中国SSBN舰队准备好了 - 但是为什么呢？

By Hans M. Kristensen

China’s emerging fleet of 3-4 new Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines is getting ready to deploy on deterrent patrols, “probably before the end of 2014,”according to U.S. Pacific Command。

A new satellite image taken in October 2013 (above) shows a Jin SSBN in dry dock at the Bohai shipyard in Huludao. Two of the submarine’s 12 missile tubes are open. It is unclear if the submarine in the picture is the fourth boat or one of the first three Jin SSBNs that has returned to dry dock for repairs or maintenance.

The U.S. intelligence communitypredictsthat “up to five [Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs] may enter service before China proceeds to its generation SSBN (Type 096) over the next decade,” an indication that thenoisyJin-class design might already be seen as outdated.

这和许多其他商业卫星图像s (see below) show how China over the past decade has built an infrastructure of naval facilities to service the new SSBN fleet. This includes upgrades at naval bases, submarine hull demagnetization facilities, underground facilities and high-bay buildings for missile storage and handling, and covered tunnels and railways to conceal the activities from prying eyes in the sky.

Apart from how many Jin SSBNs China will build, the big question is whether the Chinese government will choose to operate them the way Western nuclear-armed states have operated their SSBNs for decades – deployed continuously at sea with nuclear warheads on the ballistic missiles – or continue China’s long-held policy of not deploying nuclear weapons outside Chinese territory but keeping them in central storage for deployment in a crisis.

核海底目击事件

在过去的十年中，Google Earth上共有25个商业卫星图像提供了有关Jin SSBN的状态和位置的视觉确认和信息（请参见下表）。他们在四个地点展示了潜艇：在建造潜艇的Bohai Sea Huludao的Bohai造船厂；达利安附近的小米海军基地，在该基地上安装了导弹发射测试；北海舰队基地位于庆庄附近的江孔，一个Jin SSBN与1980年代的旧Xia-Class SSBN一起进行了主页；自2008年以来，至少一个Jin SSBN一直在海南岛的Longpo的南海舰队基地。

Bohai Ship Yard

The Bohai shipyard at Huludao builds China’s nuclear-powered submarines. The shipyard, which is located in the north of the Bohai Sea, is immensely busy with numerous large tankers and cargo ships under construction at any time. The submarine hulls are assembled in a large 40,000-squaremeter construction hall at the western end of the shipyard, rolled across a storage area into a dry dock for completion, and then launched into the harbor where they spend years tied up to a pier fitting out until handed over to the Chinese navy (PLAN).

商业卫星照片提供t的快照he status of submarine construction and the quality is good enough to differentiate different submarine types and identify design details such as dimensions and layout of the missile compartment. One of the most recent photos (see below) shows a Jin-class SSBN in dry dock with two of 12 missile tubes open. Additional unassembled submarine hull sections are laid out on the ground next to the assembly hall.

In addition to satellite photos, tourists also occasionally take photos and post them on Google Panoramio or other web site. One such photo (see below) shows most of the shipyard with other overlaid photos showing dry dock cranes and two missile submarines2007年首次出现。

Xiaopingdao Submarine Refit Base

After completing construction at the Bohai shipyard the submarines sail to the Xiaopingdao refit base near Dalian. This base is used to prepare the submarines for operational service and is where test missiles are loaded into the launch tubes for test launches from the Bohai Sea across China into the Qinghai desert. Xiaopingdao is also used by China’s single Golf-class SSB, a special design submarine previously used to test launch SLBMs.

The base has been upgraded several times over the past decade-and-a-half including an extended pier to service the larger Jin-class SSBNs.

