中国SSBN Fleet Getting Ready – But For What?

By Hans M. Kristensen

中国的新兴舰队由3-4个新的金级核动力导弹潜艇组成according to U.S. Pacific Command。

2013年10月（上）拍摄的新卫星图像显示了Huludao Bohai造船厂在干船坞中的Jin SSBN。潜艇的12枚导弹管中的两个是打开的。目前尚不清楚图片中的潜艇是第四艘船还是前三艘Jin SSBN之一，它已返回干船坞进行维修或维护。

美国情报界预测“最多五个[Jin-class（类型094）SSBN]可以在中国在未来十年中进入其SSBN（类型096）之前进入服务”，这表明noisyJin-class design might already be seen as outdated.

这和许多其他商业卫星图像s (see below) show how China over the past decade has built an infrastructure of naval facilities to service the new SSBN fleet. This includes upgrades at naval bases, submarine hull demagnetization facilities, underground facilities and high-bay buildings for missile storage and handling, and covered tunnels and railways to conceal the activities from prying eyes in the sky.

除了中国将建造多少金SSBN，最大的问题是，中国政府是否会选择像西方核武器国家经营其SSBN数十年的方式 - 连续部署在海上，并在弹道导弹上使用核弹头 -continue China’s long-held policy of not deploying nuclear weapons outside Chinese territory but keeping them in central storage for deployment in a crisis.

Nuclear Submarine Sightings

Over the past decade, a total of 25 commercial satellite images made available on Google Earth have provided visual confirmation and information about the status and location of the Jin SSBNs (see table below). They show the submarines at four sites: the Bohai shipyard at Huludao on the Bohai Sea where the submarines are built; the Xiaopingdao naval base near Dalian where the submarines are fitted out for missile launch tests; the North Sea Fleet base at Jianggezhuang near Qingdao where one Jin SSBN is homeported along with the old Xia-class SSBN from the 1980s; and at the South Sea Fleet base at Longpo on Hainan Island where at least one Jin SSBN has been based since 2008.

波海船场

The Bohai shipyard at Huludao builds China’s nuclear-powered submarines. The shipyard, which is located in the north of the Bohai Sea, is immensely busy with numerous large tankers and cargo ships under construction at any time. The submarine hulls are assembled in a large 40,000-squaremeter construction hall at the western end of the shipyard, rolled across a storage area into a dry dock for completion, and then launched into the harbor where they spend years tied up to a pier fitting out until handed over to the Chinese navy (PLAN).

商业卫星照片提供t的快照he status of submarine construction and the quality is good enough to differentiate different submarine types and identify design details such as dimensions and layout of the missile compartment. One of the most recent photos (see below) shows a Jin-class SSBN in dry dock with two of 12 missile tubes open. Additional unassembled submarine hull sections are laid out on the ground next to the assembly hall.

In addition to satellite photos, tourists also occasionally take photos and post them on Google Panoramio or other web site. One such photo (see below) shows most of the shipyard with other overlaid photos showing dry dock cranes and two missile submarinesfirst seen in 2007。

米金多潜艇改建基础

After completing construction at the Bohai shipyard the submarines sail to the Xiaopingdao refit base near Dalian. This base is used to prepare the submarines for operational service and is where test missiles are loaded into the launch tubes for test launches from the Bohai Sea across China into the Qinghai desert. Xiaopingdao is also used by China’s single Golf-class SSB, a special design submarine previously used to test launch SLBMs.

The base has been upgraded several times over the past decade-and-a-half including an extended pier to service the larger Jin-class SSBNs.

On two occasions, in March 2009 and March 2011, two Jin SSBNs have been seen docked at Xiaopingdao at the same time.

Xiaopingdao is also where the first Jin-class SSBNwas spottedon a commercial satellite photo in July 2007.

Jianggezhuang (Laoshan) Submarine Base

The oldest nuclear submarine base is the North Sea Fleet base at Jianggezhuang (Laoshan) approximately 18 kilometers (11 miles) east of Qingdao in the Shandong province.

