所有船只”时，他的经济真相是一个有用的经济真相，但确实，当海洋平静时，无论如何，无论如何，有些船都会下沉 - 暂停的需求使一个行业容易受到攻击。进口这些是公平还是不公平的贸易实践的结果，而工人不可避免地会遭受苦难，因为该行业由于缺乏竞争力还是提高了生产力的提高而缩小了该行业，从而使其降低了工人。
正如新的技术评估办公室（OTA）研究指出的那样，确定制造业的GNP份额充满了困难。以目前的美元衡量，该份额从1960年的29％下降到1986年的20％，自1979年以来的下降速度增加。但是，当前的美元分析无法充分处理生产率的提高。
Constant dollar calculations, on the other hand, vary depending on the assumptions made and the years chosen. For example, the OTA study makes clear that in 1982 dollars, manufacturing has been a steady 21 or 22 percent of total output since the late 1940s; whereas, using 1972 constant dollars it has hovered around 24 percent; and with 1958 dollars around 30 percent. Each constant dollar revision appears to produce a reasonably straight line, but at a lower level.
This phenomenon is related both to the different weights given to industry inputs in different years that distort the actual structure of the economy in previous years, as well as the need to adjust for quality and performance improvements in products that are nominally the same from year to year. (A 1952 and a 1986 care are statistically the same thing, but in terms of actual performance or quality are light years apart.)
此外，非电机机械领域的性能使1982年的结果偏向，其中包括计算机，其收益如此之大，不仅在该部门的其他部门都抵消了损失，而且还抵消了其他组成制造的行业的损失。在一个部门一部分中，这一巨大改善的统计结果是支撑所有制造业的GNP份额。OTA对数据的重新评估（使用1980恒定的美元）表明，制造业的GNP份额从1972年的23.3％下降到1984年的21.9％，1979年以后的下降速度加速了，如商务部门的分析。
The OTA study suggests fairly clearly that domestic manufacturing production has been declining, but, as is always the case in these matters, production is only one side of the equation. What is unquestionably less controversial is that consumption of manufactured goods has outstripped corresponding domestic levels of production, leading to a growing gap that is reflected in the trade deficit. OTA estimates, for example, that the American share of spending on manufactured goods increased from 23 percent of GNP in 1948 to 27.7 percent in 1986. Meanwhile, manufacturing output in the latter year was 20.5 percent of GNP, a continuation of the declining trend that began in the early 1970s.
一些经济学家将这种恶化与农业的恶化进行了比较，农业的变化在更长的时间内显着下降，占美国经济的百分比 - 从本世纪初的22％的GNP到1986年的2.2％。为了证明增加制造业的份额是向后工业经济过渡的不可避免和健康的一部分。
The analogy, however, is inexact. While agriculture's share of the economy has declined, its output has not only kept pace with demand, but has also consistently generated surpluses. In the case of manufacturing, not only has the sector failed to keep pace with demand, but demand itself also has increased, as previously noted. This is not the hallmark of an economy in transition, where demand for services is replacing demand for manufactured goods. In fact, from a consumer point of view, the manufacturing sector is alive and well. From a producer point of view, however, it has been seriously ill.
This is not a unique situation. According to OTA, it is reflected in the economies of all the major industrial nations, including Japan, although the sector's `downward slope' has been steeper in the United States.
`作为国内生产总值的一部分，美国制造业从1965年到1985年缩减了31％。相比之下，英国的下降27％，德国23％，法国14％。日本在1965年仍处于工业化阶段，在此期间下降了7％。可以预见的是，在韩国，菲律宾和新加坡等新工业化国家中，制造业中的份额在新工业化国家中增加。4
This extended discussion of manufacturing is necessary because analysts and policy-makers are increasingly coming to the conclusion that its health is the key to solving our macroeconomic problems. There is little doubt that events in the manufacturing sector are largely responsible for the trade deficit. In March 1988, when the merchandise trade deficit reached a several year low of $9.7 billion, manufacturing accounted for more than two-thirds of our exports and nearly 79 percent of our imports. Eighty-five percent of the 1987 current account deficit was in the manufacturing sector.
