由汉斯·M·克里斯坦森
从获得的新收购的卫星照片Digital Globe(Maxar) show that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is building what appears to be a new type of missile silo in the missile training area near Jilantai, possibly for use by a new ICBM.
The photos also show that 18 road-mobile launchers of the long-awaited DF-41 ICBM were training in the area in April-May 2019 together with launchers for the DF-31AG ICBM, possibly the DF-5B ICBM, the DF-26 IRBM, and the DF-21 MRBM.
Altogether, more than 72 missile launchers can be seen operating together.
中国是其核武库和吉兰泰训练区，从2014年起已构建的显著现代化的中间，出现在现代化建设中发挥的重要组成部分。
导弹发射井的一个新类型？
在培训领域最令人惊讶的新发展，是什么可能是一种新型的导弹发射井的建设。我想强调的是，没有官方确认的结构是一个筒仓，但它非常类似于一个。如果是这样，这是潜在的可能的话，可能是中国努力开发部署一些新的固体燃料公路机动洲际弹道导弹的选项的一部分 - 可能的DF-41 - 料仓。按照2019 Pentagon reporton Chinese military developments, “China appears to be considering additional DF-41 launch options, including rail-mobile and silo basing.”
Construction of the silo began in June 2018. Initially, a roof was built over it to conceal details, but in May 2019 the roof was removed exposing the silo to satellite photography (see image below).
The layout of the Jilantai silo is very different from the silos seen at Wuzhai. Those silos, which are thought to be similar to about 20 operational silos hidden in the mountains of the Henan and Hunan provinces for use by the liquid-fuel DF-5A/B ICBMs, consist of a rectangular retractable lid covering the silo on a concrete pad. And they have large exhaust vents to protect the DF-5’s liquid fuel from the launch heat.
Instead, the Jilantai silo looks more like Russian ICBM silos. It is not yet complete but so far consists of what appears to be a 180-meter line-up path and a 30-meter missile loader pad next to the silo. The precise silo diameter is difficult to measure given the image resolution but appears to be 5-6 meters, which is smaller than the 8-9 meter diameter silos at Wuzhai. Moreover, the absence of exhaust vents hints the Jilantai silo might be intended for solid-fuel missiles.
新仓的设计，可提供更高效的（安全）导弹装载。在DF-5料仓，导弹由起重机，其吊每个阶段关闭其转运和它降低到筒仓加载。这是一个繁琐而冗长的过程。此外，DF-5被推进通过被分开存储，并且必须被加载可以发射导弹之前液体燃料。随着吉兰泰仓的设计，然而，固体燃料导弹可能将在一块（弹头有效载荷可能增加所带来的装载机是备份到仓的边缘，提升了导弹，并降低其进入筒仓后来）。
If the structure seen at Jilantai indeed is a new silo, it presumably would only be used for training. If the design is successful, it would likely be followed in the future by the construction of similar silos in China’s ICBM basing areas for use by operational missiles.
Extensive Missile Training
The Jilantai missile training area, which has been constructed since 2014 and is located in the south-western part of the Inner Mongolia province approximately 930 kilometers (578 miles) west of Beijing, has undergone significant changes since I在一月份将其形容。The central technical facilities continue to expand, TEL drive-through facilities are being added, and road-mobile launchers for China’s newest nuclear-capable ballistic missiles are seen more or less constantly training in the area.
This includes the new DF-41 ICBM that may be in the final phase before starting to deploy to operational PLARF brigades. The new DF-31AG ICBM is also training at Jilantai, as is the new DF-26 IRBM and the DF-21 MRBM (see image below).
