威慑和保证:重新评估核姿势

经过2013年8月15日

汉斯·克里斯滕森(Hans M. Kristensen)的演讲
核信息项目主任
Federation of American Scientists
威慑和保证工作组
USAF全球罢工司令部
路易斯安那州巴克斯代尔空军基地
May 7, 2013

编者注:2013年5月7日,在路易斯安那州巴克斯代尔空军基地的USAF Global Strike Command的威慑和保证工作组提交了以下评论。

首先,让我感谢科瓦尔斯基将军的邀请,来到这里来到巴克斯代尔空军基地,并解决威慑和保证工作组。

I would be dishonest if I didn’t admit that for someone working in the NGO nuclear arms control community standing here today is somewhat akin to being in the lion’s den.

不错,我社区中很少有人会直接与军事社区讨论威慑和保证,我认为这是公众辩论的重要问题,因为它在对这些问题的看法上留下了巨大的差距。金博宝正规网址

而且我还了解到,威慑和保证不仅是关于核力量的,甚至主要是主要是关于核力量的,而且我必须限制我的演讲,因此核问题是我今天将要关注的问题。让我从一开始就强调:我没有许可。因此,这是一个未分类的观察者。

在公开辩论中,我们基于一个非常简单的方程来评估核力量水平,该方程式应该足以阻止任何人。

在核计划界,第一个问题当然也是威慑,但在评估如果威慑失败时需要哪种力量和方案。

这种看法差距意味着我们 - 一侧的军备控制社区和另一侧的军队 - 实质上是在谈论两件不同的事情。

目前,公众辩论在成本问题上很大程度上受到了主导。我们可以负担多少,出于什么目的,多少,我们需要多少种类和保证?

我世界上的大多数人都认为,核姿势仍然太过了冷战思维,并且与我们今天生活的世界不同步,或者可以看到地平线。我并不认为人们可以在心跳中消除核武器,但我相信有可能进行大量负责任的减少,这些减少仍然足以使威慑和保证工作。

总统指派给核力量的角色和任务有多少取决于多少。那会改变。它已经改变了。它将继续改变。任何人都可以看到,核武器国家和盟友对确定和确保足够的核武器的数量和类型的核武器具有截然不同的看法。

如果您问俄罗斯和美国,答案是,在地缘政治惊喜的情况下,需要几千枚核弹头才能进行即时任务,技术对冲和重建。但是,如果您问中国,英国和法国的答案是几百。在印度,巴基斯坦和以色列国家安全所需的人数甚至更低。

同样,俄罗斯和美国还坚持要求Quadrad(这是战略发射器和非战略性核力量的三合会),每个具有独特属性的每一条能提供足够的灵活性和适用于工作的选择,并且可以保证工作和国家在危机中有足够不同选择的领导才能。中国,印度,巴基斯坦以及可能的以色列也在试图建造三合会,但它们的功能较小,能力较低。法国曾经有一个三合会,但在1990年代放弃了其陆基导弹,现在说二元组足以满足其国家安全需求。英国已经走到了一个拥有单个武器系统的单子,甚至在辩论它是否需要它。

Russia and the United States also say that deterrence and national security require that more than 1,500 of their warheads are deployed on launchers, and that several hundred of those warheads must be on high alert 24/7/365 and ready to launch in a few minutes. Britain and France say they can do with much lower readiness levels, while China, India, Pakistan and Israel don’t see a need to have warheads deployed on launchers or on alert at all.

2009年,新当选的总统巴拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama)在布拉格(Brague)的演讲重新激发了国际军备控制社区,该演讲致力于美国“迈向没有核武器的世界”,并“减少核武器在我们的国家中的作用安全策略“结束冷战思维”。

The speech scared the heck out of the nuclear community and had it not been for the Minot incident just two years earlier and the subsequent effort to reinvigorate the Air Force nuclear mission, the air-delivered nuclear posture both here in the United States and in Europe might have looked very different today.