明显的结论是，缩小贸易差距取决于制造业的某些变化。这很可能既需要出口似乎都在发生，并且进口尚未开始。即使是3月的主要改进，其出口量比1988年的平均值增长了27.7％，同时带来了7％increase在1988年平均水平的进口中。
除了制造构成赤字的主要部分，因此不可避免地必须构成解决方案的主要部分之外，还有另一个原因我们需要将注意力集中在那里。以最简化的形式，我们的经济实力基于生产而不是消费的前提。正如弗吉尼亚州拉德福德大学经济学助理教授威廉·霍金斯（William R. Hawkins）写道，“低价值产业对高价值增值产业的长期替代将破坏美国的经济实力。财富和权力最终取决于生产的力量，而不是消费。”5
这不是复活有关服务作业是否比制造作业更可取的或付费的辩论的地方，但是两者之间的链接是明确的，计算机硬件和软件是最明显的现代示例。OTA研究得出的结论是，约有800万服务与制造业直接相关。加州大学伯克利分校的Stephen Cohen和John Zysman的研究表明，这个数字可能高达500-6亿。广告，法律，银行，运输，工程和建筑尤其容易受到进一步制造的影响。6毫无疑问，大多数服务工作，无论他们是汉堡包，建筑师还是投资银行家，最终都基于某物的生产，而且必须衡量我们的实力。
制造业的危机不仅限于对我们经济健康的短期后果。贸易赤字和财政部维护较低价值的策略威胁到产生严重的长期后果。轶事证据反映出对生产下降及其对我们对我们的安全性和行动独立性的影响的担忧已经开始浮出水面，对外国对美国财产的收购的担忧也开始浮出水面。
国防部正在制定一项计划，以确定哪种采购是“濒临灭绝的”，因为国内生产不足以满足我们的需求 - 目前还是战争时。7查询专注于机床，某些计算机，专业钢，怀和铸件以及滚珠轴承等领域。国会激发了其中的一些问题，但其中很大一部分起源于国防部，因为它无法满足美国国防基础的需求。
同样,增加外国收购美国公司mpanies, such as that proposed in the attempt of Fujitsu to take over Fairchild Semiconductor (although Fairchild was already owned by a different foreign company), has raised concerns both about the transfer of critical technology abroad and about our continued ability to meet our defense needs from secure sources. This concern led to the inclusion of the so-called Exon/Florio Amendment in the trade bill. This provision gives the president authority to block foreign acquisition on national security grounds. The challenge for the amendment's drafters, and for the administration that will ultimately implement it, is to insure that this new authority does not become transformed by the bureaucratic process into a formal investment screening process of all transactions based upon the pretext of an expanded definition of national security.
Sometimes the goals of adequate domestic production and domestic ownership of technology are in conflict. The Pentagon is increasingly finding cases where the best way to maintain U.S. production is to allow a foreign takeover, even at some risk to the technology involved:
`For years, the Pentagon discouraged substantial foreign investment in defense companies, for reasons still cited by opponents of such acquisitions. They say that allowing foreign companies to control vital defense weaponry would leave the U.S. vulnerable in the event of war. They add that a stake in a U.S. defense-electronics contractor could let a foreign company and a foreign government see potentially critical technology--strengthening foreign competitors and increasing the danger of espionage.
`The critics see yet another example of America's technological and industrial dominance slipping away. And their concern is all the deeper because of American defense contractors' increasing purchases of sophisticated parts from abroad.
但与Defens卡路奇的提升e Department's top job, economic considerations have gained ground in foreign-investment decisions. Many at the Pentagon--and in the industry--now say that preventing jobs from drifting overseas and remaining able to crank out weapons at home are more important than lessening the risk of espionage or a loss of face as an industrial power. With the right controls, they believe, the national interest can be protected as well. `We must not allow ourselves to use this issue as a shroud for protectionism,' says Robert B. Costello, who oversees Pentagon procurement.' 8
Anecdotal evidence, of course, is hardly dispositive, but in the political environment it carries great weight because it represents political, i.e. constituent, pressure for action. When machine-tool manufacturers complain about imports and lost market share, for example, they go first to their congressmen and senators. While that might produce protectionist proposals in the short run, they often are not intended to be enacted--and rarely are enacted--but rather serve as catalysts for a thorough examination of the problem through already existing procedures.
在米achine-tool case, for example, the industry ultimately filed a petition under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 seeking relief from imports on national security grounds. After a year-long investigation by the Department of Commerce and a two-year review by the White House (far too long, in the judgment of everyone associated with this case), the president decided under considerable pressure from Congress, that some action was warranted and directed the negotiation of import restraints to be held with key foreign producers.
This case, along with the 1984 steel section 210 case that was resolved by steel quota legislation, suggest that congressional agitation, though it might ultimately not produce a law, is an action-inducing device that a wise industry will seek to employ. A second conclusion, unfortunately, is that there are inevitably elements in the bureaucracy of any administration that prefer smooth relations with our trading partners regardless of the domestic cost and will oppose actions that might be viewed by our trading partners as disruptive.
Congressional pressure, however, is generally concerned with the short term and specific cases. The big picture is not alien to congressmen, but it is often put on the back burner by the force of current events. In addressing those events wede factomake policy more often by accident than design. A better means of focusing on that big picture is needed.
[Page: S7703]
正是，必须作为我在制造业和外国投资中讨论过的变化的背景的更大了解。这些变化不能孤立地看待，而是必须将其视为全世界发生的一系列更广泛发展的一部分，这些发展导致我们在世界经济中实力相对地位的下降。在战后时代，我们在自由世界的GNP中的份额从60％下降到25％，随之而来的是我们能够在国际上发挥的影响力。这些更改中的几个值得注意。
Permeable economies
The increasing speed and sophistication of transportation and communications systems have created a true world market for goods as well as services. Who would have thought even ten years ago, for example, that over half our daily supply of fresh carnations and chrysanthemums would come from overseas (Colombia, Israel and Europe)? Satellite communications systems and electronic financial systems now permit virtually instantaneous transfer not only of news, but also of data and business and financial transactions. Approximately $70 trillion of foreign exchange transactions occurred in 1986, more than $200 billion every working day, a volume of transactions that dwarfs trade flows by a factor of eighteen times. More recent figures suggest current financial transactions are more than twice that level. These developments have made virtually every economy accessible to every other and have made the movement of money more important than the movement of goods.
