Posted onApr.08, 2020inArms Control,Nuclear Weapons,Russia,战略安全,United States经过Hans M. Kristensen

A Decade After Signing, New START Treaty Is Working

汉斯·克里斯汀森（Hans M. Kristensen）

On this day, ten years ago, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitri A. Medvedev签署了新的开始条约during a ceremony in Prague. The treaty capped the number of strategic missiles and heavy bombers the two countries could possess to 800, with no more than 700 launchers and 1,550 warheads deployed. The treaty entered into force in February 2011 and into effect in February 2018.

Twice a year, the two countries have exchanged detailed data on their strategic forces. Of that data, the public gets to see three sets of numbers: the so-called aggregate data of deployed launchers, warheads attributed to those launchers, and total launchers. Nine years of published data looks like this:

The latest set of this data was发行经过the U.S. State Department last week和shows the situation as of March 1, 2020. As of that date, the two countries possessed a combined total of 1,554 strategic missiles and heavy bombers, of which

1,140 launchers were deployed with 2,699 warheads (note: the warhead number is actually about 100 too high because each deployed bomber is counted as one weapon even though bombers don’t carry weapons under normal circumstances).

Compared with September 2019, the data shows the two countries combined cut 3 strategic launchers, reduced deployed strategic launchers by 41, and reduced the number of deployed strategic warheads by 103. Of these numbers, only the “3” is real; the other changes reflect natural fluctuations as launchers move in and out of maintenance or are being upgraded.

Compared with February 2011, the data shows the two countries combined have cut 435 strategic launchers, reduced deployed strategic launchers by 263, and reduced the number of deployed strategic warheads by 638. While important, it’s important to remind that this warhead reduction is but a fraction (less than 8 percent) of the estimated 8,110 warheads that remain in the two countries combined nuclear weapons stockpiles (less than 6 percent if counting their total combined inventories of 12,170 stockpiled and retired (but yet to be dismantled) warheads).

The United States

数据显示美国目前拥有ing 800 strategic launchers, of which 655 are deployed with 1,373 warheads attributed to them. This is a reduction of 13 deployed strategic launchers and 3 deployed strategic warheads over the past 6 months. These are not actual reductions but reflect normal fluctuations caused by launchers moving in and out of maintenance. The United States has not reduced its total inventory of strategic launchers since 2017.

Compared with February 2011, the United States has reduced its inventory of strategic launchers by 324, deployed launchers by 227, and deployed strategic warheads by 427. While important, the warhead reduction represents only a small fraction (about 11 percent) of the剩下的3,800弹头in the U.S. stockpile (a little over 7 percent if counting total inventory of 5,800 stockpiled and retired (but yet to be dismantled) warheads).

The Russian Federation

The New START data shows Russia with an inventory of 764 strategic launchers, of which 485 are deployed with 1,326 warheads attributed to them. Compared with six months ago, this is a reduction of 28 deployed launchers and 100 deployed strategic warheads and reflects launcher maintenance and upgrade work to new systems.

Compared with February 2011, Russia has cut its inventory of strategic launchers by 111, deployed launchers by 36, and deployed strategic warheads by 211. This modest reduction represents less than 5 percent of the estimated4,310 warheads that remain在俄罗斯的核武器中，如果计算6,370个库存的总库存不到4％，则已退休并退休（但尚未被拆除）俄罗斯弹头。

The Russian reductions accomplished under New START are smaller than the U.S. reductions because Russia had fewer strategic forces than the United States when the treaty entered into force in 2011.

Build-up, What Build-up?

由于美国官员和核武器经常提倡俄罗斯正在增加其核武库的要求，有趣的是，尽管有一项重要的现代化计划，但新的起点数据表明，这种增加并没有在俄罗斯战略核力量的规模中发生。

On the contrary, the New START data shows that Russia now has 170 deployed strategic launchers fewer than the United States, a number that exceeds the size of an entire US Air Force ICBM wing. The Russian launcher deficit has been growing by more than one-third since the lowest point of 125 in February 2018.

俄罗斯军方正试图通过增加可以用更新的导弹代替较旧类型的弹头来弥补这一发射器差异。在正常情况下，大多数这些弹头并未在导弹上部署，但可能会在危机中上传到发射器上。The United States also has such an upload capabilityfor its larger inventory of launchers and therefore is not at a strategic disadvantage.

俄罗斯两项新的战略核武器（Avangard和Sarmat）被新起点涵盖。其他类型的数量相对较少，似乎无法打破战略平衡。该条约包括包括新武器类型的规定。

Inspections and Notifications

In addition to the New START data, the U.S. State Department also recently updated its overview of the status of the on-site inspections and notification exchanges that are part of the treaty’s verification regime.

自2011年2月以来，美国和俄罗斯检查员对彼此的战略核力量进行了328次检查，并交换了19,852个发射器运动和活动的通知。由于冠状病毒，今年发生了四次检查，在活动暂时停止之前。

This inspection and notification regime and record are crucial parts of the treaty and increasingly important for U.S.-Russian strategic relations as other treaties and agreements have been scuttled.

But time is now also running out for New START with only a little over 10 months remaining before the treaty expires on February 5, 2021.

俄罗斯和美国可以将新的起点条约延长多达5年。双方都必须采取负责任的行动，并这样做以维护这一基本协议。

也可以看看：Count-Down Begins For No-Brainer: Extend New START Treaty

约翰·D（John D.）和凯瑟琳·T·麦克阿瑟（Catherine T.新土地基金会，耕地基金会和前景山基金会。所作的陈述和表达的观点仅仅是作者的责任。

Posted onFeb.05, 2020inArms Control,Nuclear Weapons,Russia,United States经过Matt Korda和Hans M. Kristensen

Count-Down Begins For No-Brainer: Extend New START Treaty

By Matt Korda and Hans M. Kristensen

从今天开始的一年，即2021年2月5日，新的起点条约将到期，除非美国和俄罗斯法案将最后一项核武器控制协议延长了五年。

无论你的政治取向,条约extension is a no-brainer – for at least six primary reasons.

1. New START keeps nuclear arsenals in check.If the treaty expires, there will be no constraints on US or Russian strategic arsenals for the first time since 1972. It would remove caps on how many strategic nuclear missiles and bombers the two sides can own and how many warheads that are carried on them. This means that Russia could quickly upload about a thousand new warheads onto its deployed missile arsenal–without adding a single new missile.美国可以上传更多，因为它具有比俄罗斯更多的导弹和轰炸机（请参见下表）。双方都可以开始增加武器库，冒着新的核武器竞赛的风险。

*Both Russia and the United States have large warhead inventories that could be added to missiles and bombers if New START treaty expires. Click image to view full size*

At a time when NATO-Russian relations are at their lowest since the end of the Cold War, when long-term predictability is more important than in the past three decades, allowing New START constraints to expire is obviously not in the US strategic interest or that of its allies. Very simply, New START is a good deal for both the United States and Russia; it cannot be allowed to expire without replacing it with something better.

2.新的起步力量水平是当前核基础设施计划的基础。美国和俄罗斯都制定了他们的核武器和行业现代化计划，假设新的起步力量水平将继续，或者至少不会增加。如果新的起点消失了，那些假设和现代化计划将必须修改，从而导致巨大的额外费用，俄罗斯和美国都无法负担。

3. New START offers transparency and predictability in an unstable world.Under the current treaty, the United Statesreceives a notificationevery time a Russian missile is deployed, every time a missile or bomber moves between bases, and every time a new missile is produced. Without these notifications, the United Stateswould have to spend more money and incur significant risksto get the exact same information through National Technical Means (i.e. satellites and other forms of site monitoring). Russia benefits in the same way.

*New START has forced Russia and the United States to reduce deployed strategic nuclear forces. Click image to view full size*

Why would we willingly give all that up – to get absolutely nothing in return (and actually pay a steep price for giving it up)?

