中国的布拉瓦？

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By Hans M. Kristensen

类似于俄罗斯陷入困境的Bulava海洋发射导弹，五角大楼的latest report关于中国的军事力量，中国为开发新的海上核导弹的努力遇到了问题。

五角大楼关于中国军事力量的延迟年度报告中描述的其他核力量发展，现在更名涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展，包括缓慢部署新的陆基移动导弹以及核指挥和控制挑战。

海军核计划

While the first boat of a small class of new Jin-class (Type 094) sea-launched ballistic missile submarines “appears ready” and up to four more may be building, development of the long-range ballistic missile Julang-2 for the class is said to have “encountered difficulty.”

The report reveals that the new missile has been “failing several of what should have been the final round of flight tests.”

Julang-2“干”发射

五角大楼说，中国的新型海洋弹道导弹未通过多项测试。

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最新的挫折继续了多年来中国海军核计划的特征。第一个SSBN程序（092型）仅生产了一条船，Xia从未在威慑巡逻队上航行。即使是最近一项漫长的海底大修，五角大楼也将Xia的Julang-1导弹系统的运营状况描述为“可疑”。

核动力攻击潜艇计划似乎也受到挑战，只有两艘Shang-Class（类型为093）的船与去年相同，而四只旧汉族（型091）船仍在使用。取而代之的是，核攻击潜艇计划的重点似乎已转移到建立新类别，即095。

Land-Based Nuclear Missiles

引入新的陆基移动弹道导弹仍在继续，但步伐缓慢。DF-31程序似乎停滞在“ <10”导弹，与去年报道一样。在今年的报告中，洲际DF-31A的数量仅增加了几枚导弹，从去年的“ <10”增加到“ 10-15”。

DF-31A在北京游行

新五角大楼的报告显示，DF-31和DF-31A的部署很慢。

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Probably as a possible result of the slow deployment of the new DF-31, the number of old liquid-fueled DF-3A and DF-4 missiles remain the same as last year.

尽管去年在北京的军事游行中表现出色，但与去年相比，DF-21发射器的数量并未增加。导弹的数量略高一些，85-90导弹与60-80相比，可能反映了传统的DF-21C版本的添加。

该报告持续了前几年的预测，即可能正在开发新的公路摩托车ICBM，这可能是对难以捉摸的DF-41或其他系统的参考。新导弹被描述为“可能能够携带多个独立靶向重新进入车辆（MIRV）”。

先前的报告已经报告ReportsReports了MIRV技术的发展多年了，但总是得出结论，移动导弹的MIRV技术太困难和昂贵。尽管有很多警告：“可能正在开发”和“可能能够携带” mirv，但提到公路摩托车ICBM MIRV功能是新的。

如果部署，MIRV系统将代表中国核就业战略的重大变化。俄罗斯和美国部署了mirved的系统，以改善针对军事目标的目标。第二个原因 - 对于英国来说，这可能是主要原因 - 是压倒导弹防御的原因。

而不是增加目标,中国motivation for pursuing MIRV probably is the emergence of increasingly advanced U.S. ballistic missile systems. Phase 4 of the Obama administration’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) includes an anti-ballistic missile defense capability against ICBMs from around 2020. This may push China further toward MIRV.

Julang-1 Loading

Could loading of nuclear missiles in a crisis affect crisis stability?

核指挥和控制

与2009年的报告一样，2010年的报告强调了中国领导人面临的指挥和控制问题。金博宝正规网址“引入更多的移动系统将为中国领导层创造新的指挥和控制挑战，现在面临与部署和释放当局有关的一组不同的变量。”

One of these is the emerging SSBN force, an almost entirely new form of nuclear deployment in Chinese posturing. The report states that “the PLA has only a limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea, and the PLA Navy has no experience in managing a SSBN fleet that performs strategic patrols with live nuclear warheads mated to missiles.”

Chinese SSBNs have never performed a strategic deterrent patrol (none were conducted in 2009), and if current Chinese doctrine is any indication it is doubtful that the SSBNs will deploy with “live nuclear warheads mated to missiles” in peacetime. But the absence of operational experience and the limited communication capability raises serious questions about how inadequate proficiency and launch control procedures might create problems in a crisis.

The report raises similar issues with the emergency of the new generation of land-based mobile missiles. Although China has operated medium-range mobile missiles for decades, the delegation of launch authority in a crisis to units with quicker-launch solid-fuel long-range missiles raises questions about use control, crisis stability, and misunderstandings.

DF-31A on Launch Pad

诸如DF-31A之类的远程远程导弹将如何影响发射权威的命令，控制和委托？

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And there “is little evidence,” the Pentagon concludes, “that China’s military and civilian leaders have fully thought through the global and systemic effects that would be associated with the employment of these strategic capabilities.”

尽管在先前的年度五角大楼报告金博宝正规网址和公众中有关中国核学说的可能改变，尤其是其无用政策的条件中的这些问题和猜测，2010年的报告得出结论：“ReportsReports没有迹象表明国家领导人愿意愿意attach such nuances and caveats to China’s ‘no first use’ doctrine.”

也可以看看：previous blogs about China

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