Growth of the trade sector
In part as a result of the permeable economies, foreign markets have become more important both for American producers seeking growth and for foreign producers seeking to take advantage of our open market to promote their growth. While in 1970 exports and imports of goods represented 7 percent of U.S. GNP, in 1987 they amounted to 15.1 percent. This figure, although significant, was still behind that of most European nations.
对纪律的需求
The increased importance of trade has created powerful constituencies for stronger international standards for the conduct of commerical activities and a better means of enforcing those standards. It is not longer only the import-impacted industries such as steel, footwear and textiles that are sensitive, but modern, technologically competitive industries such as machine tools, computers and semiconductors as well as growing segments of the agricultural sector that are joining the chorus of complaints about subsidized imports and access to foreign markets. These complaints translate into the newly popular term `fair trade.'
Failure of adjustment
发达国家几乎一致失败成功地追求和实施不再具有竞争力的行业的调整策略，这也有助于贸易体系中的纪律。
In steel, for example, the United States and the EC represent contrasting extremes of failure. The United States, having had virtually no policy, forced the steel industry to adjust in the most painful way possible. The result was abrupt reductions in employment (from 453,000 in 1979 to 163,000 in 1987--a decline of 64 percent in eight years!) and a series of corporate bankruptcies and mergers. The EC, in contrast, has regularly postponed the pain of adjustment by continuing subsidies and attempting to regulate levels of production between the member nations. The result has not been enough to stop exporting the responsibility for shrinkage to the United States. Parenthetically, it is worth noting that James Clifton of the Center for Industrial Competitiveness has done some preliminary analysis that suggests the United States leads other developed countries in downsizing its basic industries and that the gap in this country is being filled by imports from other developed countries rather than from lesser developed countries (LDCs). 9
Lack of consensus on rules
全世界见证了非西方贸易参与者的重要性，他们的标准，做法和经商方式与战后时代在美国及其欧洲盟友所起草的基本西方贸易体系有所不同。伪造，专利海盗行为和知识产权盗窃的其他形式的日益严重的问题（例如，书籍，唱片和磁带）表现出了这一事实，即许多自由汇款和新工业化国家（NICS）不接受或没有接受或有没有制定西方法律标准，并且经常将其视为西方经济剥削的工具。今年春天，泰国政府受到瓦解的威胁，因为该国立法者对加强泰国版权法的提议的抵制。
认识经济变化
The United States has personal experience with the difficulty developed nations have in handling LDC industrialization. This is matched by the LDCs' difficulties in understanding the additional responsibility that comes with development. Admitting that a Korea or a Brazil can produce products of equivalent quality more cheaply than we can has been painful but necessary. Persuading a Korea or a Brazil that industrialization should mean a phasing out of the special benefits given LDCs and that a market-oriented system without subsidies offers the best hope of further balanced growth is equally painful, but equally necessary.
The debt bomb
最后，我们必须面对最不发达国家债务危机的毁灭性影响。近年来，近40％的美国出口进入了第三世界市场。这个数字大于欧洲和日本总和的数字。但是，最不发达国家债务问题和无法为先前的进口水平提供资金，导致美国仅在1981年至1984年之间向拉丁美洲出口的220亿美元恶化。这种贸易损失转化为美国出口部门的550,000个就业机会。
1983年和1984年的国际货币基金组织（IMF）行动避免了灾难，而美元价值的降低使美国回到了对拉丁美洲的出口现在仅低于1981年的水平18％。尽管如此，人们越来越怀疑我们充其量减轻了危机，但没有解决。仅1986年，与1970年代的出口增长率持续相比，美国向最不发达国家的出口损失了700亿美元。这是210万个工作岗位。
Most developing countries still find themselves in a slow-growth mode with per capita growth rates over the last five years half the average of the 1970s. Debtor nations, however, complain that IMF austerity programs have failed, and these countries continue to demonstrate growing sympathy for a more development-oriented set of policies with greater World Bank involvement. Secretary of the Treasury James Baker's plan to lend an additional $20 billion has been received skeptically by both LDCs and some U.S. banks. Growing private bank reluctance to provide new funds in the face of increasing LDC resistance to repayment shows clearly the difficulty of arriving at any long-term solution.
[页：S7704]
生产力的证据。10
没有比生产力数字更好的证据表明全球贸易术语变化。从1960年到1986年，美国的生产率增长率平均每年不到3％，尽管自1979年以来的记录已经好得多。然而，在整个时期，我们的进步与日本，法国，意大利和德国（5％）以及英国和加拿大（超过3％）相比，我们的进步变得苍白。
最有说服力的是较早的几年。尽管我们从1960年到1973年的生产率增长率为每年3.2％，但欧洲国家的表现要好得多，这主要是因为他们仍在修复战争损失并投资新设备。日本在此期间的平均年率为10.3％。
这些数字反映了欧洲和日本的“赶上”，从较低的基地到美国。从1973年到1979年的美国表现异常差（每年1.4％）的帮助，这可能归因于劳动力的快速扩张以及通货膨胀和油价上涨（尽管后两个因素也影响了其他国家）。
Since 1979, the U.S. performance has matched our trading partners, but the damage was already done. We are now competing on equal terms with Europe and Japan and in some respects may have fallen behind. As many other developments over the past thirty years, this one may be good for the system and is certainly good for our trading partners. However, it is clearly not so good for us, particularly when viewed in conjuction with other events that occurred simultaneously.