4. New START has overwhelming bipartisan support––even among Trump voters.Not only is extension a foreign policy priority for Democrats, butpolling data indicatesthat approximately 70% of Trump voters across the country are in favor of extending New START.

Additionally,高级军事领导人like the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commander of Air Force Global Strike Command have expressed support for the treaty. Even one of Trump’s own political appointees, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy David Trachtenberg, has testified that that “the transparency and verification requirements of the New START Treaty are a benefit” to the security of the United States.

5. We won’t get another chance.If New START expires next year, arms control between Russia and the United States as we know it is effectively over. Given the underlying East-West tensions and upcoming dramatic governance shifts in both the United States and Russia, there appears to be little interest or bandwidth available on either side in negotiating a new and improved treaty.

Moreover, although future arms control must attempt to incorporate other nuclear-armed states, efforts to do so should not jeopardize New START.

At risk of stating the obvious, negotiating a new treaty is exponentially more difficult than extending an existing one.

6. It’s easy.Extension of New START doesn’t require Congressional legislation or Senate ratification. All it takes is a presidential stroke of a pen. And at the end of 2019,Putin offered立即扩大条约“没有任何先决条件”。特朗普总统应该立即提出他的提议。截至今天，他还剩下一年的时间。但是不要等到最后一刻！完成它！

Additional information:

约翰·D（John D.）和凯瑟琳·T·麦克阿瑟（Catherine T.新土地基金会，耕地基金会和前景山基金会。所作的陈述和表达的观点仅仅是作者的责任。

Posted onJan.21, 2020inArms Control,China,Nuclear Weapons经过Hans M. Kristensen

China’s New DF-26 Missile Shows Up At Base In Eastern China

汉斯·克里斯汀森（Hans M. Kristensen）

Pictures taken recently by Maxar Technologies’ satellites show a large number of launchers for the DF-26 intermediate-range missile operating at a training site approximately 9 kilometers (5.7 miles) south of Qingzhou City in China’s Shandong Province.

这是在该地区首次看到DF-26，并标志着将导弹整合到中国军队中的新阶段。DF-26具有双重能力，这意味着它可以同时提供核和常规的弹头，并且被认为范围约为4,000公里（2,490英里）。DF-26于2016年首次进行，五角大楼2019年有关中国军事发展的报告estimatedChina has up to 80 DF-26 launchers with 80-160 missiles (each launcher may have one reload).

The DF-26 is an INF-weapons, which means its range puts it in the category of ground-launched missiles that Russia and the United States banned in their arsenals for 32 years until Russia violated the treaty and the United States withdrew in protest.

中国第一个DF-26旅在2018年4月站起来，位于河南省Xinyang郊外的青木西南约630公里（390英里）。在过去的两年中，DF-26出现在中国各地的多个地点，在北京以外的一家工厂可以看到大量生产。

DF-26 Sightings At Qingzhou

青木遗址已经活跃了数十年，似乎是人民解放军火箭部队（PLARF）经营的导弹支撑基地的一部分。CIA最初identifiedthe location as I-TU, a misspelling of its former name Yidu County, since changed to Qingzhou. The main base is located in the southwest district of the city [36.6774°, 118.4541°] and includes three large high-bay garages for servicing missile launchers. Over the years, several nuclear missile launchers have been seen operating there: DF-3A IRBM, DF-21 SRBM, DF-31/A ICBM, and now DF-26 IRBM.

DF-26最近出现的设施大约是在Google Earth在Google Earth上标识为Zhuanghanmiaocun的位置附近的南方的9公里（5.7英里）。DF-26发射器于2019年11月首次出现在卫星图像上，当时看到了十二个发射器。在2020年1月初，Google Earth加载了2019年12月11日的Maxar图像（注：Google Earth上显示的图像日期是在某些原因提前一天与拍摄的实际日期相比的），这是第一个描述经过Twitter user @DexReloaded. During December, several images taken by Maxar satellites show up to 18 DF-26 launchers, approximately the same number that was displayed at Xinyang in 2018 and at Jilantai in 2019.

最近的图像是2020年1月8日，显示了两组DF-26发射器：一个在车库之间和旧的DF-3A圆形发射台之间，向北（36.6026°，118.4803°）；以及在清除的空间上，南部的第二组（36.5999°，118.4835°）仍然可以看到以前的DF-31发射台。图像上也可见的是部署后需要支持或维修发射器所需的许多支持车辆。DF-26发射器可能是将其集成到新旅中的一部分。

DF-26 launchers at Qingzhou training site. Click on image to view full size.

DF-26 Sightings Elsewhere

如上所述，中国在2018年站立了其第一个DF-26单位。一个图像from the activation ceremony shows 24 trucks parked under a temporary cover: 18 DF-26 TELs and 4 support vehicles. If each brigade has 18 launchers, then the 80 launchers reported by the Pentagon would be sufficient for four brigades. Not all have become operational yet but DF-26s are beginning to appear at various sites across China: Xinyang (Henan), Qingzhou (Shandong), Dengshahe (Liaoning), Korla (Xinjiang), possibly Jinhua (Anhui), and the large training area at Jilantai (Inner Mongolia).

The standing up of the first DF-26 brigade at Xinyang in April 2018 wasannouncedon Chinese news media with pictures and videos from the ceremony. But even before that, in January 2018, DF-26 launchers showed up at the field training site of the 651^stBrigade near Dengshahe northeast of Dalian (Liaoning).

然后，在2019年1月，中国媒体announcedDF-26在“西北中国高原和沙漠地区”进行了一项运动。操作稍后geo-locatedto the large new training area west of Jilantai (Inner Mongolia), where theycontinued to trainin April-May 2019 together with DF-41s, DF-31AGs, and DF-17s before being shipped to Beijing for the parade in September 2019.

DF-26 training at Jilantai has been a favorite propaganda tool for the Chinese government with several test-launches shown on various news media outlets (here和here). A propaganda documentary jointly produced by the Political Bureau of the Central Military Commission and the PLA News and Communication Center and broadcast by CCTV by the end of 2019 included a brief clip showing a DF-26 launch. The launch site is geolocated in the figure below:

Geolocation of DF-26 test launch at Jilantai training field. Click on image to view full size.

During those months, DF-26 launchers were also seen operating at the 646 Brigade base in Korla (Ku’erle) in the Xinjiang province in western China. The first launcher was seen in April and two more in August 2019 (see image below).

DF-26 launchers at Korla missile base. Click on image to view full size.

DF-26生产和数字

The Pentagon estimated in 2019 that China had fielded up to 80 DF-26 launchers. Not all of those are fully operationally deployed; some brigades are still being equipped. Noted China military expert Mark Stokesestimated大概一年前的两三个DF-26旅，每个旅都有6-12个发射器。因此，在Xinyang和Qingzhou的18个发射器的展示显然很有趣：它包括第二旅的6-12个发射器，还是DF-26旅的发射器有更多的发射器？

Eighteen launchers were also the number可见操作at Jilantai.

DF-26 launchers are produced at a factory near Fangshan in the outskirt of Beijing. The factory has been expanded significantly during the past decade with several large vehicle assembly halls added. The factory also appears to be involved in the production of DF-21 MRBM launchers as well as various air-defense systems. The main parking area for DF-26 launchers is in the middle of the southern end of the complex (see image below).

DF-26 production at Fangshan factory. Click on image to view full size.

Fangshan的第一个DF-26发射器于2009年3月出现在卫星图像上，在部署开始时，通常可以在2016年看到四到五个发射器。可见发射器的数量在2017年底和2018年初增加到15-25，并在2018年底和2019年初增加到20-38发射器，直到2019年9月初达到51个可见发射器。看到完全组装；例如，在2019年9月可见的51个发射器中，似乎只有38个完成。在图像上清晰可见组装的各个阶段（请参见下图）。

Df-26 production stages. Click on image to view full size.