消除核武器的最终目标并不是什么新鲜事物,而是自1960年代以来一直是美国政策,无论当时的政府是共和党还是民主党,还是他们是在增加或减少核武库。但是,“投入和结束冷战思想”的承诺似乎是新的。不幸的是,总统除了“减少核武器在我们的国家安全战略中的作用”之外,没有解释他的意思。

自从冷战以来,随着任务和任务的崩溃,苏联的灭亡以及传统能力的提高,这种角色或突出性已经显着下降。四年级国防审查,弹道导弹国防审查和核姿势评论都暗示了核武器作用的进一步降低,但这似乎取决于非核能力的进一步改善。

Because of this change, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) determined that the United States “is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing ‘negative security assurance’ by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”

在此之前,这项长期存在的政策取决于NPR的新“加强保证”是否与核武器国家结盟,但通过发行新的“加强保证”,美国肯定,任何有资格有资格的州使用化学或生物武器针对美国或其盟友和伙伴的保证将面临毁灭性的前景conventional军事反应……”(强调)。

This language has been widely used by officials and interpreted by analysts and journalists as the NPR reducing the role of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear attacks. President Obama has even stated publicly that he has reduced the role. “As President, I changed our nuclear posture to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy,” he said in a speech at Hankuk University in South Korea last year. “We’ve narrowed the range of contingencies under which we would ever use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.”

The year before that, National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon declared that the NPR had created a “new doctrine” that “reduces the role of nuclear weapons in our overall defense posture by declaring that the基本角色美国的核力量是为了阻止核发作。

But it is not clear to me how and to what extent a reduction in the role has happened because of the NPR. When has the “fundamental role” of U.S. nuclear weapons not been to deter nuclear attack? Moreover, the reduction in the role that has taken place appears to have occurred well before the NPR following the elimination of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional threat to Europe and subsequent improvements in U.S. and allied conventional capabilities and counter-weapons of mass destruction capabilities. Even the “strengthened assurance” comes with a huge exemption. According to the NPR:

“对于不受此保证所涵盖的国家(拥有核武器和不符合其核不扩散义务的国家)的国家,there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack反对美国或其盟友和合作伙伴。因此,目前尚未准备好采取普遍政策,即美国核武器的“唯一目的”是阻止对美国和我们的盟友和我们的盟友的核攻击……”(强调)。

Neither the public, allies, friends nor adversaries know much about U.S. nuclear war planning, except that the current strategic nuclear war plan is called OPLAN 8010-12 Strategic Deterrence and Force Employment, and that it is a “family” of plans with a myriad of options directed against half a dozen potential adversaries. But since all of these adversaries are exempt from the “strengthened assurance,” it is hard to see how the NPR has reduced the role of nuclear weapons.

In fact, according to one former White House official, the strengthened negative security assurances were “deliberately crafted to exclude countries like North Korea and Iran which threaten our allies – or countries that depend on us – with a range of potential nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional threats.”

当然,奥巴马总统还说,只要存在核武器,美国就会保留安全,安全和有效的核武库。他还承认,核裁军可能不会在他的一生中发生。

毫不奇怪,每个人都在樱桃挑选自己最喜欢的演讲。军备控制社区和国务院的重点是减少核武器的数量和作用,军方专注于维持和现代化核武库,而保守的立法者一直致力于防止进一步减少。

作为对新开始条约的“是”投票,政府在未来十年中同意重大的核现代化(有些算法)2140亿美元。实际上,看到奥巴马政府获得的核现代化资金比布什政府所能做的,真是太神奇了。作为几年前国家核安全管理局的前行政官评论:“我会为这样的预算杀死。”

The twin-commitments to reductions and elimination on the one hand and sustainment and modernization on the other hand have created a somewhat schizophrenic nuclear policy where it can be hard to see what the focus is.

Whether one likes it or not, however, the pledge to reduce the role of nuclear weapons is now a central element of U.S. nuclear policy and to the international community’s perception of what it is.

因此,对于威慑,保证以及不变的目标而言,角色(无论是否减少)都不会模糊或过多,这非常重要。它必须是真实的和真实的。在两个区域中,这特别重要。

一个是朝鲜半岛,威慑与保证之间的相互作用尤其引人注目。美国一直在试图阻止朝鲜并确保韩国,但是随着朝鲜的核试验,该任务最近采取了新的重要性。

但是随着近30,000名美军部署在韩国,大规模的联合演习,轰炸机旋转关岛,八枚弹道导弹潜艇在太平洋巡逻,数百个核弹头,每年的美国联合韩国韩国言论重新填充了核伞,在过去的二十年中,美国和韩国常规部队的现代化现代化,人们如何更或更好地阻止北方?如果所有这些都不保证南方,那将是什么?

Yet when North Korea earlier this year set off a third nuclear test, launched a missile in defiance of the international community, and issued direct nuclear threats against the United States, all of the above capabilities, operations and statements didn’t seem to matter very much. So B-2 and B-52 bombers were deployed as well to demonstrate extra deterrence and assurance. But how do we know that they made any difference in Pyongyang or in Seoul? What we could see, however, was that they played directly into the North Korean brinkmanship by being used to justify the next outrageous threat. I think what worried me the most was how willing each side was to walk up the escalation ladder until someone finally said: “hold on a minute.”