两次，在2009年3月和2011年3月，在Xiaopingdao上看到了两个Jin SSBN。

Xiaopingdao is also where the first Jin-class SSBNwas spotted在2007年7月的商业卫星照片上。

Jianggezhuang (Laoshan) Submarine Base

最古老的核海底基地是北海（Laoshan）的北海舰队基地，位于山东省金丁多以东约18公里（11英里）。

Jin-Class SSBN于2010年8月以商业卫星图像在Jianggezhuang首次出现。

The base is also home to the old Xia-class SSBN, the lone unit of China’s first experiment with ballistic missile submarines. The Xia completed a multi-year dry dock overhaul in 2007 but has probably never been fully operational and has never conducted a deterrent patrol.

这个基地是我们的地方in 2006 spottedthe long-rumored submarine cave, alsodescribed inImaging Notes。The cave has a large water tunnel with access from the harbor and three land-tunnels providing access from various base facilities.

A satellite image from July 2013 (see below) shows both the Xia and a Jin SSBN at the base, with the Xia being assisted by two tugboats. Water turbulence behind the submarine indicates the Xia’s engine is operational.

Jianggezhuang also has a dry dock, the only one at a naval base that has so far been seen servicing nuclear-propelled submarines. There are also several nuclear-powered attack submarines homeported at the base.

基地以北只有几英里的地下设施，可能正在为潜艇舰队存储弹药。因此，它可能还可以作为SLBMS核弹头的区域存储设施，曾经在中央军事委员会的危机中释放给海军。

Several buildings have been added since 2003, possibly in preparation for accommodating the new Jin SSBN and its larger JL-2 SLBMs.

Hainan Island Submarine Complex

The South Sea Fleet naval facilities on Hainan Island are under significant expansion. The nuclear submarine base at Longpo has been upgraded to serve as the first nuclear submarine base in the South China Sea. The first Jin-class SSBN被看见在2008年2月27日的Longpo上，2013年11月的一张新照片显示了一个带有导弹管的Jin SSBN（见下文）。

Longpo潜艇基地包括四个用于潜艇的码头，一个地下潜艇设施，可从港口进入隧道，并从山另一侧进行陆地刺，以及一个退火设施。朗普（Longpo）是第一个获得撤销设施的基地，此后也是如此已添加to the East Sea Fleet near Ningbo.

The Hainan naval complex also includes the conventional submarine base at Julin, which also appears to be under expansion with new piers and a sea break wall under construction.

Approximately 12 kilometers (7 miles) northeast of Longpo is a military facility that appears to include four tunnels connecting to one or several underground facilities inside the mountain. Tugged away at the end of a lake inside a valley, the facility has a significant infrastructure with administrative and technical buildings as well as several camouflaged high-bay buildings surrounded by berms for blast protection during explosives handling.

The Longpo base does not have a dry dock so nuclear submarines would have to sail to another base for maintenance or repair. The conventional submarine base at Julin has a 165-meter (550-feet) dry dock that could potentially accommodate a Jin-class SSBN, but it would be a tight fit. More likely are the 215-meter (706-feet) dry docks at the Zhanjiang Naval Base on the mainland north of Hainan Island, or the East Sea Fleet submarine base near Ningbo. Yet so far available commercial satellite images have not shown a nuclear submarine at either Julin, Zhanjiang (South Sea Fleet headquarters), nor Ningbo (East Sea Fleet headquarters), and it is unclear if the bases are certified for nuclear-propelled submarines. If not, then nuclear submarines based on Hainan Island would have to use a dry dock as far north as Jianggezhuang or Bohai for maintenance and repairs. That seem strange so I’m sure I’ve missed a naval dry dock somewhere closer to Hainan.

A unique new feature at Longpo is a 1.3-kilometer (0.8-mile) long covered railway completed in May or June 2010 (see below). The railway connects a high-bay building with possible access into the mountain at the eastern part of the base with one of the land-based tunnels to the underground submarine cave on the Longpo peninsula. The covered railway clearly seems intended to keep movement of something between the two mountains out of sight from spying satellites. Two turnoffs from the railway lead to a large building under construction with rail tracks inside. The purpose of the new facilities and rail is unknown but might potentially be intended for movement of SLBMs or other weapons between storage inside the mountain to the submarine cave for arming of SSBNs or SSNs.