五角大楼的中国如何报告80 DF -26 launchers? The report doesn’t explicitly say the 80 are fielded or deployed and the operational brigades and launchers seen at training areas do not add up to 80 – that number is less than 60. It seems likely the DOD estimate includes at least some of the launchers in production at Fangshan. As illustrated above, those launchers include some that are not finished but at various stages of assembly.

如果一个人加起来的仿膳饭庄发射器应用ear complete (those with missile canister installed), the number was about 40 in mid-2018, when DOD reported 16-30 launchers. By mid-2019, when DOD reported 80 launchers, the total number of completed launchers at Fangshan was about 50. Such a count does not accurately show how many launchers were complete because the available images were not evenly distributed over time; some were taken only a few days or weeks apart and there were month-long gaps between others. Nonetheless, it does indicate that the DOD estimate of 80 launchers likely included complete launchers at the Fangshan factory in addition to those deployed at the brigade bases and training areas.

DF-26 Implications

的“新”DF-26不是可以圆盾t Guam (other missiles have been able to do so for decades); it is that it can do so with an accurate conventional warhead. But there are also other reasons why the deployment of additional new DF-26s at Qingzhou and other locations, as well as the considerable production that is underway, is important.

The first reason is the growing size and diversity of the Chinese nuclear arsenal. China officially maintains what it calls a minimum deterrent focused on ensuring it has a secure retaliatory capability to respond to a nuclear attack. Compared with Russia and the United States, the Chinese nuclear arsenal is small; but compared with France, Britain, and India, the Chinese arsenal is significant. And it is increasing further with China about to overtake France as the世界第三大核武器国家。在过去的15年中，中国的阿森纳几乎翻了一番，预计未来十年将进一步增长，尽管也许不那么多some say。There is no indication China is seeking numerical parity (or near-parity) with Russia and the United States or changing its nuclear strategy. Yet the apparently open-ended growth of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is deepening uncertainty and anxiety in neighboring countries and other nuclear-armed states about China’s long-term intentions.

中国对这种担忧的拒绝是众所周知的，但适得其反，因为它将推动中国将其视为对其国家安全的威胁日益增加的军事能力的发展和部署。中国政府可以通过发出有关其核武库状况和未来计划的事实陈述来帮助减轻关注和最坏的反应。这不需要披露一切，但是随着军事力量的日益增长，中国可以躲在更大的核力量后面的日子。

DF-26 launchers at Beijing parade in September 2019.

A second reason the growing DF-26 deployment is important is that it is a dual-capable weapon that can deliver either a conventional or a nuclear warhead. The inability to clearly distinguish the two creates significant challenges for crisis stability and escalation scenarios. In a tense crisis or a war, Chinese readying of conventionally-armed DF-26 launchers could easily be misinterpreted as preparations to employ nuclear weapons and cause an adversary to ready its nuclear weapons unnecessarily and precipitately. If China launched a conventionally-armed DF-26, the target country might assume the worst and prematurely escalate to nuclear use. This dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that the conventional DF-26 is part of the PLARF’s conventional missile strike force intended to provide pre-nuclear strike options, a force that in a potential war with the United States would likely be subject to focused and intense conventional strikes. If the United States used conventional weapons to target what it perceived was conventional DF-26 launchers, China might conclude that the United States had attacked its nuclear forces and escalate accordingly.

不断增长的DF-26部署的第四个原因是，有效载荷部分是指导性的，并且根据国防部的说法，对土地目标具有“能够接近精确的罢工能力”。报复性核威慑不需要接近精确，但战斗可能。因此，中国部署高度准确，快速，双重能力的武器可能会进一步加深对中国核战略的不确定性和猜测。它也可能影响中国对核武器在降级方案中的亚战略用途的考虑。

Finally, the DF-26 deployment is important because the missile is part of China’s growing inventory of INF-range weapons. Russia’s violation of the INF treaty was probably partially a response to China’s growing inventory of INF-range missiles, and the United States used China as part of its justification for withdrawing from the INF treaty and is developing several INF missiles that it plans to deploy within range of China. Russian and US deployment of INF missiles near China will likely further stimulate China’s production of INF-range weapons and potentially result in a destabilizing INF arms race in the Pacific.

由于这些原因,重要的是,中国箴言ides more information about its future plans for the development of its missile forces and engage in ongoing official discussions about the scope and role of its nuclear deterrent, including INF forces. And although China is unlikely to join US-Russian strategic agreements in the foreseeable future, Beijing should already now begin to develop options for what it could offer and what it would want in return if joining such agreements in the future. This could include articulating which US (and Indian) capabilities China is most concerned about and what Beijing would offer in return for limits on them. As a goodwill gesture, China could also offer unilateral limits on its INF capabilities in return for the US and Russia not deploying new INF systems in the region. Information and limits on the dual-capable DF-26 would be a good start.

This publication was made possible by generous contributions from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the新土地基金会，耕地基金会和前景山基金会。所作的陈述和表达的观点仅仅是作者的责任。

Posted onOct.04, 2019inArms Control,Nuclear Weapons,Russia,United States经过Hans M. Kristensen

新开始条约数据显示，条约将战略核武器盖好

汉斯·克里斯汀森（Hans M. Kristensen）

The latest data on US and Russian strategic nuclear forces limited by the New START treaty shows the treaty is serving its intended purpose of keeping a lid on the two countries’ arsenals.

The data waspublished由国务院昨天。

Despite deteriorating relations and revival of “Great Power Competition” strategies, the data shows neither side has increased deployed strategic force levels in the past year.

The data set released is the last before the New START treaty enters its final year before it expires in February 2021. The treaty can be extended for another five years by the stroke of a pen, but arms control opponents in Washington and Moscow are working hard to prevent this from happening. If they succeed, the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals will be completely unregulated for the first time since the 1970s.

By The Numbers

The latest data shows that the United States and Russia combined, as of March 1^st, 2019, deployed a total of 1,181 strategic launchers (long-range ballistic missiles and heavy bombers) with a total of 2,802 warheads attributed to them (see chart below). That is very close to the combined forces they deployed six months ago. These two arsenals constitute more strategic launchers and warheads than all the world’s other seven nuclear-armed states possess combined.

For Russia, the data shows 513 deployed strategic launchers with 1,426 warheads. That’s a slight decrease of 11 launchers and 3 warheads compared with March 2019. Russia is currently 187 launchers and 124 warheads below the treaty limit for deployed strategic weapons.

The United States deploys 668 strategic launchers with 1,376 warheads attributed to them, according to the new data, or a slight increase of 12 launchers and 11 warheads compared with March 2019. The United States is currently 32 launchers and 174 warheads below the treaty limit for deployed strategic weapons.

These increases and decreases since March 2019 are normal fluctuations in the arsenals due to maintenance and upgrades and do not reflect an increase or decrease of the force structure or threat level.

重要的是要提醒，在新起点下报告的俄罗斯和美国核力量只是其核武器总库存的一部分，currently estimatedat 4,330 warheads for Russia and 3,800 for the United States (6,500 and 6,185, respectively, if also counting retired warheads awaiting dismantlement). Both sides could upload many hundreds of warheads extra on their launchers if New START was allowed to expire.

Build-Up, What Build-Up?

Both Russia and the United States are engaged in significant modernization programs to extend and improve their strategic nuclear forces. So far, however, these programs largely follow the same overall structure and are unlikely to significantly change the strategic balance of those forces. The New START data shows the treaty is serving to keep a lid on those modernization plans.

That said, both countries are working on modifications to their strategic nuclear arsenals. Russia has been working for a long time – even before New START was signed – to develop exotic intercontinental-range weapons to overcome US ballistic missile defense systems. These exotic weapons, which are not yet deployed or covered by the treaty, include a ground-launched nuclear-powered cruise missile (Burevestnik) and a submarine-launched torpedo-like drone (Poseidon). The Trump administration is complaining these new weapons should be included in the treaty. A third weapon, an ICBM-launched glide-vehicle commonly known as Avangard, is close to initial deployment and will be accountable under the treaty but would likely replace existing deployed warheads. All of these weapons are limited in numbers and insufficient to change the overall strategic balance or challenge extension of New START. The treaty provides for adding new weapon types if agreed by the two parties, although neither side has formally proposed to do so.