The Jin-class SSBN was first seen at Jianggezhuang on a commercial satellite image in August 2010.

The base is also home to the old Xia-class SSBN, the lone unit of China’s first experiment with ballistic missile submarines. The Xia completed a multi-year dry dock overhaul in 2007 but has probably never been fully operational and has never conducted a deterrent patrol.

This base is where wein 2006 spottedthe long-rumored submarine cave, alsodescribed inImaging Notes。该洞穴有一条大型水隧道，可从海港进入，三个陆地隧道可从各种基地设施提供通道。

从2013年7月开始的卫星图像（见下文）显示了基部的Xia和Jin SSBN，Xia在两艘拖船的协助下。潜艇后面的水湍流表明Xia的发动机是运营的。

江岛也有一个干码头，这是迄今为止一直在海军基地上的唯一一座码头，该码头已被视为为核抛光潜艇提供服务。该基地也有几艘核动力攻击潜艇。

Only a few miles north of the base is an underground facility that may be storing munitions for the submarine fleet. As such, it could potentially also serve as a regional storage facility for nuclear warheads for the SLBMs once released to the navy in a crisis by the Central Military Committee.

自2003年以来，已经增加了几座建筑物，可能为适应新的Jin SSBN及其较大的JL-2 SLBMS做准备。

海南岛潜艇综合体

The South Sea Fleet naval facilities on Hainan Island are under significant expansion. The nuclear submarine base at Longpo has been upgraded to serve as the first nuclear submarine base in the South China Sea. The first Jin-class SSBNwas seenat Longpo on February 27, 2008, and a new photo from November 2013 shows a Jin SSBN with its missile tubes open (see below).

Longpo submarine base includes four piers for submarines, an underground submarine facility with tunnel access from the harbor and land-tunnels from the other side of the mountain, as well as a demagnetization facility. Longpo was the first base to get a demagnetization facility, which has since alsobeen addedto the East Sea Fleet near Ningbo.

The Hainan naval complex also includes the conventional submarine base at Julin, which also appears to be under expansion with new piers and a sea break wall under construction.

Approximately 12 kilometers (7 miles) northeast of Longpo is a military facility that appears to include four tunnels connecting to one or several underground facilities inside the mountain. Tugged away at the end of a lake inside a valley, the facility has a significant infrastructure with administrative and technical buildings as well as several camouflaged high-bay buildings surrounded by berms for blast protection during explosives handling.

Longpo基地没有干码头，因此核潜艇必须航行到另一个基地进行维护或维修。Julin的常规海底底座具有165米（550英尺）的干船坞，可能有可能容纳Jin-Class SSBN，但这很紧密。更有可能是位于海南岛以北大陆的Zhanjiang海军基地的215米（706英尺）的干船坞，或宁波附近的东海舰队潜艇基地。然而，到目前为止，尚未在Julin，Zhanjiang（南海舰队总部）和Ningbo（东海舰队总部）的商业卫星图像显示出核潜艇，目前尚不清楚这些基地是否获得核销售潜艇的认证。如果不是这样，那么基于海南岛的核潜艇将不得不使用北部北部的干船坞或波海岛进行维护和维修。这似乎很奇怪，所以我敢肯定，我错过了海南附近的海军干船坞。

A unique new feature at Longpo is a 1.3-kilometer (0.8-mile) long covered railway completed in May or June 2010 (see below). The railway connects a high-bay building with possible access into the mountain at the eastern part of the base with one of the land-based tunnels to the underground submarine cave on the Longpo peninsula. The covered railway clearly seems intended to keep movement of something between the two mountains out of sight from spying satellites. Two turnoffs from the railway lead to a large building under construction with rail tracks inside. The purpose of the new facilities and rail is unknown but might potentially be intended for movement of SLBMs or other weapons between storage inside the mountain to the submarine cave for arming of SSBNs or SSNs.