但是现在我们承诺了。所以下次朝鲜做一些愚蠢的事情时,我们不要发送轰炸机,然后我们发出什么信号?而且,如果派轰炸机只会使朝鲜进一步加剧威胁,那么我们是否必须将非战略性核武器重新投入到韩国?

在欧洲,情况大不相同。核威慑几乎不需要,但是很多人说他们需要保证。在欧洲和北约的美国非战略核武器的单方面减少了二十年之后除非俄罗斯愿意减少其非战略核武器的清单,否则不应减少更多。

然而,俄罗斯不是对北约的军事威胁,也没有进行大规模攻击的常规能力。因此,它正在使用非战略核武器来弥补美国和北约更先进的常规力量。

东欧国家的国家安全关注也不是对俄罗斯非战略核武器的保证的需求。他们涉及边境安全,有组织的犯罪,少数派问题以及多年被苏联占领后,对俄罗斯的普遍和可理解的不安。金博宝正规网址的确,如果明天俄罗斯消除了所有非战略核武器,那么东欧北约国家可能会与他们说的同样的安全问题完全相同。

So in Europe the challenge is how to transition the alliance out of the remnants of the Cold War posture of forward-deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons to something that better captures the essence of Europe’s security situation today and better expresses the direction NATO wants to take in the future. Right now the Alliance seems stuck in the mud. Indeed, non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are probably the least credible form of assurance because they are the least likely to ever be used or needed for the security concerns that face Europe today or in the foreseeable future.

最后我想说,有obvious deterrence and assurance challenges but I believe that they are predominantly about non-nuclear capabilities. The nuclear mission is in the background and it can be reduced further. And I am pleased to see that despite a recent tendency to take advantage of Congressional opposition to further nuclear reductions and instead modernize the entire legacy Cold War posture, the military community is spending more time thinking and planning about non-nuclear missions in support of deterrence and assurance.

Although there are nuclear challenges and any nuclear use would be horrific, I think the current scaled-down Cold War nuclear posture is above and beyond what it needed for sufficient deterrence and assurance. In a report to Congress in May last year, the Office of the Secretary of Defense – in a coordinated assessment with the Intelligence Community – expressed an extraordinary confidence in the nuclear posture even against the most severe of all potential nuclear threats.

它得出的结论是,即使俄罗斯进行了撤防第一次罢工,甚至显着超过了新的开始条约限制,“会有几乎没有影响on the U.S. assured second-strike capabilities that underwrite our strategic deterrence posture” (emphasis added). Moreover, the DOD report stated, the “Russian Federation…would not be able to achieve a militarily significant advantage通过其战略核力量的任何合理扩展,即使在《新开始条约》下的作弊或突破情况下,主要是由于固有的生存能力of the planned U.S. Strategic force structure, particularly the OHIO-class ballistic missile submarines, a number of which are at sea at any given time.”

I want to end with this statement because when we in the public debate read such an official assessment, we find it hard to understand why it is necessary to retain the large nuclear force structure and alert posture that we have today – not least in the current fiscal environment. Despite the challenges with Russia, it would be helpful to reduce the asymmetry in strategic nuclear forces to help remove some of the drivers for worst-case planning and improve the incentives to reduce overall force levels.

五角大楼和白宫已经决定,有可能满足威慑和保证要求,而核武器少于我们。政府的长期NPR实施审查可能会减少针对性和警报要求。因此,核力量水平不会上升或保持不变,但将来会进一步下降。因此,空军全球罢工司令部的挑战不是如何打击减少的方式,而是如何维持较低水平的足够威慑和保证。

让我在这里结束,然后就您可能遇到的任何问题开放。谢谢。

Hans Kristensenis the美国科学家联合会的核信息项目主任,在那里他为公众提供了有关核力量状况和核武器作用的分析和背景信息。他专注于在他的研究中使用《信息自由法》(FOIA),并且是一名经常顾问,并在新闻媒体中广泛引用了核武器的作用和地位。

他在2010年与NRDC的研究人员合作,导致对美国核武器大小的估计,库存了只有13个武器实际数量由美国政府解释。克里斯滕森(Kristensen)是原子科学家公告和世界核力量概述的核笔记本栏的合着者,在SIPRI年鉴中。

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