在建造屋顶以将陆地隧道掩盖到海底洞穴中之前，在卫星图像上可以看到进入隧道的铁轨。基地这一部分的其他功能包括五个通风堆，覆盖的铁路和隧道入口之间的屋顶以及在第二个隧道道路入口处建造的覆盖范围（请参见上文）。这些功能在Google Panoramio上发布的旅游照片中也可见（见下文）。

Implications

With the emerging Jin-class SSBN fleet, China appears ready to add an important component to its nuclear deterrent. Although the focus of China’s nuclear posture is the land-based missile force, the Chinese leadership appears to view a triad of nuclear forces as a symbol of great power status. Commercial satellite images clearly show that the Chinese leadership has been spending considerable resources over the past decade building the infrastructure needed to support the SSBN fleet. The development is watched closely in India, Japan, and the United States as an example of China’s (modestly) growing and more sophisticated nuclear arsenal.

In building the Jin-class SSBN fleet, however, China appears more to mirror the nuclear postures of the United States, Russia, Britain and France rather than demonstrating a clear purpose and contribution of the SSBN force to China’s own security and crisis stability in general.

As a new second-strike capability added to the Chinese nuclear arsenal, the Jin SSBN fleet only makes strategic sense if it ismore secure比第二炮兵的陆基洲际弹道大军。它的理由必须基于一个结论，即洲际弹道导弹太容易受到第一次罢工的攻击，因此需要更安全的海上第二击力。

The ultimate test of the Jin SSBNs will be whether they can survive long enough at sea in a hypothetical war situation to provide a back-up deterrent at all. If they are too noisy, the Jins could be vulnerable to early detection and attrition, especially if they had to deploy to distant patrols areas in order for the missiles to be able to reach important targets. With a range of 7,200 to 7,400 kilometers (4,470 to 4,600 miles) – the range estimate given by the U.S. intelligence community for the JL-2 SLBM carried on Jin-class SSBNs, a submarine would need to sail deep into the Pacific Ocean to be able to target the U.S. west coast. To threaten Washington DC, a Jin SSBN would have to sail halfway across the Pacific (see map below). Not exactly safe travel for a submarinethat is noisierthan the ancient Russian Delta III SSBNs built in the 1970s.

It is probably a fair assumption that U.S. attack submarines have already been trailing or monitoring the Jin SSBNs to record individual sound characteristics and observe operational patterns. Such information would be used to locate and, if necessary, sink the Chinese submarines in a hypothetical war.

Jin SSBN的价值还取决于其与淹没巡逻地区土地上的国家指挥部沟通的能力。安全可靠的沟通对于中国领导人能够对SSBN上的核导弹的指挥和控制至关重要。如果沟通不佳，那么SSBN可能会变得无关紧要，或者更重要的是，如果失去接触导致北京错误地得出结论，北京被敌人的行动沉没了。这可能会导致中国领导人得出结论，即核阈值已经越过，并决定以对手将其视为准备发射的方式来激活其土地核力量。

Some of these issues may become clearer when China begins to operate the Jin submarines as a real SSBN force. Part of the public debate has been somewhat overblown with claims that Jin SSBNs will be able to target the continental United States from Chinese waters.他们不会。和国防部assessmentJins“将为PLA海军的第一个可靠的海洋核威慑力量，可能为时过早，并且肯定取决于“可信”的含义。

Whatever their ultimate capability may be, however, the Jin SSBNs and the infrastructure China is building are symbols of the extensive nuclear modernizations that are underway in all the nuclear-armed countries. The Chinese government says it “will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country,” but it is certainly in a technological race with the United States, Russia and India about developing improved and more capable nuclear weapons.

Additional resources:Previous articles about Chinese nuclear forces| Most recent (2013)Nuclear Notebook on Chinese nuclear forces。

这份出版物是由格兰特成为可能the Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.