All these changes mean a very different trading system, one in which the United States is no longer the dominant player and in which there is no common agreement on the rules of the game. The consequences for American firms doing business internationally are no more clearly spelled out than in a speech by Cordell Hull, director and senior vice president of Bechtel Power Corp., a company on the cutting edge of large-scale engineering and construction technology. Commenting on the growing need for officially subsidized government support for exports, Mr. Hull said:
在1960年代,美国工程和结构ion industry did not need as much credit support from Eximbank with respect to other international activities because:
`这个国家在技术知识，设备质量和价格头寸方面拥有领先的领先优势。
`Competition from the newly industrialized countries was virtually non-existent;
`外汇率是稳定的，在大多数情况下是可预测的。
`Moving into the 1970's, economic storm clouds gathered as:
`东道国更加直接参与项目开发，因此需要为其项目提供融资；作为回应，外国工程和建筑竞争对手很快得到了补贴政府贷款的支持。。。
`Emerging foreign competition secured increasingly larger shares of the engineering and construction market with their government's subsidies and support. Further, some of these competitors were state enterprises, directly owned and backed by their governments, able to take extraordinary risks with impunity.' 1 1
赫尔先生暗示的另一个变化直接影响了我们的政策和经济绩效，这是市场限制和国外障碍的增长。这是国家中普遍的做法，更不用说良好的国内政治，定期指责一个人的贸易伙伴。公理的是，总是更容易地将问题归咎于别人，尤其是外国人是一个容易的政治目标，因为他们在美国不投票。
At the same time, however, there is growing evidence, both anecdotal and statistical, that suggests an increasing portion of world trade is becoming subject to restraints of one form or another. The Reagan administration is pursuing more section 301 cases asserting violations of our General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rights or barriers to our products in other markets than in past years. News articles have fully covered our fights over citrus (EC), pasta (EC), beef (Japan), soybean oil (EC), apples (EC), almonds (India), oranges (Japan), informatics (Brazil), fish (Canada), semiconductors (Japan), tobacco (Japan, South Korea), chocolate (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), insurance (South Korea), motion pictures (South Korea, Canada), ice cream (Canada), eggs (EC, Brazil), lawyers (Japan), telecommunications equipment (Japan), medical equipment (Japan), wood products (Japan) and aircraft (EC), and this is hardly a complete list.
此外，我们被迫通过倾倒和补贴的商品或欺诈和规避法律来应对自己市场的渗透率的增加。这些战斗也是公开记录的：钢铁（二十多个国家），相册（韩国），纺织品和服装（许多国家），各种电子组件（日本和其他国家），叉车（日本），覆盆子（加拿大）（加拿大）加拿大），木材（加拿大），猪肉（加拿大），黄铜（几个国家）和各种化学品（许多国家）仅提及少数。
These specific cases constitute graphic evidence of what observers have begun to report in the aggregate--the growth of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade as a way of life in most of the world. The World Bank summarized this trend with a table showing the proportion of trade covered by `hard core' NTBs by region: 1 2
TABLE 1: INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY IMPORTS SUBJECT TO `HARD-CORE' NTB'S 1981 AND 1986
[以百分比]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
进口国的进口来源
Industrial countries Developing countries
1981 1986 1981 1986
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
EC 10 13 22 23
Japan 29 29 22 22
美国9 15 14 17
All industrial countries 13 16 19 21
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bank defines hard-core NTB's as those `most likely to have significant restrictive effects.' It lists among them import prohibitions, quantitative restrictions, voluntary export restraints, variable levies, Multifiber Agreement (MFA) restrictions (textiles and apparel) and nonautomatic licensing.
表1得出了几个有趣的结论。首先，很明显，总体情况正在越来越严重，而不是更好 - 几乎在每个类别中都在增加。其次，美国落后于其主要保护方面的主要同行，尽管我们似乎以比其他人更快的速度越来越糟。第三，日本显然是最糟糕的罪犯，尤其是从工业国家进口的罪犯，其中包括制造商品的成比例和更少的原材料；但这似乎并没有增加其硬核障碍。第四，除日本以外，发达国家对其最不发达国家的合作伙伴的态度比其工业化的伙伴还差。
These conclusions do not suggest the smooth transition to free trade that economists would like to see. In fact, they suggest the opposite: the system is disintegrating rather than coalescing. The 1988 Omnibus Trade Act was intended to be a response to his process.
贸易法案非常简单地反映了国会观点，即我们的行为方式与他人的行为方式之间存在不连续，以及我们无法再承受自己的方式的认识。在战后时代，这是可以接受的，当时美国占全球60％的国民生产总值，以我们的方式采取行动，以制度强化，这进一步加强了我们的政治或军事目标，因为经济成本很小。重建欧洲并将日本融入西方联盟具有政治意义，如果有任何短期成本，很少有。
Now, however, the bill is coming due. Ironically, this is because from an economic rather than a trade policy perspective the playing field has already become level. For years our higher industrial base tilted it in our favor; now we are competing on more equal terms and not liking it.