俄罗斯是没有优势的strategic nuclear forces and the new data shows it does not appear to try to close the significant gap that exists in the number of deployed strategic launchers – 155 in US favor by the latest count (up 23 launchers from March 2019). To put things in perspective, 155 launchers are the equivalent of an entire US ICBM wing, or more than seven Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines fully loaded, or more than twice the size of the entire US nuclear bomber fleet. If the tables were turned, US officials and hardliners would certainly be complaining about a Russian advantage. Given this launcher disparity, one could also suspect that Russia might seek to retain more non-deployed launchers for potential redeployment to be able to rapidly increase the force if necessary. Instead, the New START data shows that Russia has continued to decrease its non-deployed launchers (down 12 since March 2019).

Instead of trying to close the launcher gap, Russia is compensating for the disparity by maximizing warhead loadings on its new missiles to be able to keep overall parity with the United States. Since 2016, the New START data indicates that Russia has been forced to reduce the normal warhead loading on some of its ballistic missiles in order to meet the treaty limit for deployed warheads. This demonstrates New START has a real constraining effect on Russian deployed strategic forces.

Having said that, Russia could potentially – like the United States – upload large numbers of non-deployed nuclear warheads onto deployed strategic launchers if a decision was made to break out of the New START limits or the treaty was allowed to expire in 2021. Those launchers would include initially bombers, then sea-launched ballistic missiles, and in the longer term the ICBMs. Significantly increasing the force structure, however, would take decades to achieve because both sides have based their long-term planning on the assumption that the New START force level would continue.

The United States has dismantled and converted more launchers than Russia because the United States had more of them when the treaty was signed, not because Washington was handed a “bad deal,” as some defense hardliners have claimed. But Russia has complained – including in an unprecedentedletter to the US Congress– that it is unable to verify that launchers converted by the US to a conventional role cannot be returned to nuclear use. The New START treaty does not require irreversibility, however, and the US insists the conversions have been carried out in accordance with the treaty provisions that Russia agreed to when it signed the treaty.

The Russia complaints about converted launchers and the US complaints about incorporating new strategic weapons are issues that should be resolved in the treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Committee (BCC).

The US complains new Russian strategic weapons should be included in New START and Russia complains it can’t verify irreversibility of converted US launchers

验证和通知

Although not included in the formal aggregate data, the State Department has also disclosed the total number of inspections and notifications conducted under the treaty. Since February 2011, this has included 313 onsite inspections (25 this year) and18,803 notifications（最近12个月2,387）。这种数据流对于提供信心和放心至关重要的是，对方的战略力量确实是他们所说的。它还提供了对结构和运营事务的宝贵洞察力，这些洞察力与国家技术手段相互补充并扩展了可能确定的可能性。

现在怎么办？

尽管华盛顿和莫斯科的官僚和寒冷战士目前都在忙于提出有关新起点条约的投诉和不确定性，但没有办法围绕这一基本事实：两国的国家安全利益以及两国的国家安全兴趣 - 以及他们的盟友。

但是该条约将于2021年2月到期，如果他们的领导层愿意采取行动，双方都可以通过笔的笔触扩展。

Unfortunately, Russian complaints that it is incapable of confirming US conversion of strategic launchers, US complaints that new exotic Russian weapons circumvent the treaty, Russia’s violation and the US decision to withdraw from the INF treaty, as well as the growing political animosity and bickering between East and West, have combined to increase the pressure on New START and put extension in doubt.

这一切都很好地捕捉了冷战心态的危险，在这种情况下，民族主义的勇敢和胸部大打击效率为旨在利用国家和国际安全的理性战略。糟糕的时期不是牺牲条约的借口，而是提醒保留它们的重要性。武器限制条约不是与朋友签订的（您不必这样做），而是潜在的对手，以限制其进攻性核力量并提高透明度和验证。如果官员专注于抱怨和列出问题，那就是他们会得到的。

It is essential that Russia and the United States decide now to extend the New START treaty. Without it, the two sides will switch into a worst-case-scenario mindset for long-term planning of strategic forces that could well trigger a new nuclear arms race.

Additional information:

Posted onAug.14, 2019inArms Control,Nuclear,Nuclear Weapons,United States经过Matt Korda

No Bret, the U.S. Doesn’t Need More Nukes

上周，广岛和长崎爆炸纪念74周年，许多人花了一些时间反映upon thedestruction由战时唯一使用核武器引起的。但不是纽约时报'布雷特·史蒂芬斯（Bret Stephens）借此机会争论建立更多的核武器。

In an op-ed entitled“The U.S. Needs More Nukes,”史蒂芬斯（Stephens）提出了反对武器控制的案子：“坏人作弊，好人都没有，”美国核武库一直在“越来越破旧”。

It’s a simple narrative; it’s also false. In fact, Stephens’ article is largely littered with bad analogies, flawed assumptions, and straight-up incorrect facts about the nature of nuclear weapons and arms control.

As examples of arms control agreements where the “bad guys cheat” and the “good guys don’t,” Stephens cites the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (from which the United States withdrew in 2002), the Iran Deal (正在工作until the United States withdrew last year), and the Treaty of Versailles (which famously isn’t an arms control agreement), among others. None of these involved significant cheating on the part of the “bad guys,” unless you count the Trump administration’s violation of the Iran Deal in 2018.

Stephens also cites the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty as a prime example of an arms control agreement gone wrong. Yes, it appears that Russia likely violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by developing and deploying a banned ground-launched cruise missile; however, aswe’ve written previously, Trump’s decision to pull out of the treaty makes the United States needlessly complicit in its demise and frees Russia from both the responsibility and pressure to return to compliance. Contrary to Stephens’ thesis, when someone breaks the law, you shouldn’t throw away the law.

And contrary to the title of Stephens’ piece, the United States doesn’t need more nukes. As we explain in our latestUS Nuclear Notebook，特朗普政府希望开发两个新的弹头 - 一场低产的弹头和一枚海上弹射的巡航导弹 - 都是危险的，这都是必要的。除了降低核用途的阈值外，低收益弹头的“低收益”方面是一个错误的名称。大约是炸死100,000人的广岛炸弹的三分之一。新的海洋发射的巡航导弹是一个从死者那里带来的概念：美国有一个直到2013年，奥巴马政府当时retired itbecause it was pointless, wasteful, and politically controversial.

In addition to his well-establisheddenialismof issues like systemic hunger, rape culture, and climate change, Stephens is known for his hawkish––and often inaccurate––takes on nuclear issues. In 2013, heclaimed伊朗的交易比张伯伦在1938年对希特勒的app脚还要糟糕。2017年，他争论in favor of regime change in North Korea. Later that year, he derisively引用to ICAN––the group that won the Nobel Peace Prize for its work to ban nuclear weapons––as “another tediously bleating ‘No Nukes’ outfit.” In June, hewrotethat “If Iran won’t change its behavior, we should sink its navy.” Remember, this is coming from a guy who授予Iraq War architect Paul Wolfowitz “Man of the Year” in 2003 (The runners-up? Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Tony Blair, and George W. Bush).

Furthermore, in last week’s piece, he erroneously stated that Iran repeatedly violated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a claim which the International Atomic Energy Agency—the international organization charged with monitoring Iran’s compliance––has continuously rebutted. Noticeably, Stephens linked to Mark Fitzpatrick’s work to back up his claim, but when Marktweetedout that his article didn’t say anything of the sort, the link was changed. It now references David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, who is known for his hawkish views on Iran.

Stephens’ columns are clearly emphasizing ideology over accuracy. And publishing a pro-nukes article on the anniversary of the Nagasaki bombing––without acknowledging the human cost of nuclear weapons, or even the anniversary itself––demonstrates that he is clearly not guided by empathy.

