巴基斯坦不断发展的核武器基础设施

汉斯·克里斯滕森（Hans M. Kristensen）

In our latest巴基斯坦核力量的核笔记本，罗伯特·诺里斯（Robert Norris）和我估计，巴基斯坦估计产生了130-140枚核弹头的库存，用于通过短距离和中距离弹道导弹，巡航导弹和战斗机炸弹袭击。

Pakistan now identifies with what is described as a full-spectrum nuclear deterrent posture, which is though to include strategic missiles and fighter-bombers for so-called retaliatory strikes in response to nuclear attacks, and short-range missiles for sub-strategic use in response to conventional attacks.

尽管多年来有很多谣言，但具有核能力的发射器的位置在很大程度上避开了巴基斯坦19岁的大部分宣布为核武器历史的公众关注。大多数公众分析都集中在核工业上（see here for a useful recent study). But over the past several years, commercial satellite pictures have gradually brought into light several facilities that might form part of Pakistan’s evolving nuclear weapons launcher posture.

This includes 10 facilities, including 5 missile garrisons (soon possibly 6) as well 2 (possibly 4) air bases with fighter-bombers.

据认为，将武装起发射器的核弹头存储在尚未确定的其他安全设施中。在危机中，这些弹头首先必须将其带到基地，并与发射器交配，然后才能使用它们。

这些和其他巴基斯坦国防设施的安全是一个日益关注的问题，在过去的10年中，许多人在恐怖袭击中升级了其他安全部队。

There are still many unknowns and uncertainties about the possible nuclear role of these facilities. All of the launchers are thought to be dual-capable, which means they can deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads. So even if a base has a nuclear role, most of the launchers might be assigned to the conventional mission. Further analysis in the future might disqualify some and identify others. But for now, this profile of potential road-mobile launcher garrisons and air bases are intended as a preliminary guide and accompany the recentFAS Nuclear Notebook on Pakistani nuclear forces。

Nuclear-Capable Road-Mobile Missile Launcher Bases

巴基斯坦具有核能力的导弹基地的总数和位置尚不清楚。但是对商业卫星照片的分析已经确定了特征，这些特征表明至少五个基地可能在巴基斯坦的新兴核姿势中发挥作用。其中包括Akro（Petaro），Gujranwala，Khuzdar，Pano Aqil和Sargodha的陆军驻军。在巴哈瓦尔布尔（29.2829，71.7955）的第六个基地可能正在建设中。Dera Ghazi Khan（29.9117，70.4922）附近还有第七个基地，但基础设施却非常不同，尚未令人信服。

在确定核小姐。一个明显的困难le bases is that the infrastructure is not yet publicly known, that commercial satellite photos do not have sufficient resolution to positively identify nuclear-capable launchers with certainty (especially smaller shorter-range types), that all launchers are dual-capable (not all bases with a certain launcher may have a nuclear role; and not all nuclear-capable launchers at a particular base may be assigned nuclear warheads), and that Pakistan (like other nuclear-armed states) most likely is engaged in considerable efforts to conceal and confuse identification of nuclear launchers.

有了这些警告，这里有一个描述，上面写着我们认为是五个主要核能基础的基础和巴基斯坦的主要TEL（运输架架发射器）生产设施：

Akro Garrison:该基地位于海得拉巴以北约18公里（11英里）的阿科罗（Akro）和佩特罗（Petaro）北部约18公里（11英里）位于信德省南部距离印度边境约145公里（90英里）之间的约18公里（11英里）。驻军覆盖了6.9平方公里（2.7平方英里）的区域，自2004年以来已大大扩展（基地是由德国业余卫星图像爱好者马丁·布拉（Martin Bulla）向我指出的）。Akro驻军包括一个独特的地下设施，位于似乎是导弹车库综合大楼的下方。地下设施由沿着中央走廊的两个星形部分组成，该部分连接到两座带有覆盖通行坡道的建筑物。六个电视车库似乎是为12个发射器设计的。

It is not possible to identify the suspected launchers in the TEL complex from the available photos. But analysis of a vehicle training area in the northeast corner of the garrison shows what appears to be five-axel TELs for the Babur cruise missile weapon system.

In a hypothetical crisis the launchers presumably would load their complement of missiles at the base and disperse outside to predetermined launch locations in the region. The range of the Babur is uncertain; NASIC reports it as 350 km (217 miles) while the Pakistan government claims a range of more than 500 kms (373 miles), sometimes as much as 700 kms (435 miles). The Akro unit would be able to defend all of the southeastern part of Pakistan, including Karachi.