如上所述，我们自己系统中的柔软度反映在生产率较差的绩效和陷入困境的制造业，以及我们的集体无法纪律地纠正我们的两个预算失衡中的任何一个。
Our competitors, on the other hand, have discovered short cuts on the road to comparative advantage through such means as the combined use of government subsidies and protection to nurture fledgling industries beyond the point where they are competitive, and the practice of businesses dumping in the U.S. market to capture market share at any price while sustaining themselves in the interim through a protected home market. Both of these practices are market-distorting deviations from free trade principles that in most cases are GATT-illegal. Clyde Prestowitz, author ofTrading Places: How We Allowed Japan to take the Lead,commented on these tactics as applied by Japan:
`Just as the U.S. government orchestrated industry efforts to put a man on the moon, the Japanese government bent every effort to create world-class industries in such areas as steel, computers, and semiconductors. Critics say that government is no good at picking `winners' and `losers.' But the Japanese government hasn't picked aircraft, computers, telecommunications, biotechnology and advanced ceramics as `winners,' the market has. The government is just making sure that Japanese industries ride with the winners.
`在这种情况下，日本公司有时以低于成本或低于本国市场价格的外国市场出售时会看到长期的战略优势。是的，这样的倾销可能意味着非日本消费者的立即意外收获，但这也可以使日本行业能够在重要市场上获得或保持锁定。
`For example, the conquest of the U.S. television market, partly by dumping, paved the way for Japan's lucrative monopoly in VCR's. Today U.S. entrepreneurs who wish to build improved VCR's or peripherals cannot, because Japanese suppliers will not provide the critical parts or licenses.
`Similarly, the driving of U.S. semiconductor producers out of key products has made U.S. electronics makers dependent on Japanese suppliers--their biggest competitors. And the Japanese will find it easier to block the entry of new electronic entrepreneurs into the market. Dumping can also protect market share while an industry adjusts to changing market conditions; during the recent rapid appreciation of the yen, Japanese producers held the line on prices, despite profit losses, to give them time to cut costs.
`From the point of view, far from being a gift, dumped products look more like the hot goods of a fence. Of course the consumers gets a low price and the fence makes a nice profit, but ultimately, legitimate producers get put out of business.' 13
The United States has historically been less reliant on subsidies than its counterparts and has only recently begun to increase its use of market-closing tactics, often as a response to others' trade distorting practices, as in the case of steel. The trade bill is an indication of congressional determination that our tougher line against market distorting practices should continue. It is ironic that it comes so late and is so weak that it simply amounts to little more than a validation of the somewhat more aggressive position the Reagan administration had already begun in 1986.
[Page: S7705]
While the trade bill points the country in the right direction, no one has ever claimed it alone is a sufficient solution to all our problems. Indeed, action will be necessary on a far broader scale if there is to be any significant impact on the trade deficit, and such action will have to address both our attitude and our policy.
One of the things we should have learned from the trade debate over the past few years is that competitiveness is, among other things, a state of mind and way of thinking; and there are a number of things we can do to recognize our thought processes for competitiveness.
理解我们的力量的真正基础
The Reagan administration continued the historical tendency of American governments in the postwar era to define our strength in military terms--the size and credibility of our nuclear deterrent and our ability to project our strength and further our foreign policy goals around the globe. Recent poll data as well as media stories, perhaps inspired by books such as Paul Kennedy's大国的兴衰，在民众中，人们对这个问题更加复杂，而真正的实力是经济权力和经济的工业基础的越来越多的意识。用图形术语，越来越多的意识到，如果您没有建造它的基础架构或购买它的钱，那么600艘海军的海军是一个无关紧要的目标。有人建议，问题不一定是枪支与黄油，而是经济术语枪支是butter, and vice versa.
所有政策制定都涉及选择。理解我们力量的真实本质意味着将来做出不同的选择 - 选择培养经济增长和生产力提高的选择，尤其是在制造业中。
Reprioritize trade policy
This corollary is a logical consequence of the first principle. It is a sad but necessary fact of life in the bureaucracy that decisions are not made in isolation. A decision on whether to press Japan on any of its various agriculture quotas will be influenced by concerns of the Defense Department on possible Japanese reduction in defense spending, of the State Department on a range of pending political issues, of the National Security Council on Japanese political and military cooperation in the Pacific Rim, and so on.