但是也许最明显的是，斯蒂芬斯的作品是由恐惧驱动的。可以理解的是：目前，我们被锁定在一场不断增加的核武器竞赛中，没有迹象表明它会放慢脚步。如果您不害怕，您可能不会关注。但是，在不阐明任何战略愿景的情况下哭泣的“更多核武器”并不会使我们摆脱困境。

实际上，摆脱军备竞赛的最佳方法是拒绝比赛。美国不应以其他国家的调整方式来基于其核武库的规模 - 这只有在您认为核武器是为了打击战争时才有意义。但是，引用里根的古老格言，“核战争不能赢得胜利，绝对不能进行。”相反，正如全球零的所述替代核姿势审查, the United States should move towards a “deterrence-only” nuclear posture, which would allow for sizable cuts to the US nuclear arsenal without changing the strategic balance.

Very simply, we need to start enacting ambitious solutions that are equal to the problems that we face. Not just reflexively demanding more nukes.

—

（图片：长崎炸弹爆炸后的第二天，Yamahata Yosuke）

Posted onAug.02, 2019inArms Control,Nuclear Weapons,Russia,United States经过Hans M. Kristensen和Matt Korda

The INF Treaty Officially Died Today

By Matt Korda and Hans M. Kristensen

Six months after both the United States and Russia announced suspensions of their respective obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the treaty officially died today.

The Federation of American Scientists strongly condemns the irresponsible acts by the Russian and US administrations that have resulted in the demise of this historic and important agreement.

Ina they-did-it statementon the State Department’s web site, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo repeated the accusation that Russia has violated the treaty by testing and deploying a ground-launched cruise missile with a range prohibited by the treaty. “The United States will not remain party [sic] to a treaty that is deliberately violated by Russia,” he said.

通过退出INF，特朗普政府向俄罗斯屈服了法律和政治压力，要求恢复合规性。政府似乎没有外交，而是打算通过开发自己的IN IN IND导弹来加大军事压力。

Signed in 1987, the INF Treaty dramatically helped reduce nuclear threats and stabilize the arms race for thirty-two years, by banning and eliminating all US and Russian ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers––a grand total of 2,692 missiles. And it would have continued to have a moderating effect on US-Russia nuclear tensions indefinitely, if not for the recklessness of both the Putin and Trump administrations.

美国第一publicly accused俄罗斯在2014年7月的条约合规报告中违反该条约，称俄罗斯违反了其义务“不拥有，制作或进行测试，一台被打击的巡航导弹（GLCM），范围为500 km至5500 km，或拥有或生产此类导弹的发射器。”俄罗斯最初否认了美国的主张，多年来重复说没有这种导弹。但是，一旦美国公开命名为9M729 –或SSC-8，正如北约所说的那样 - 俄罗斯 - 俄罗斯承认其存在，但statedthat the missile “fully complies with the treaty’s requirements.” Since then, the United Statesclaimed俄罗斯已经从固定和移动发射器进行了9m729的测试以欺骗，并且deployed四个营中有将近一百枚导弹。

We assess这涉及16个发射器，其中有64枚导弹（加上备件），可能与Elanskiy的Iskander SRBM单位相处，Kapustin Yar（现在可能是现在移至永久基地），Mozdok和Shuya。如果部署了更多的营，则有可能，但未知。

俄罗斯可能早在2007年就决定违反《 INF条约》，当时联合国将该条约的多边提议失败。虽然很可能将基础工作放在更远的地方。根据普京的说法arms race truly began in 2002当布什政府退出了蚂蚁i-Ballistic Missile Treaty––understood by Putin to be the cornerstone of the US-Russia arms control regime.

For its part, Russia has responded to US accusations withclaimsthat the United States is the true violator of the treaty, stating that US missile defense launchers based in Europe could be repurposed to launch INF-prohibited missiles, among other violations. In a detailed report, the Congressional Research Service has被驳斥all three accusations.

Regardless of who violated the INF, the Trump administration’s decision to kill the treaty is the wrong move. As we wrote in theBulletin of the Atomic Scientists当特朗普首次宣布辞去该条约的意图时，撤离在美国之间建立了虚假的道德同等性，他们可能没有违反该条约，俄罗斯可能是俄罗斯。它还使美国与自己的关键政策文件冲突核姿势审查和public statements made last year, which emphasized bringing Russia back into compliance through diplomatic, economic, and military measures.

底线是:如果有人打破了law, you shouldn’t throw away the law. By doing so, you remove any chance to hold the violator accountable for their actions. If the ultimate goal is to coax or coerce Russia back into compliance with the treaty, then killing the treaty itself obviously won’t achieve that. Instead, it legally frees Russia to deploy even more INF missiles.

The decision to withdraw wasn’t based on long-term strategic thinking but appears to have been based on ideology. It was apparently the product of National Security Advisor John Bolton––a hawkish“serial arms control killer”––having the President’s ear. Defense hawks chimed in with warnings about Chinese INF-range missiles being outside the treaty (which they have always been) and recommendations about deploying new US INF missiles in the Pacific.

Now, we find ourselves on the brink of an era without nuclear arms control whatsoever. With the demise of the INF, the only remaining treaty – the New START treaty – is in jeopardy, a vital treaty that caps the number of strategic nuclear weapons the United States and Russia can deploy andprovides important verification and data exchanges。尽管它可以轻松地延长超过2021年2月的到期日期，但笔却很疯狂，但约翰·博尔顿疯狂地说这是“不太可能的”。俄罗斯官员也开始提出有关扩展的问题。金博宝正规网址允许新的起点到期，将消除美国俄罗斯核约束的最后遗迹，并为世界开放新的开放式核武器竞赛。

国会必须竭尽所能，说服特朗普总统扩大新的起点条约。

Posted on5月31日，2019年inArms Control,China,Nuclear Weapons,United States经过Hans M. Kristensen

DIA Estimates For Chinese Nuclear Warheads

汉斯·克里斯汀森（Hans M. Kristensen）

在哈德逊研究所会议国防情报局（DIA）中将罗伯特·阿什利（Robert Ashley）中将在俄罗斯和中国核现代化方面说prepared remarks: “Over the next decade, China is likely to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile…”

This projection is new and significantly above recent public statements by US government agencies. But how reliable is it and how have US agencies performed in the past?

The public record is limited because estimates are normally classified and agencies and officials are reluctant to say too much. But a few examples exist from declassified documents and public statements. These estimates vary considerably – some seemed downright crazy.

But before analyzing DIA’s projection for the future, let’s examine what the estimated Chinese nuclear stockpile looks like today.

Current Chinese Stockpile Estimate

While warning the Chinese stockpile will “at least double” over the next decade, Lt. Gen. Ashley’s prepared remarks did not say what it is today. But in the follow-up Q/A session,he added: “We estimate…the number of warheads the Chinese have is in the low couple of hundreds.

That estimate is close to statements made by DOD and STRATCOM nearly a decade ago. In our forthcoming Nuclear Notebook on Chinese nuclear forces (scheduled for publication in July 2019), we estimate the Chinese stockpile now includes approximately 290 warheads and is likely to surpass the size of the French nuclear stockpile (~300 warheads) in the near future.

较早的中国库存估计

Earlier projections made by US agencies of China’s nuclear stockpile have varied considerably. DIA’s estimates have consistently been higher – even extraordinarily so – than that of other agencies (see graph below). The wide range reflects an enormous uncertainty and lack of solid intelligence, which makes it even more curious why DIA would make them. This record obviously raises questions about DIA’s latest projection.

例如，在1980年代4月，DIA发布了标题：Nuclear Weapons Systems in China。The brief, which was prepared by the China/Far East Division of the Directorate for Estimates and approved by DIA’s deputy assistant director for estimates, projected an astounding growth for China’s nuclear arsenal that included everything from ICBMs, MRBMs, SRBMs, bombs, landmines, and air-to-surface missiles. The brief concluded a curious double estimate of 150-160 warheads in the text and 360 warheads in a table and projected an increase from 596 warheads in 1989 to as many as 818 by 1994. The brief was partially redacted for many years butit has since been possible to reconstructin its entirety because of inconsistencies in the processing of different FOIA requests.