Gujranwala Garrison：这个庞大的基地综合体覆盖了约30平方公里（11.5平方英里），位于旁遮普省东北部（32.2410，74.0730）（32.2410，74.0730），距离印度边境约60公里（37英里）。自2010年以来，该基地已经增加了该综合大楼西部的电视发射器区域。似乎还有一个为发射器提供服务的技术领域。TEL区域于2014年或2015年开始运营。电视区域似乎由两个相同的部分组成（每个部分都由发射器车库组成，一个武器装载厅和一个武器存储igloo），每个设计都与TEL区域的设计相似Pano Aqil。安全周边似乎有第三个电话部分的空间。（https://twitter.com/rajfortyseven也发现了此设施和其他设施。）

Several trucks have been seen on the satellite pictures that strongly resemble the NASR short-range missile launcher. It is impossible to identify the launchers with certainty due to the relatively poor quality of the pictures (the launchers could potentially also be multiple rocket launchers), but the resemblance is strong with a drivers cabin, a power and hydraulics unit, and a twin box launcher seen on NASR test launch photos published by the Pakistan military. The range of the NASR is equal to the base’s distance from the Indian border.

Khuzdar Garrison：导弹的驻军位于迄今为止,Khuzdar Garrison some 220 kms (136 miles) west of Sukkur in south-east Balochistan Province is the one located (27.7222, 66.6241) the farthest from the Indian border (295 kms or 183 miles). The base is split in two sections: a northern section and a southern section (where the TELs are based).

Possible launchers have not been seen and identified in Khuzdar photos, but the TEL garages are longer than at all the other bases except the Sargodha Garrison. This could potentially be a base for Shaheen-2 medium-range missile launchers.

The TEL area includes what appears to be an underground facility similar to the one identified at the Akro Garrison. It consists of two buildings on covered access ramps that probably provide TEL access to an underground weapons storage and handling facility.

Khuzdar似乎还设有第二个地下设施，位于电视区以东约600米（1,800英尺）。该设施的总体尺寸大致与电视区域内的访问坡道之间的可疑地下设施大致相同，但是第二个设施的顶部没有TEL设施，并且似乎没有明确的访问点。一种潜在的可能性是，将来该设施可能是第二个电视区域的。

Pano Aqil Garrison：The Pano Aqil Garrison is split up in several sections that cover a combined area of nearly 20 square kms (7.7 square miles). This includes the main garrison area, a TEL area (27.8328, 69.1575), a munitions depot, an airfield, and a shooting range. The base is located approximately 80 kms (50 miles) from the Indian border in the northern part of the Sindh Province.

TEL区域位于主驻军东北部1.8公里（1.2英里），包括五个电视车库（正在建造第六个车库）和一间服务建筑。在该设施的北端，位于武器存储冰屋和一个武器处理厅。TEL区域的布局与Gujranwala Garrison（似乎具有两倍的容量）相似。尽管支持车辆可能使用了一些空间，但五个电视车库可能会持有25塔尔。

Identification of TEL type is difficult due to the relatively poor quality of the satellite pictures, but it could potentially be NASR, Shaheen-1 or Ghaznavi short-range missile launchers.

Sargodha Garrison:The large munitions storage depot at Sargodha长期以来一直有传闻to include TEL garages. The facilities date back to the mid-1990s when Pakistan was first reported to have acquired M-11 missiles from China (DF-11 or CSS-7), which was used to produce what is now known as Pakistan’s Ghaznavi and Shaheen-1 short-range ballistic missiles. But the garages (31.9722, 72.6838) at Sargodha are nearly twice the size that would be needed by short-range Ghaznavi and Shaheen-1 launchers and seem better sized for medium-range Ghauri or Shaheen-2 launchers. There appear to be 10 TEL garages plus two garages with different dimensions that might be used for maintenance.

Yet the Sargodha complex has less of the type of infrastructure seen at other potential TEL bases. Much of the infrastructure seen might be used by personnel that maintain the large weapons depot itself. Whatever the large garages are used for, they are currently being upgraded and additional infrastructure is being added.

Sargodha综合大楼还包括几个地下设施，其中包括有两座大型建筑物，可能是导弹处理大厅。其他隧道正在建设中。

国家发展综合体：在国家发展综合大楼（有时称为国防综合体）或NDC，在不同的导弹驻军中看到或怀疑的几种类型类型。它由散布在伊斯兰堡以西的Kala-Chitta山脉上的一系列设施组成。但是，该综合体的心脏是Fateh Jang（33.6292，72.7106）以北的Tel集会部分。NDC据说在1990年代中期出现，以基于中国提供的技术生产Gazhnavi和Shaheen-1短程弹道导弹。

Since then NDC has expanded considerably to include facilities west and east of the central TEL assembly area. The central area has expanded considerably since 2003, with the addition of a TEL truck assembly facility as well as three large high-bay TEL assembly halls for mounting missile compartments onto TEL trucks. For the past ten years, these facilities have been busy producing Shaheen-2 medium-range ballistic missile launchers and Babur ground-launched cruise missile launchers.