The insertion of these not directly relevant concerns is neither surprising nor troubling; it is an inevitable part of a decision-making process. What is troubling is the fact that nontrade considerations consistently carry the day when trade policy decisions are actually made. The National Security Council, for example, delayed resolution of the machine-tool industry's request for import relief for more than two years, among other reasons because of concerns about the impact it would have on Japan's cooperation with us on strategic matters. Over three years ago, then chairman of the International Trade Subcommittee, Senator John Danforth, succinctly summed up this problem in a speech at the National Press Club:
`For years, trade policy has been the poor stepchild of our Government. It has been shoved to the back of the line, behind foreign policy and tax policy, behind antitrust policy and export controls, and behind any number of other considerations. For the sake of our own people as well as the international trading system itself, the era of second-class status must be brought to an end.' 1 4
解决这个问题的方法不是消除这些其他考虑因素。也不要发起另一个重组，这将使官僚机构在混乱中持续一年。而是仅仅是为了做出正确反映我们实际优先事项的决策。
Reevaluate the role of government in the economy
正如上面所讨论的,夏娃的国际趋势nts in the trade sector seems to be in favor of greater government direction of the economy, particularly the trade and export sector. The success of Japan in literally creating comparative advantage out of a mix of government subsidies, effective allocation of credit and selective protection has not been lost on its Pacific Rim competitors, beginning with Korea and Taiwan. There are signs that the lesson is also being learned farther south as well. Likewise in the LDCs, what has been heralded as a gradual shift to free market principles in the more successful countries may actually be little more than a shift to smarter subsidies.
这并不意味着我们应该遵循相同的道路。相反，我们应该继续在国际上竭尽所能坚持自由市场原则，就像里根政府一样。在某种程度上，我们无法获得全球遵守该标准的遵守，从长远来看，我们可能会面对一些不可接受的选择，但要采用贸易伙伴采用的一些相同的策略。此外，我们在所谓的出口国际银行“战争箱”中以及我们最近的一些农业计划的经验表明，有时候，应对其他国家的补贴和涉及市场的措施的最佳方法是以图形方式证明我们有更深的口袋，准备使用其中的东西。这是一种适合改变全球经济状况的战术灵活性，在面对新的多边挑战时，我们需要保持思维的最前沿。
在过去的八年中，如果没有其他事情，就明确了任何人的不愿意 - 总统，国会，甚至是美国人民 - 在应对我们的双胞胎缺陷方面采取了决定性的行动。原因很简单：没有令人愉快的选择；Ergo，没有人想选择。最后一节讨论了下一个政府需要进行的政策变化。
减少我们的联邦预算赤字不可避免地意味着增加税收或支出削减，包括国防，或者更有可能同时组合。从政治上讲，宣布对增加税收的支持类似于宣布一个瘟疫。这是一张短期政治生涯的门票。同样，试图就削减支出在哪里达成共识是徒劳的。结果，国会采取了诸如以折扣价出售联邦资产的巧妙步骤，以筹集资金并将武装部队的发薪日从9月30日到10月1日更改，这效果将大型支出转移到了下一个财政年度，并且用预算来看，在早年将这些资金释放用于其他支出。迟早国会和总统将用完头，不得不面对真正的选择。
减少贸易赤字需要我们拒绝做出的类似的艰难选择。困境的本质在于，很清楚出口的简单选择将无效。美元的价值下降 - 在我的判断中太晚了 - 哈斯有助于增加出口（比1986年第三季度到1988年第一季度增长了30.9％），但正如艾伯特·沃尼洛尔（Albert Wojnilower）在预先认识的分析中指出的那样：
`试图通过更高的迅速减少赤字出口会产生过热，吸引更大的进口，并在经济衰退中达到高潮。即使从长达长远来看，通过向工业机构的其他成员出口增长来降低我们的赤字也有其限制，因为它威胁了他们的经济以及政治和经济强烈反对。唯一的可持续出口市场是发展中国家。为了迅速增加销售额，我们必须从它们进口更多的工业用品，为原材料支付更高的价格或原谅其债务。当我们做所有这些事情时，毫无疑问，我们已经准备好[这样做]。15
The export increases that have occurred, however, have been accompanied by climbing imports. For the first four months of 1988, imports were running nearly 12 percent, or $15.7 billion, ahead of the same period last year. More to the point, they were more than $1.3 billion higher than the last four months in 1987. Subsequent data show some further declines in both exports and imports, but the change is at best glacial. Consumpton is not clearly declining, and until it does, the trade deficit will remain too high, and the increases in savings and investment necessary for our long-term competitiveness will have to be postponed.
贸易辩论的一个肮脏的小秘密是，那些以自由交易者为荣的人不喜欢提到任何有效的解决方案都需要减少进口和增加出口。仅通过后者减少赤字，我们的国外销售将需要超过1500亿美元，这是人类历史上前所未有的全球经济统治水平。
但是，正如Wojnilower还指出的那样，减少进口的手段几乎不是时尚的：
`通过降低减少赤字的三种方法imports进口替代,减少总需求,or protectionism. For the moment at least, import substitution--making things at home rather than importing them--has the same drawback as export increases, namely, heightening the inflationary pressure on domestic resources. Reducing demand is a euphemism for recession. With the United States accounting for 18% of the world's imports, recession here likely would mean recessions abroad and it is doubtful that anyone would come out ahead. One consequence would be certain: protectionism would mushroom everywhere. In fact protectionism is probably the only, though hardly a desirable, way to shrink the trade deficit in a hurry.' 1 6
这不是国会议员喜欢的选择。他们将抵制明显的 - 某种全面的进口附加费或其他限制性设备，而是试图将问题定义为“不公平”贸易的问题，并微调我们的贸易法来处理问题。当然，没有分析师和任何国会议员认为在国外开放市场或制止不公平的贸易惯例将无法解决问题的一小部分，但是我们政治家喜欢相信这些问题可以通过谈判“解决”。显然，应该为上述克莱德·普雷斯托维茨（Clyde Prestowitz）概述的原因而解决，但是我们不应该幻想这样做本身就是对我们经济问题的充分答案。
Ultimately, meaningful progress will require both import-limiting action on our part and action to increase growth elsewhere in the world. Import-limiting action could be either general or targeted. In either case it will hit Japan the hardest. In the spring of 1985, I was among the first to propose an import surcharge on Japanese goods, a tariff increase that would both reduce imports and raise revenue. That idea has not found much favor, but it will return inevitably as the choices narrow.