In the 1990s, CIA published three estimates, all significantly lower than the DIA projection from 1984. But DIA apparently was reworking its methodology because in 1999 it published关于未来威胁的入门that was lower than the CIA estimate but projected an increase of the Chinese stockpile from 140-157 warheads to 358-464 warheads in 2020. The Primer predicted that deployment of US missile defenses would cause China to significantly increase its ICBM force, a prediction that has come through to some extent and is now ironically used by DIA and others to warn of a growing Chinese nuclear threat against the United States.

在2010年关于参议院批准新开始条约的激烈辩论之后told Congress2011年：“估计中国只有几百个核武器……”。

And when false rumors flared up in 2012 that China had hundreds – even thousands – of warheads more than commonly assumed, STRATCOM commander Gen Kehler rebutted the speculations说:“我不相信中国有数百或thousands more nuclear weapons than what the intelligence community has been saying,” which is “that the Chinese arsenal is in the range of several hundred” nuclear warheads.

从那以后，中国开始部署配备多个弹头（MIRV）的基于筒仓的DF-5B ICBM，这是DIA在1999年预测的对美国导弹防御措施的响应的一部分，并部署了大量的双重抗辩有能力的DF-26 IRBM。即便如此，阿什利（Ashley）的最新声明大致与米勒（Miller）和基勒when he says：“我们估计……中国人的弹头数量是数百个。”

中国库存怎么会超过两倍？

Although Ashley predicted a significant expansion of the Chinese stockpile, he did not explain the assumptions that go into that assessment. What would China have to do in order to more than double its stockpile over the next decade?

There are several potential options. China could field a significant number of additional launchers, or deploy significantly more MIRVs on some of its missiles, or – if the MIRV increase is less dramatic – a combination of more launchers and more MIRV. It seems likely to be the latter option.

额外的mirving似乎是一个重要因素。中国正在开发据说能够携带MIRV的公路Mobile DF-41 ICBM。它还开发了基于筒仓的DF-5（DF-5C）的第三个修饰，与当前的DF-5B相比，该修饰可能具有额外的MIRV能力。最后，尽管我还没有看到固体消息来源这么说，但下一代JL-3 SLBM可能具有MIRV能力。There are many rumors about up to 10 MIRV per DF-41 (even unreliable rumors about MIRV on shorter-range systems), but if China’s decision to MIRV is a response to US missile defenses (which DIA and DOD have stated for years), then it seems more likely that the number of warheads on each missile is low and the extra spaces used for decoys.

中国还在扩大其SSBN机队，如果下一代096年的生产在2020年代初期进行，则可能在未来十年的规模中翻一番。据报道，中国已经重新签署了轰炸机的核任务，正在开发新的具有核能的轰炸机，以及可能具有核选择的空气弹道导弹。假设有几个轰炸机中队将在2020年代后期具有核能，这也可以帮助解释DIA的投射。总的来说，这加起来是一个假设的武器库，可能看起来像这样，以“至少两倍”库存的大小：

Conclusions

Whether DIA’s projection comes through of a Chinese stockpile “at least double” the size of the current inventory remains to be seen. Given DIA’s record of worst-case predictions, there are good reasons to be skeptical. It would, at a minimum, be good to hear what the coordinated Intelligence Community assessment is. Does the Director of National Intelligence agree with this projection?

That said, the Chinese leadership has obviously decided that its “minimum deterrent” requires more weapons. To that end, the debate over how much is enough, what the Chinese intentions are, and what the US response should be, are important reminders that the Chinese leadership needs to be more transparent about what its modernization plans are. Lack of basic information from China fuels worst-case assumptions in the United States that can (and will) be used to justify defense programs that increase the threat against China. The recommendation by the Nuclear Posture Review to develop a new nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile is but one example. Both sides have an interest in limiting this action-reaction cycle.

Even if DIA’s projection of a more than doubling of the Chinse stockpile were to happen, that would still not bring the inventory anywhere near the size of the US or Russian stockpiles. They arecurrently estimatedat 4,330 and 3,800 warheads, respectively – even more, if counting retired, but still largely intact, warheads awaiting dismantlement.

But despite the much smaller Chinese arsenal, a significant expansion of the stockpile would likely make US and Russia even more reluctant to reduce their arsenals – a reduction the Chinese government insists is necessary first before it will join a future nuclear arms limitation agreement. So while China’s motivation for increasing its arsenal may be to reduce the vulnerability of its deterrent, it may in fact also cause the United States and Russian to retain larger arsenals than otherwise and even increase their capabilities to threaten China.

Whether DIA’s projection pans out or not, it is an important reminder of the increasingly dynamic nuclear competition that is in full swing between the large nuclear weapons states. The pace and scope of that competition are intensifying in ways that will diminish security and increase risks for all sides. Strengthening deterrence is not always beneficial and even smaller arsenals can have significant effects.

Posted onApr.17, 2019inArms Control,Nuclear Notebook,Nuclear Weapons,Secrecy,United States经过Hans M. Kristensen

Pentagon Slams Door On Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Transparency

汉斯·克里斯汀森（Hans M. Kristensen）

五角大楼已决定不披露国防部核武器库存中当前的核武器数量。该决定是denial of a request from FAS’s Steven Aftergoodfor declassification of the 2018 nuclear weapons stockpile number, reverses the U.S. practice from the past nine years and represents an unnecessary and counterproductive reversal of nuclear policy.

The United States in 2010 for the first time解密核武器stockpil的整个历史e size, a decision that has since been used by officials to support U.S. non-proliferation policy by demonstrating U.S. adherence to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), providing transparency about U.S. nuclear weapons policy, counter false rumors about secretly building up its nuclear arsenal, and to encourage other nuclear-armed states to be more transparent about their arsenals.

Importantly, the U.S. alsodisclosedthe number of warheads dismantled each year back to 1994. This disclosure helped document that the United States was not hiding retired weapons but actually dismantling them. In 2014, the United States even解密当时仍在等待拆除的退休弹头的总库存：2,500。

The 2010 release built on previous disclosures, most importantly the Department of Energy’s declassification decisions in 1996, which included – among other issues – a table of nuclear weapons stockpile data with information about stockpile numbers, megatonnage, builds, retirements, and disassemblies between 1945 and 1994. Unfortunately, the web site is poorly maintained andthe original pageheadlined “Declassification of Certain Characteristics of the United States Nuclear Weapon Stockpile” no longer has tables,another page已损坏，但原始数据是still available here。Clearly, DOE should fix the site.

The decision in 2010 to disclose the size of the stockpile and the dismantlement numbers did not mean the numbers would necessarily be updated each subsequent year. Each year was a separate declassification decision that was announced on the国防部开放政府网站。The most recentdecision from 2018in response to a request from FAS showed the stockpile number as of September 2017: 3,822 stockpiled warheads and 354 dismantled warheads.

The 2017 number was extra good news because it showed the Trump administration, despite bombastic rhetoric from the president, had continued to reduce the size of the stockpile (see my analysis from 2018).

自2010年以来，英国和法国都遵循了美国的示例，尽管他们尚未透露弹头库存的整个历史，但提供了有关其武器库规模的其他信息。俄罗斯，中国，印度，巴基斯坦，以色列和朝鲜尚未提供有关其武器库规模或历史的信息。

FAS’ Role In Providing Nuclear Transparency

美国科学家联合会（FAS）一直在与自然资源国防委员会（NRDC）合作多年。奥巴马政府在2010年在FAS/NRDC估计中仅在2010年拆除的5,113-Warhead Stockpile数字仅在13枚弹头。

我们提供这些估计on our web site，在我们的战略安全Blog, and in publications such as the bi-monthlyNuclear Notebookpublished in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the annual nuclear forces chapter in theSIPRI Yearbook。The work is used extensively by journalists, NGOs, scholars, parliamentarians, and government officials.