卫星图片给出了NDC不同TEL类型的生产流程的示例，还提供了比较单个导弹驻军在单个导弹驻军中的尺寸的宝贵参考点。例如，在组装或维护过程中，2016年的几张图片显示了6轴Shaheen-2 Tels和5轴Babur Tels，也可能显示4轴Shaheen-1 Tels。8轴Shaheen-3 TEL尚未被视为该武器系统的生产很早，并且尚未在操作上部署。

空气基地

Pakistan has a large number of air bases but only a small number is thought to be involved in the nuclear mission. This includes bases with Mirage and F-16 fighter-bombers. United States officials have stated that F-16s were sold to Pakistan on the conditions that they could not be uses to deliver nuclear weapons, but other sources have indicated that some of the planes were converted nonetheless. French-produced Mirage aircraft are widely assumed to be equipped to deliver the Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile.

面部空军基地：This base is located (24.8855, 66.9280) west of the city of Karachi and has long been suspected of serving a role in Pakistan’s airborne nuclear deterrent. The base is home to the 32^ndFighter Wing with Mirage fighter-bombers and is located only 5 kms (3 miles) from a potential nuclear weapons storage site (24.9429, 66.9083).

Over the past decade, unique facilities have been construction at Masroor Air Base that might potentially form part of Pakistan’s nuclear posture. This includes a large underground facility that is located inside a high-security area. The purpose of the facility has not been confirmed and could potentially also involve command and control. Yet the facility is clearly unique compared with other Air Bases and might potentially serve as an underground nuclear weapons storage and handling facility. (Update: the underground facility is possibly a command center.)

Masroor空军基地的另一个独特设施是一个硬化的飞机庇护所，该飞机避难所由地下隧道连接到似乎是武器存储设施。该设施的目的（首先由https://twitter.com/rajfortyseven发现）尚不清楚，但有可能设计用于使Mirage Fighter Bommers的隐藏核武器装载。

It should be emphasized that despite the interesting features of some of the facilities at Masroor Air Base, there is no official publicly available information that explicitly identifies them as nuclear.

穆沙夫空军基地：巴基斯坦最古老的可疑能力空气基之一是旁遮普省Sargodha附近的Mushaf Air Base（32.0431，72.6710）。基地是38的家^Th长期以来一直怀疑有F-16中队的机翼，构成了巴基斯坦空中核威慑的一部分。

One pair of hardened aircraft shelters at the base are located inside an area with additional security perimeter but there is little visible evidence of nuclear facilities at the base. The munitions storage area shows no unique structures that suggest a nuclear weapons storage role.

取而代之的是，Mushaf空军基地F-16的核弹可能存储在附近的Sargodha武器存储设施，距南部不到10公里（6英里）​​。

Others Air Bases:还有其他几个幻影和F-16空中基地，也有可能作为巴基斯坦空中核罢工任务的一部分发挥作用。其中包括Rafiqui（30.7580，72.2822）的配备幻影基地，该基地在过去三年中一直升级。Shahbaz（28.2825，68.4506）的F-16底座已被大大升级以容纳新的F-16（52块）。

这些基础和其他基础可能有可能为海市rage楼和F-16核能力轰炸机提供分散基础。但是几乎没有明显的物理证据表明它们发挥了核作用。同样，Kamra（Minhas）空军基地（33.8697，72.4004）经常被怀疑具有核作用，但似乎是飞机的转换设施。

结论和含义

商业卫星图片提供了有关巴基斯坦新兴核武器姿势的新信息，其中包括用于短距离核能导弹的导弹驻军，潜在的核武器储存的独特地下设施以及具有与核相关设施的空中基地。

The tactical nuclear-capable launchers do not present a strategic threat to India due to their short range, but their introduction into the Pakistani armed forces raises important questions about early dispersal of nuclear warheads and launch authority in a crisis as well as potential earlier use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with India.

我们估计巴基斯坦目前的库存为130-140枚核弹头，并且正在建造更多。但是，我们还注意到一些巴基斯坦官员的陈述，即该国可能不打算继续无限期地增加阿森纳，但很快可能会达到其全谱威慑力量的目标。是否以及何时发生的何时待观察。目前，巴基斯坦阿森纳处于动态阶段。

附加信息：

• FAS Nuclear Notebook: Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2016
• Pakistan’s Strategic Nuclear and Missile Industries

新的土地基金会和植物基金会的赠款使该出版物成为可能。所作的陈述和表达的观点仅是作者的责任。