188金宝搏官网是多少 >战略安全 >Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure
Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure
汉斯·克里斯汀森（Hans M. Kristensen）
In our latestNuclear Notebook on Pakistani nuclear forces，罗伯特·诺里斯（Robert Norris）和我估计，巴基斯坦估计生产的库存为130-140核弹头，用于通过短距离和中等弹道导弹，巡航导弹和战斗机袭击者的交付。
巴基斯坦现在以一种全镜的核威慑姿势来识别，尽管该姿势包括战略导弹和战斗机袭击者，以响应核攻击而进行的所谓报复性罢工，以及用于在短程中，用于在核攻击中以进行亚战略用途对传统攻击的反应。
尽管多年来有很多谣言，但具有核能力的发射器的位置在很大程度上避开了巴基斯坦19岁的大部分宣布为核武器历史的公众关注。大多数公众分析都集中在核工业上（see here for a useful recent study). But over the past several years, commercial satellite pictures have gradually brought into light several facilities that might form part of Pakistan’s evolving nuclear weapons launcher posture.
This includes 10 facilities, including 5 missile garrisons (soon possibly 6) as well 2 (possibly 4) air bases with fighter-bombers.
据认为，将武装起发射器的核弹头存储在尚未确定的其他安全设施中。在危机中，这些弹头将首先必须带到基地，并与发射器交配，然后才能使用它们。
Security at these and other Pakistani defense facilities is a growing concern and many have been upgraded with additional security perimeters during the past 10 years in response to terrorist attacks.
There are still many unknowns and uncertainties about the possible nuclear role of these facilities. All of the launchers are thought to be dual-capable, which means they can deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads. So even if a base has a nuclear role, most of the launchers might be assigned to the conventional mission. Further analysis in the future might disqualify some and identify others. But for now, this profile of potential road-mobile launcher garrisons and air bases are intended as a preliminary guide and accompany the recent巴基斯坦核武器的FAS核笔记本.
具有核能的公路摩托导弹发射器基地
巴基斯坦具有核能力的导弹基地的总数和位置尚不清楚。但是，对商业卫星照片的分析已经确定了特征，这些特征表明至少五个基地可能在巴基斯坦的新兴核姿势中发挥作用。其中包括位于Akro（Petaro），Gujranwala，Khuzdar，Pano Aqil和Sargodha的陆军驻军。在巴哈瓦尔布尔（29.2829，71.7955）的第六个基地可能正在建设中。Dera Ghazi Khan（29.9117，70.4922）附近还有第七个基地，但基础设施却非常不同，尚未令人信服。
在确定核小姐。一个明显的困难le bases is that the infrastructure is not yet publicly known, that commercial satellite photos do not have sufficient resolution to positively identify nuclear-capable launchers with certainty (especially smaller shorter-range types), that all launchers are dual-capable (not all bases with a certain launcher may have a nuclear role; and not all nuclear-capable launchers at a particular base may be assigned nuclear warheads), and that Pakistan (like other nuclear-armed states) most likely is engaged in considerable efforts to conceal and confuse identification of nuclear launchers.
有了这些注意事项，这里有一个描述，上面描述了我们认为是五个主要具有核核能基础的基础和巴基斯坦的主要TEL（运输架架发射器）生产设施：
Akro Garrison：This base is located (25.5483, 68.3343) approximately 18 km (11 miles) north of Hyderabad between Akro and Petaro in the southern part of the Sindh Province approximately 145 kms (90 miles) from the Indian border. The garrison covers an area of 6.9 square kms (2.7 square miles) and has been expanded significantly since 2004 (the base was first pointed out to me by Martin Bulla, a German amateur satellite imagery enthusiast). The Akro Garrison includes a unique underground facility located under what appears to be a missile TEL garage complex. The underground facility consists of two star-shaped sections located along a central corridor that connects to two buildings with covered access ramps. The six TEL garages appear to be designed for 12 launchers.
无法从可用照片中识别出TEL综合大楼中的可疑启动器。但是，对驻军东北角的车辆训练区的分析显示，Babur Cruise导弹武器系统似乎是五轴的特征。
In a hypothetical crisis the launchers presumably would load their complement of missiles at the base and disperse outside to predetermined launch locations in the region. The range of the Babur is uncertain; NASIC reports it as 350 km (217 miles) while the Pakistan government claims a range of more than 500 kms (373 miles), sometimes as much as 700 kms (435 miles). The Akro unit would be able to defend all of the southeastern part of Pakistan, including Karachi.