With the Pentagon decision to close the books on the stockpile, and the rampant nuclear modernization underway worldwide, the role of FAS and others in documenting the status of nuclear forces will be even more important.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Pentagon’s decision not to disclose the 2018 nuclear weapons stockpiled and dismantled warhead numbers is unnecessary and counterproductive.

The United States or its allies are not suffering or at a disadvantage because the nuclear stockpile numbers are in the public. Indeed, there seems to be no rational national security factor that justifies the decision to reinstate nuclear stockpile secrecy.

The decision walks back nearly a decade of U.S. nuclear weapons transparency policy – in fact, longer if including stockpile transparency initiatives in the late-1990s – and places the United States is the same box as over-secretive nuclear-armed states, several of which are U.S. adversaries.

The decision also puts the United States in an even more disadvantageous position for next year’s nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference where the administration will be unable to report progress on meeting its Article VI obligations. Instead, this decision, as well as decisions to withdraw from the INF treaty, start producing new nuclear weapons, and the absence of nuclear arms control negotiations, needlessly open up the United States to criticism from other Parties to the NPT – a treaty the United States needs to protect and strengthen to curtail nuclear proliferation.

The decision also puts U.S. allies like Britain and France in the awkward position of having to reconsider their nuclear transparency policies as well or be seen to be out of sync with their largest military ally at a time of increased East-West hostilities.

With this decision, the Trump administration surrenders any pressure on other nuclear-armed states to be more transparent about the size of their nuclear weapon stockpiles. This is curious since the Trump administration had repeatedly complained about secrecy in the Russian and Chinese arsenals. Instead, it now appears to endorse their secrecy.

The decision will undoubtedly fuel suspicion and worst-case mindsets in adversarial countries. Russia will now likely argue that not only has the United States obscured conversion of nuclear launchers under the New START treaty, it has now decided also to keep secret the number of nuclear warheads it has available for them.

最后，该决定还使与俄罗斯和中国达成新的武器控制协议以限制其核武库变得更加困难。毕竟，如果美国不愿意保持其弹头库存的透明度，他们为什么要披露它们的透明度？

It is yet unclear why the decision not to disclose the 2018 stockpile number was made. There are several possibilities:

Is it because the chaos and incompetence in the Trump administration have enabled hardliners and secrecy zealots to reverse a policy they disagreed with anyway?
这是否是由于核姿势评论以冷战般的本能对大国的拥抱，以增加对核武器的依赖，杀死武器控制条约，增加保密性和一些人说安抚对手的政策？
Is it because of a Trump administration mindset opposing anything created by president Obama?
Or is it because the United States has secretly begun to increase the size of its nuclear stockpile? (I don’t think so; the stockpile appears to have continued to decrease to now at or just below 3,800 warheads.)

The answer may be as simple as “because it can” with no opposition from the White House. Whatever the reason, the decision to reinstate stockpile secrecy caps a startling and rapid transformation of U.S. nuclear policy. Within just a little over two years, the United States under the chaotic and disastrous policies of the Trump administration has gone from promoting nuclear transparency, arms control, and nuclear constraint to increasing nuclear secrecy, abandoning arms control agreements, producing new nuclear weapons, and increasing reliance on such weapons in the name of Great Power Competition.

这是任何标准的历史性政策逆转，也是一项要求国会和2020年总统选举候选人尽最大努力的努力，以防止美国基本上核行为，但将其恢复为更具建设性的核武器政策。

Posted onApr.10, 2019inArms Control,Nuclear Weapons,Russia,United States经过Hans M. Kristensen

Despite Obfuscations, New START Data Shows Continued Value Of Treaty

汉斯·克里斯汀森（Hans M. Kristensen）

The latest set of New START treaty aggregate data发行美国国务院表明，俄罗斯和美国继续遵守《新起点条约》的局限性。数据表明，自2011年2月以来，俄罗斯和美国的合并总共减少了429个战略发射器，将部署的发射器数量减少了223，并减少了归因于511的弹头数量。

The good news comes despite efforts by officials inMoscow和华盛顿to create doubts about the value of New START by complaining about lack of irreversibility, weapon systems not covered by the treaty, or other unrelated treaty compliance and behavioral matters. These complaints are part of the ongoing bickering between Russia and the United States and appear intended – they certainly have that effect – to create doubt about the value of extending New START for five years beyond 2021.

Playing politics with New START is irresponsible and counterproductive. While the treaty has facilitated coordinated and verifiable reductions and provides for on-site inspections and a continuous exchange of notifications about strategic offensive nuclear forces, the remaining arsenals are large, undergoing extensive modernizations, and demand continued limits and verification.

By the Numbers

The latest New START data shows that the United States and Russia combined, as of March 1^st, 2019, deployed a total of 1,180 strategic launchers (long-range ballistic missiles and heavy bombers) with a total of 2,826 warheads attributed to them (see chart below). These two arsenals constitute more strategic launchers and warheads than all the world’s other seven nuclear-armed states possess combined.

For Russia, the data shows 524 deployed strategic launchers with 1,461 warheads. That’s a slight increase of 7 launchers and 41 warheads compared with September 2018. Russia is currently 176 launchers and 89 warheads below the treaty limit for deployed strategic weapons.

The United States deploys 656 strategic launchers with 1,365 warheads attributed to them, or a slight decrease of 3 launchers and 33 warheads compared with September 2018. The United States is currently 44 launchers and 185 warheads below the treaty limit for deployed strategic weapons.

自2018年9月以来，由于维护和升级，这些增加和减少是武器库的正常波动，并且不反映威胁水平的增加或下降。

重要的是要提醒，在新起点下报告的俄罗斯和美国核力量只是其核武器总库存的一部分，currently estimatedat 4,350 for Russia and 3,800 for the United States (6,850 and 6,460, respectively, if also counting retired warheads awaiting dismantlement).

Build-Up, What Build-Up

尽管经常提出someabout a Russian nuclear “buildup,” the New START data does not show such a development. On the contrary, it shows that Russia’s strategic offensive nuclear force level – despite ongoing modernization – is relatively steady. Deteriorating relations have so far not caused Russia (or the United States) to increase strategic force levels or slowed down the reductions required by New START. On the contrary, both sides seem to be continuing to structure their central strategic nuclear forces in accordance with the treaty’s limitations and intentions.

That said, both countries are working on modifications to their strategic nuclear arsenals. Russia has been working for a long time – even before New START was signed – to develop exotic intercontinental-range weapons to overcome US ballistic missile defense systems. These exotic weapons, which are not deployed or covered by the treaty, include a ground-launched nuclear-powered cruise missile (Burevestnik) and a submarine-launched torpedo-like drone (Poseidon). An ICBM-launched glide-vehicle commonly known as Avangard is close to initial deployment but would likely supplement the current ICBM force rather than increasing it. The new weapons are limited in numbers and insufficient to change the overall strategic balance or challenge extension of New START. The treaty provides for adding new weapon types if agreed by the two parties, although neither side has formally proposed to do so.

就整体战略核力量而言，俄罗斯没有优势，似乎也没有试图缩小重大差距，新的起点数据显示在战略发射器的数量中存在 - 最新计数对美国有利132。从角度看，132个发射器几乎相当于美国洲际弹道导弹翼，超过6级俄亥俄州弹道导弹潜艇，或整个美国核弹舰队的两倍。如果桌子转过身，美国官员和硬派人士就会尖叫不利。惊人的someare still trying to make that case despite the US advantage. Given the launcher asymmetry, one could also suspect that Russia might seek to retain more non-deployed launchers for potential redeployment to be able to rapidly increase the force if necessary. Instead, the New START data shows that Russia has continued to decrease its non-deployed launchers by 185 since the peak of 421 in 2013.