One action that will probably not work is further reduction in the dollar's value. Although its 38 percent reduction from its 1985 peak (against a basket of currencies) has made a difference, it has not been nearly as great as textbooks would suggest, and there clearly is a limit to how much more juice can be squeezed out of that particular orange.
The reasons for this is simple. Foreign producers elected in many cases to reduce or even eliminate profits and kept prices low to retain market share. U.S. producers, who must have been reading different textbooks than the Japanese, often did the reverse, increasing prices to restore profits that had been missing in the early 1980s. At the same time, U.S. consumers have continued in their determination to buy foreign products regardless of price increases. In some situations, VCRs being the most conspicuous example, there is no significant U.S. producer, and yen appreciation goes straight into U.S. inflation. We have done well so far in reducing the dollar's value without stimulating inflation, but it does not appear that there is much more benefit to be gained from that strategy.
The other choice is increased economic growth elsewhere. Jim Baker, as Treasury Secretary, had pursued this policy with enthusiasm but with limited success. Japan responded, but not in a way that will produce rapid results here. Germany remains paralyzed by its fear of inflation--not entirely irrational in view of its history--and appears willing to live with less economic growth as a consequence. Many of the NICs are constrained by their debt burdens from making much of a contribution. That leaves Taiwan, South Korea and a few others--not enough to make a difference. It remains the right policy, but counting on others to solve our problems is at best naive and at worst foolish. In the end we will have to solve our own problems through our own actions.
Wojnilower's response to this dilemma is that `we must learn if not to love our deficit at least to become more relaxed about it,' 1 7 a reflection of his pessimism about a near-term solution.
The right response is for the private sector to understand the profound challenge we face and for labor and management to work far more realistically and cooperatively. Nevertheless, our government must recognize the urgency of creating a climate for the success of these efforts. We must go directly to the core of the problem and start with a comprehensive blueprint to support and encourage the revitalization of our manufacturing base. Following are some necessary parts of such a blueprint.
[Page: S7706]
Shift the tax system to favor savings and investment rather than consumption; provide tax incentives for research and development
The United States has consistently had the lowest savings rate in the developed world. This has both crippled our ability to make badly needed investments in research and development and infrastructure, but it has permitted the consumption binge that has created our trade and current account deficits.
Devise strategies to create targeted comparative advantage while facilitating adjustment
我首先提出了五年前为行业的市场促进调整策略。最好的方法不是政府领导或指示的方法，而是政府对行业的支持（劳动和管理层）的支持 - 合作将解决方案设计解决方案。政府成为该过程中的主持人不是合作伙伴。
Help develop a stronger export mentality among our manufacturers
It is axiomatic in any analysis of American economic history that Americans have ignored foreign markets in favor of the large domestic market. Even those who have sought to export have often not tackled the global market systematically and have gone to it only in times of surplus capacity, pulling back when domestic demand has increased. This has prevented the development of a true export mentality in the United States, in sharp contrast to so many of our trading partners who rely on exporting as an integral part of their economies.
We need to encourage more thinking about exports. The Commerce Department has launched several such initiatives, most recently its Export Now program, and the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 was intended to do the same thing for smaller businesses. We need to pursue these and other initiatives aggressively to help our manufacturers fully undestand the extent to which they are now part of a global market.
积极定义市场体系，反对竞争对手的不公平贸易实践
Stopping dumped and subsidized imports makes economic sense over the long term for both the United States and foreign economies. In the short term, aggressive enforcement limits inports not only in the directly affected sector but more broadly because of the message it sends our trading partners about our determination to support market principles.
普及的另一个不公平的实践是专利/商标盗版。由于合理的原因，美国的创新领导者已经被围困。盗窃技术和对我们产品的直接复制使问题变得更糟。最近通过的贸易法案将有助于打击这项活动，但是关于对知识产权更强有力保护的国际谈判也将是必要的。
Indeed, the entire Uruguay Round can play an important role in the reduction of our trade deficit, not just by opening others' closed doors, but by further tightening the rules on unfair practices, particularly in the area of agricultural subsidies.
Lower the cost of capital by reducing the budget deficit
This has been discussed above, but it is worth reiterating to stress its relevance as part of a comprehensive approach.
Upgrade the capability of the work force through education and retraining
The trade bill takes some important steps in this direction by significantly increasing our job retraining and trade adjustment assistance funds. The decline in unemployment over the past year makes it tempting to put retraining on the back burner. That would be a grave mistake. Changes in the structure of our economy and the nature of our manufacturing sector are coming ever faster. Making sure our work force is prepared to adapt to them is critical.