所有这些系统都在公路机动发射的固体燃料导弹。但它也有可能 - 尽管在这一点上未确认 - 在吉兰泰该导弹系统看到培训包括对基于筒仓DF-5B ICBM运输。这是一个大的井基导弹，将无法从移动发射器发射，但图像显示独特的两部分，卡车拉着拖车类似于在2015年被显示在北京阅兵的DF-5B运输机（见图像的下方）。
It must be underscored that there is no confirmation the trailers are for the DF-5B. In one photo some of the trailers are longer and it is unclear why DF-5B transporters would be training at Jilantai given there are no DF-5B silos in the area. If the towed trailers are not DF-5Bs, they could potentially be transporters of reload missile for the road-mobile launchers seen on the satellite photos.
The DF-41 ICBM
卫星图像显示，DF-41运输发射车在吉兰泰在2019年4月开始训练一个新的TEL驾车通过高棚设施完成后不久（第二正在建设进一步向北）。似乎有18 DF-41发射器。在从2019年4月17，一个照片，例如，15 DF-41S柱可以看出从做它的方式新的驱动器，通过设施（两个附加DF-41S仍然可以在该设施和18中可以看出日可能仍然是内部）到游行条加入18的组装DF-31AGs，18 DF-26，和5（可能）DF-5B转运蛋白。
The DF-41 has been in development for a very long time. The Pentagon’s annual report on Chinese military developments first mentioned the missile in 1997 and sensational news articles have claimed it has been operational for years. The DF-41 was widely expected to be displayed at the 2015 military parade in Beijing, but that didn’t happen. Nor was it displayed at the PLA’s anniversary parade in 2017.
The DF-41 training at Jilantai with the other launchers is probably part of the formal integration of the new missile into PLAFRF service, more than two decades after development began. It seems likely that the DF-41 will appear at the military parade in Beijing on October 1st。事实上，两个月后，发生在吉兰泰培训，18 DF-41发射器（可能同18）可以在阳坊约35千米（22英里）军事设施的卫星照片中可以看出北京西北显然已经准备好继续十月游行。图像首次提出它的方式在互联网上8月9日日, when it waspostedby the Twitter user @Oedosoldier. The image carried the user’s logo but it was a screenshot from a Digital Globe image on TerraServer dated July 4, 2019.
中国核导弹展望
The highly visible display and clustering of more than 72 missile launchers at Jilantai in April and May indicate the PLARF wants them to be seen and is keenly aware that satellites are watching overhead. This is Beijing’s way of telling the world that it has a capable and survivable nuclear deterrent.
一旦他们开始运作，看到对卫星照片的18个DF-41S可能会形成两个或三个旅，并加入现有力65-90DF-5A / B，DF-31 / A / AG，和DF-4洲际导弹。
Despite the visible display, there is considerable uncertainty about the future development of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, not least how many missiles China plans to deploy. It seems possible the DF-41 over time might replace one or more of the older ICBMs. It is potentially also possible that the DF-31AG will replace the older DF-31/A trailer launchers (the DF-31 is notably absent from the Jilantai images). And the old DF-4 seems likely to be retired in the near future.
美国国防情报局（DIA）五月陈述今年,“未来十年,中国是李kely to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile…” Part of that projection hinges on the DF-41 adding MIRV capability to the solid-fuel road-mobile missiles for the first time (the DF-5B is already equipped with MIRV).
Whether DIA’s projection comes true remains to be seen; the agency has been notoriously bad about Chinese nuclear warhead在过去的预测。在这一点上，中国的武器库estimated以包括大约290弹头，美国和俄罗斯的核武库的一小部分s。为了把事情的角度，都看到了对卫星照片的发射补不到发射器的数量的一半在三个美国洲际弹道导弹的翅膀之一。
Nonetheless, China is modernizing and increasing its nuclear arsenal. And the activities captured by commercial satellites at the PLARF’s training area west of Jilantai – operations of new DF-41 and DF-31AG ICBMs, the new dual-capable DF-26 IRBM, and the construction of what might be a new type of missile silo – are visual reminders of the important developments currently underway in China’s nuclear posture.
Additional background:
FAS核笔记本：Chinese nuclear forces, 2019
This publication was made possible by generous contributions from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, theNew Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.