Gujranwala Garrison：This sprawling base complex covers an area of approximately 30 square kms (11.5 square miles) and is located (32.2410, 74.0730) in the northeastern part of the Punjab Province approximately 60 kms (37 miles) from the Indian border. Since 2010, the base has added what appears to be a TEL launcher area in the western part of the complex. There is also what appears to be a technical area for servicing the launchers. The TEL area became operational in 2014 or 2015. The TEL area appears to be made up of two identical sections (each consisting of launcher garages, a weapons loading hall, and a weapons storage igloo), each similar in design to the TEL area at Pano Aqil. The security perimeter appears to have room for a third TEL section. (This and other facilities have also been spotted by https://twitter.com/rajfortyseven.)
Several trucks have been seen on the satellite pictures that strongly resemble the NASR short-range missile launcher. It is impossible to identify the launchers with certainty due to the relatively poor quality of the pictures (the launchers could potentially also be multiple rocket launchers), but the resemblance is strong with a drivers cabin, a power and hydraulics unit, and a twin box launcher seen on NASR test launch photos published by the Pakistan military. The range of the NASR is equal to the base’s distance from the Indian border.
Khuzdar Garrison:在到目前为止的导弹驻军中，库兹达尔驻军位于东南Bal路支省苏克尔（Sukkur）以西约220公里（136英里），位于距印度边境（295公里或183英里）的地方（27.7222，66.6241）。基地分为两个部分：一个北部和一个南部（Tels基于的）。
在Khuzdar的照片中尚未看到和确定可能的发射器，但是Tel车库比Sargodha驻军以外的所有其他基地都长。这可能是Shaheen-2中距离导弹发射器的基础。
电话区域包括与Akro驻军确定的设施相似的地下设施。它由两座建筑物组成，上面有覆盖的通行坡道，这些建筑物可能提供了对地下武器存储和处理设施的访问权限。
Khuzdar似乎还设有第二个地下设施，位于电视区以东约600米（1,800英尺）。该设施的总体尺寸大致与电视区域内的访问坡道之间的可疑地下设施大致相同，但是第二个设施的顶部没有TEL设施，并且似乎没有明确的访问点。一种潜在的可能性是，将来该设施可能是为第二个电视区域的。
Pano Aqil Garrison:Pano Aqil驻军分为几个部分，覆盖了近20平方公里（7.7平方英里）的组合区域。其中包括主要驻军区域，电话区域（27.8328，69.1575），弹药仓库，机场和射击场。该基地位于信德省北部的印度边界约80公里（50英里）。
The TEL area is located 1.8 kms (1.2 miles) northeast of the main garrison and includes five TEL garages (a sixth is under construction) and a service building. At the north end of the facility are located a weapons storage igloo and a weapons handling hall. The layout of the TEL area is similar to the Gujranwala Garrison (which appears to have twice the capacity). The five TEL garages can potentially hold 25 TELs although some of the spaces are probably used by support vehicles.
Identification of TEL type is difficult due to the relatively poor quality of the satellite pictures, but it could potentially be NASR, Shaheen-1 or Ghaznavi short-range missile launchers.
Sargodha Garrison：Sargodha的大型弹药库长期以来一直有传闻to include TEL garages. The facilities date back to the mid-1990s when Pakistan was first reported to have acquired M-11 missiles from China (DF-11 or CSS-7), which was used to produce what is now known as Pakistan’s Ghaznavi and Shaheen-1 short-range ballistic missiles. But the garages (31.9722, 72.6838) at Sargodha are nearly twice the size that would be needed by short-range Ghaznavi and Shaheen-1 launchers and seem better sized for medium-range Ghauri or Shaheen-2 launchers. There appear to be 10 TEL garages plus two garages with different dimensions that might be used for maintenance.
Yet the Sargodha complex has less of the type of infrastructure seen at other potential TEL bases. Much of the infrastructure seen might be used by personnel that maintain the large weapons depot itself. Whatever the large garages are used for, they are currently being upgraded and additional infrastructure is being added.
The Sargodha complex also includes several underground facilities, including a section with two large buildings that could potentially be missile handling halls. Additional tunnels are under construction.
National Development Complex:在国家发展综合大楼（有时称为国防综合体）或NDC，在不同的导弹驻军中看到或怀疑的几种类型类型。它由散布在伊斯兰堡以西的Kala-Chitta山脉上的一系列设施组成。但是该综合体的心脏是Fateh Jang（33.6292，72.7106）以北的Tel Assembly部分。NDC据说emerged in the mid-1990s to produce Gazhnavi and Shaheen-1 short-range ballistic missiles based on technology supplied by China.