Before a roof was constructed to conceal the land-tunnel into the submarine cave, the rail tracks into the tunnel were visible on satellite images. Other features at this portion of the base include five ventilation stacks, the roof between the covered railway and tunnel entrance, and a coverage being constructed over a second tunnel road entrance (see above). These features are also visible on a tourist photo posted on Google Panoramio (see below).

Implications

随着新兴的Jin-Class SSBN机队，中国似乎准备为其核威慑力量增加重要组成部分。尽管中国核姿势的重点是陆基导弹力量，但中国领导人似乎将核力量的三合会视为强大地位的象征。商业卫星图像清楚地表明，在过去的十年中，中国领导人一直在花费大量资源来建立支持SSBN舰队所需的基础设施。在印度，日本和美国，密切关注这一发展，以中国（适度）增长和更加复杂的核武库的一个例子。

In building the Jin-class SSBN fleet, however, China appears more to mirror the nuclear postures of the United States, Russia, Britain and France rather than demonstrating a clear purpose and contribution of the SSBN force to China’s own security and crisis stability in general.

As a new second-strike capability added to the Chinese nuclear arsenal, the Jin SSBN fleet only makes strategic sense if it ismore secure比第二炮兵的陆基洲际弹道导弹力量。Its justification must be based on a conclusion that the ICBMs are too vulnerable to a first strike and that a more secure sea-based second-strike force therefore is needed.

The ultimate test of the Jin SSBNs will be whether they can survive long enough at sea in a hypothetical war situation to provide a back-up deterrent at all. If they are too noisy, the Jins could be vulnerable to early detection and attrition, especially if they had to deploy to distant patrols areas in order for the missiles to be able to reach important targets. With a range of 7,200 to 7,400 kilometers (4,470 to 4,600 miles) – the range estimate given by the U.S. intelligence community for the JL-2 SLBM carried on Jin-class SSBNs, a submarine would need to sail deep into the Pacific Ocean to be able to target the U.S. west coast. To threaten Washington DC, a Jin SSBN would have to sail halfway across the Pacific (see map below). Not exactly safe travel for a submarinethat is noisierthan the ancient Russian Delta III SSBNs built in the 1970s.

这可能是一个公平的假设，即美国攻击潜艇已经在尾随或监视Jin SSBN以记录个人声音特征并观察操作模式。这些信息将用于定位，并在必要时将中国潜艇沉没在假设的战争中。

The value of the Jin SSBNs is also dependent on their capability to communicate with the national command authority on land from submerged patrol areas. Secure and reliable communication is essential for the Chinese leaders to be able to exercise command and control of the nuclear missiles on the SSBNs. If communication is poor, the SSBNs could become irrelevant or, perhaps more importantly, downright dangerous to crisis stability if loss of contact caused Beijing to mistakenly conclude that one or more of the subs had been sunk by enemy action. That could, potentially, cause the Chinese leadership to conclude that the nuclear threshold had already been crossed and decide to activate its land-based nuclear forces in a way that would be seen by an adversary as preparation to launch.

Some of these issues may become clearer when China begins to operate the Jin submarines as a real SSBN force. Part of the public debate has been somewhat overblown with claims that Jin SSBNs will be able to target the continental United States from Chinese waters.They will not。And the DOD评估that the Jins “will give the PLA Navy its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent” is probably premature and certainly depends on what is meant by “credible.”

Whatever their ultimate capability may be, however, the Jin SSBNs and the infrastructure China is building are symbols of the extensive nuclear modernizations that are underway in all the nuclear-armed countries. The Chinese government says it “will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country,” but it is certainly in a technological race with the United States, Russia and India about developing improved and more capable nuclear weapons.

其他资源：Previous articles about Chinese nuclear forces| Most recent (2013)Nuclear Notebook on Chinese nuclear forces。

Plowshares Fund的赠款使该出版物成为可能。所作的陈述和表达的观点仅是作者的责任。