Better manage our current account deficit by reducing energy imports through conservation and substitution and increasing defense burden-sharing by our allies
Obviously, reducing the trade and budget deficits will also contribute to better current-account control, but reducing our energy and defense bills would be two important steps beyond that, steps that are also justifiable on their own merits.
Following this blueprint is essential for both revitalizing our manufacturing sector and bringing our overall trade problems under control. There is a very real possibility, however, that in some specific cases we may be too late. To the extent that whole industries have already been decimated, recovery may be impossible. For example, the ability of the Japanese to understand interrelated end-use markets in the electronics sector has enabled them to take a commanding world lead in video recorders, video cameras, lens manufacturing, small precision electronic motor design, automatic camera focusing systems, 35 millimeter cameras, television sets, audio recorders, compact disk playback systems, video disk playback systems and high speed digital fiber transmission equipment. 18 The next battleground will likely be high definition television, where our industry faces the same technological, organizational and marketing challenge.
Related to that is the continuing struggle of our high-tech sector to maintain a full range of production of components and finished products, including dynamic random access memory chips. Our ability to develop new generations of products depends on investment in research and development, which in turn depends on earnings from sales of current generation products. Companies that abandon a product line are not just giving up present earnings; they are forfeiting their future.
我们的成功也取决于我们面临挑战的能力。只要日本公司可以在三年半的时间内将产品从想法到飞行员生产，而一家美国公司则花费了五年多的工程时间，只要日本公司可以使用相同的灵活制造业我们公司仅生产15种产品的五十种产品的系统，我们不会弥补损失的基础。
Our failure thus far to meet this challenge has meant thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in earnings surrendered overseas. We cannot get them back. We can, however, prevent the same thing from happening again, if we have the discipline and vision to follow the kind of blueprint laid out above.
Finally, President Bush must at all costs avoid a relaxed approach that hopes for favorable trends in the monthly deficit figures, a favorite media exercise. This ignores the real issues, including the serious and continuing erosion of the manufacturing sector that has been the focus of much of this article. While productivity improvements are welcome developments, they cannot substitute for the jobs lost that will not be regained, the factories closed that will not be reopened and most importantly the industries that permanently stopped producing in the United States. These consequences can only be addressed by a sea change in our thinking. Simply put, we have to understand the primary role that economics plays in our national strength; we have to define more clearly our economic interests, both short and long term; and we have to be prepared to act aggressively to further those interests, regardless of the complaints we might receive from our trading partners. The status quo works very well for them. Nobody should be surprised if they resist changing it.
但是，我们的义务是追求符合我们利益的政策，而不是他们的利益。我们已经有几年了，而且已经过去了很长的时间。大约150年前，本杰明·迪斯雷利（Benjamin Disraeli）说，“自由贸易不是原则。这是一个权宜之计。自由贸易为英国井服务，它为我们服务了，但是多年来，我们已经忘记了迪斯雷利的建议，并将其变成了第十一条诫命。现在是时候将其重新放在其应有的地方 - 在情况和利益决定的情况下，应采取的合理政策 - 现在可能还不是。
[Page: S7707]
1Clyde Prestowitz, `Let's Wake Up on Trade,'华盛顿邮报，12 June 1988, p. C4.
2 John Heinz, `Additional Views,'参议院财务委员会关于1987年《综合贸易法》的报告，Senate Report 100-71, p. 269.
3本节中的数据取自技术评估办公室，“支付法案：制造业和美国的贸易赤字”，1988年6月的报告草案。
4Ibid,chapter 4, p. 11.
5William R. Hawkins, letter to the editor,The American Spectator,October 1985.
6 Stephen S. Cohen和John Zysman，“后工业经济的神话”，Technology Review,February-March 1987, p. 58. (This article was adapted from Cohen and Zysman's book,Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of a Post-Industrial Economy.)
7一般会计办公室，“与国防工业基础至关重要的行业有关的信息”，1988年3月7日草案。
8辛西娅·米切尔（Cynthia F.Wall Street Journal,1988年4月28日，第1页。1。
9詹姆斯·克利夫顿（James Clifton），“为什么美国应该单方面缩小其基本行业的规模？”，未出版的专着。
10Office of Technology Assessment, `Paying the Bill: Manufacturing and America's Trade Deficit,' draft report, June 1988.
11 Cordell Hull，1984年10月25日，华盛顿特区美国国务院的“贸易贸易”会议上的演讲。
12世界银行，World Development Report 1987,p。142.
13克莱德·普雷斯托维茨（Clyde Prestowitz），“让我们醒来贸易”，华盛顿邮报，12 June 1988, p. C4.
14John C. Danforth, speech at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., April 1985. Reprinted in国会记录，25 April 1985, p. 9428.
15Albert M. Wojnilower, `A Trade Deficit for All Seasons,' remarks delivered to the Conference Board's 1988 Business Outlook Conference, New York, NY, 10 September 1987, p. 15.
16同上，p。15。
17同上，p。16。
18 Richard Elkus，Jr。，“迈向国家战略：杠杆战略”，在竞争或承认的会议上演讲？首席执行官应对1988年7月13日的Rebuild America，American Electronics，American Electronics，国会Clearnowhouse赞助的高科技挑战。
END