俄罗斯的战略现代化的延误和详尽的基础升级的速度比预期的要慢，并且受到政府和国防工业的经济和腐败的困扰。俄罗斯通过在其新导弹上最大化弹头装载来弥补这种不对称性，但新的起点数据表明，自2016年以来，俄罗斯被迫减少对某些弹道导弹的正常弹头装载，以达到已部署的弹头条约限制。这表明新开始对俄罗斯战略力量有真正的限制。

Having said that, Russia could – like the United States – upload large numbers of non-deployed nuclear warheads onto deployed launchers if a decision was made to break out of the New START limits. Those launchers would include initially bombers, then sea-launched ballistic missiles, and in the longer term the ICBMs.

The United States has dismantled and converted more launchers than Russia because the United States had more of them when the treaty was signed, not because Washington was handed a “bad deal,’ as some defense hardliners have claimed. But Russia has complained – including in an unprecedentedletter to the US Congress– that it is unable to verify that launchers converted by the US can’t be returned to nuclear use. The New START treaty does not require irreversibility and the US insists conversions have been carried out as required by the treaty rules that Russia agreed to. Discussions continue in Bilateral Consultative Committee (BCC).

验证和通知

Although not included in the formal aggregate data, the State Department has also disclosed the total number of inspections and notifications conducted under the treaty. Since February 2011, this has included294 onsite inspections(3 each since September) and17,516 notifications(up about 1,100 since September 2018). This data flow is essential to providing confidence and reassurance that the strategic force level of the other side indeed is what they say it is. It also provides each side invaluable insight into structural and operational matters that complements and expands what is possible to ascertain with national technical means.

美国SSBN在Drydock中。俄罗斯说，它无法验证美国战略发射器的转换。单击图像以查看全尺寸。

Conclusions and Recommendations

尽管华盛顿和莫斯科的官僚和寒冷战士目前都在忙于提出有关新起点条约的投诉和不确定性，但没有办法围绕这一基本事实：该条约在两个国家的国家安全利益上都有很强他们的盟友。

但是该条约将于2021年2月到期，如果他们的领导层愿意采取行动，双方都可以通过笔的笔触扩展。

Unfortunately, Russian claims that it is incapable of confirming US conversion of strategic launchers, US complaints that new exotic Russian weapons circumvent the treaty, Russia’s violation and the US decision to withdraw from the INF treaty, as well as the growing political animosity and bickering between East and West, have combined to increase the pressure on New START and put extension in doubt.

The idea that the INF debacle somehow requires a reevaluation of the value of New START is ridiculous. INF regulates regional land-based missiles whereas New START regulates the core strategic nuclear forces. Why would anyone in either country in their right mind jeopardize limits and verification of strategic forces that threaten the survival of the nation over a disagreement about regional forces that cannot? That seems to be the epidemy of irresponsible behavior.

And the disagreements about conversion of launchers and need to add new intercontinental forces to the treaty can and should be resolved within the BCC.

But it all captures well the danger of Cold War mindsets where nationalistic bravado and chest-thumping override deliberate rational strategy for the benefit of national and international security. Bad times are not an excuse for sacrificing treaties but reminders of the importance of preserving them. Arms limitation treaties are not made with friends (you don’t have to) but with potential adversaries in order to limit their offensive nuclear forces and increase transparency and verification. If officials focus on complaining and listing problems, well guess what, that’s what we’re going to get.

Additional information:

Posted onJan.21, 2019inArms Control,ballistic missiles,China,Nuclear Weapons经过Hans M. Kristensen

中国DF-26导弹发射器部署新的小姐ile Training Area

汉斯·克里斯汀森（Hans M. Kristensen）

[Updated Jan 31, 2019] Earlier this month, the Chinese government outletGlobal Times published a reportthat a People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) unit with the new DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile had carried out an exercise in the “Northwest China’s plateau and desert areas.” The article made vague references to a programpreviously aired on China’sCCTV-7that showed a column of DF-26 launchers and support vehicles driving on highways, desert roads, and through mountain streams.

事实证明，这项运动可能位于北京以西，但实际位置位于中部中部。几位研究人员（for example Sean O’Connor）试图了解有关该单元的更多信息。通过结合场景CCTV-7program with various satellite imagery sources, I was able to geolocate the DF-26s to the S218 highway (39.702137º, 105.731469º) outside the city of Jilantai (Jilantaizhen) roughly 100 km north of Alxa in the Inner Mogolia province in the northern part of central China (see image below).

The DF-26s appear to have been visiting a new missile training area established by PLARF since 2015. By combining use ofGoogle Earth,Planet, andTerra Server, each of which has unique capabilities needed to scan vast areas and identifying individual facilities, as well as analyzing images purchased fromDigital Globe，到目前为止，我已经能够在练习期间确定发射器和支持车辆使用的100多个发射台，一个支撑基地，登陆地带以及至少八个覆盖1,000平方公里（400千米）面积的发射单元营地站点平方英里）沿着90公里（55英里）的走廊（请参见下图）。所有这些位置的Google Earth Placemark文件（KML）是available for download here。

The Chinese military has for decades been operating a vast missile training area further west in the Qinghai province, which I在文章中介绍a decade ago. They also appear to operate a training area further west near Korla (Beyingol). The best unclassified guide for following Chinese missile units is, of course, the indispensablePLA Rocket Force Leadership and Unit Referenceproduced by Mark Stokes at theProject 2049 Institute。

It is not clear if the DF-26 unit that exercised in the Jilantai training area is or will be permanently based in the region. It is normal for Chinese missile units to deploy long distances from their home base for training. The first brigade (666 Brigade) is thought to be based some 1,100 kilometers (700 miles) to the southeast near Xinyang in southern Henan province. This was not the first training deployment of the brigade. TheNASIC在2017年报道that China had 16+ DF-26 launchers and it is building more. TheCCTV-7video shows an aerial view of a launch unit camp with TEL tents, support vehicles, and personnel tents. A DF-26 is shown pulling out from under a camouflage tent and setting up on a T-shaped concrete launch pad (see image below). More than 100 of those pads have been identified in the area.

训练区的支撑基地没有永久的导弹旅基地的轮廓。但是几张卫星图像似乎显示了该设施中DF-16，DF-21和DF-26发射器的存在。一张来自Digital Globe的图像，并于2018年10月24日由其中一颗卫星拍摄，显示了正在建造的基地，其中似乎是两个车库之间停放的两个DF-16发射器（H/T @ReuterSanders）。2017年8月16日拍摄的另一张照片显示了似乎有22个DF-21C发射器，其中还有几个可能的DF-26发射器（见下文）。

DF-26于2015年首次正式展出，于2016年举行，并于2018年4月宣布为服役，是一枚中间弹道导弹，该导弹是从六轴公路摩托车发射器发射的，可以交付常规或核核电。弹头，最大距离为4,000公里（2,485英里）。从Xinyang附近的666旅地区，DF-26 IRBM可以到达关岛和新德里（请参见下面的地图）。自1980年以来，中国有能力用核DF-4 ICBM罢工关岛，但DF-4是可移动的，液体燃料的导弹，需要很长时间才能设置，而DF-26是公路驾驶的。，固体燃料，双重能力的导弹，可以更快地发射更快。此外，DF-26首次将常规罢工添加到IRBM范围。

The 666 Brigade is in range of U.S. sea- and air-launched cruise missiles as well as ballistic missiles. But the DF-26 is part of China’s growing inventory of INF-range missiles (most of which, by far, are non-nuclear), a development that is causing some in the U.S. defense community to recommend the United States should withdraw from the INF treaty and deploy quick-launch intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the Western Pacific. Others (including this author) disagree, saying current and planned U.S. capabilities are sufficient to meet national security objectives and that engaging China in an INF-race would make things worse.

也可以看看：FAS Nuclear Notebook on中国核力量，2018年

This publication was made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the新的土地基金会和植物基金会。所作的陈述和表达的观点仅是作者的责任。