Since then NDC has expanded considerably to include facilities west and east of the central TEL assembly area. The central area has expanded considerably since 2003, with the addition of a TEL truck assembly facility as well as three large high-bay TEL assembly halls for mounting missile compartments onto TEL trucks. For the past ten years, these facilities have been busy producing Shaheen-2 medium-range ballistic missile launchers and Babur ground-launched cruise missile launchers.
Satellite pictures give an example of the flow of production of different TEL types at NDC and also provide valuable reference points for comparing dimensions of TELs seen at individual missile garrisons. Several pictures from 2016, for example, show both 6-axel Shaheen-2 TELs and 5-axel Babur TELs, and possibly also 4-axel Shaheen-1 TELs, in the process of assembly or maintenance. The 8-axel Shaheen-3 TEL has not yet been seen as this weapon system is still very early in production and not yet operationally deployed.
空气基地
巴基斯坦有大量的空中基地，但核任务中只有少数数量涉及。这包括带有Mirage和F-16战斗机的基地。美国官员表示，在无法用来提供核武器的条件下，F-16被卖给了巴基斯坦，但其他消息来源表明，某些飞机仍然被转换了。法国生产的幻影飞机被广泛假定能够发射Ra’ad空调的巡航导弹。
面部空军基地：该基地位于卡拉奇市以西（24.8855，66.9280），长期以来一直怀疑在巴基斯坦的空中核威慑力量中发挥作用。基地是32NDFighter Wing with Mirage fighter-bombers and is located only 5 kms (3 miles) from a potential nuclear weapons storage site (24.9429, 66.9083).
在过去的十年中，独特的设施一直是马斯罗尔空军基地的建设，可能是巴基斯坦核姿势的一部分。这包括位于高安全区域内的大型地下设施。该设施的目的尚未得到确认，也可能涉及指挥和控制。然而，与其他空气基地相比，该设施显然是独一无二的，并且有可能用作地下核武器存储和处理设施。（更新：地下设施可能是指挥中心。）
Masroor空军基地的另一个独特设施是一个硬化的飞机庇护所，该飞机避难所由地下隧道连接到似乎是武器存储设施。该设施的目的（首先由https://twitter.com/rajfortyseven发现）是未知的，但有可能设计用于使Mirage Fighter-Bommers的隐藏核武器装载。
应该强调的是，尽管在Masroor空军基地的某些设施中有有趣的特征，但没有明确将其识别为核的官方公开信息。
Mushaf Air Base:One of Pakistan’s oldest suspected nuclear-capable air bases is Mushaf Air Base located (32.0431, 72.6710) near Sargodha in the Punjab Province. The base is the home of the 38Th长期以来一直怀疑有F-16中队的机翼，构成了巴基斯坦空中核威慑的一部分。
底座上的一对硬化的飞机避难所位于一个区域内，有额外的安全周边，但底座上几乎没有可见的核设施证据。弹药存储区没有显示核武器存储角色的独特结构。
取而代之的是，Mushaf空军基地F-16的核弹可能存储在附近的Sargodha武器存储设施，距南部不到10公里（6英里）。
其他空气基地：有一些其他的海市蜃楼和f - 16的空气英航ses that could potentially also serve a role as part of Pakistan’s airborne nuclear strike mission. This includes the Mirage-equipped base at Rafiqui (30.7580, 72.2822), which has been upgrade over the past three years. The F-16 base at Shahbaz (28.2825, 68.4506) has been upgraded considerably to accommodate the new F-16s (Block 52).
These and other bases could potentially serve a dispersal bases for Mirage and F-16 nuclear-capable bombers. But there is little visible physical evidence to suggest they serve a nuclear role. Likewise, Kamra (Minhas) Air Base (33.8697, 72.4004) has often been suspected to have a nuclear role but appears to serve as conversion facility for aircraft.
结论和含义
商业卫星图片提供了有关巴基斯坦新兴核武器姿势的新信息，其中包括用于短距离核能导弹的导弹驻军，可能用于核武器储存的独特地下设施以及可能与核相关设施的空中基地。
具有战术核能力的发射器由于其短范围而不会对印度构成战略威胁，但是他们引入巴基斯坦武装部队提出了有关早期分散核弹头和在危机中发射权威的重要问题，以及潜在的早期使用与印度发生冲突的核武器。
我们估计，巴基斯坦目前的库存为130-140枚核弹头，并且正在建造更多。但是，我们还注意到一些巴基斯坦官员的声明，即该国可能不打算继续无限期地增加阿森纳，但可能很快就可以实现其全谱威慑力量的目标。是否以及何时发生的事情还有待观察。目前，巴基斯坦阿森纳处于动态阶段。
附加信息：
新的土地基金会和植物基金会的赠款使该出版物成为可能。所作的陈述和表达的观点仅是作者的责任。
