SSBNX Under Pressure: Submarine Chief Says Navy Can’t Reduce

经过2013年7月24日

布雷肯里奇
SSBN舰队的负责人Richard Breckenridge海军上将说,舰队的规模实际上是关于地理的。

汉斯·克里斯滕森(Hans M. Kristensen)

在一个博客和视频on the U.S. Navy web site Navy Live, the head of the U.S. submarine force Rear Admiral Richard Breckenridge claims that the United States cannot reduce its fleet of nuclear ballistic missile submarines further.

This is the third time in three months that Breckenridge has seen a need to go online to defend the size of the SSBN fleet. The第一次was in May in reaction to我的文章关于SSBN巡逻的下降。这第二次was in June when he argued that the design chosen for the next-generation SSBN was the only option.

Now Breckenridgearguesoperationa的数量l SSBNs cannot be reduced further if the U.S. Navy is to be able to conduct continuous deployments in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.

在数月的时间内进行了三项公开干预措施,表明,花费700亿美元以上建造新的12个SSBN的计划承受着压力,而Breckenridge承认了很多:“五角大楼内部的热量可能一样糟糕”the summer heat outside and “with sequestration and the fiscal crisis and the budgetary impacts on the DOD topline, there’s a lot of folks looking at how low we can go with the SSBN force.”

但是,布雷肯里奇(Breckenridge)声称,这12个计划的下一代SSBN“是地板”。

A Matter of Geography

海军并不是第一次辩称它拥有或计划建造的是绝对的最低限度,而少的一切都会破坏美国国家安全。但是,为什么海军计划建造12个新的SSBN?

这answer, Breckenridge says, “really is a matter of geography.”

“For us to be able to conduct two-oceans strategic deterrence requires a bare minimum number of SSBNs of a force of twelve,” he claims. To get to that number, Breckenridge begins with a series of broad assumptions and claims about deterrence and SSBN operations.

“对于战略威慑的工作方式,您有两个重要的一点。首先是那些SSBN必须无敌。他们必须在海上生存。对手找不到它们。隐藏并且无法检测到。其次,它们必须在对手至关重要的目标范围内,我们可以冒险阻止或劝阻他们考虑攻击我们的家园。”

他说:“地理要求我们的SSBN部队分配60-40。”“在太平洋地区,比大西洋要满足我们国家的辩护的这两个标准要多。”

我可能对地理知之甚少,但是…

That explanation might work well for a public relations sound bite, but I hope the Pentagon folks examining the SSBN force level probe a little deeper.

First of all, why does two-oceans strategic deterrence require 12 SSBNs? Three decades ago it required 41. Two decades ago it required 33. One decade ago it required 18. Now it requires 14. And in two decades it will still require 12 SSBNs, according to the navy.

Breckenridge explains that out of 14 SSBNs currently in the fleet, 11 are on average operational but it sometimes drops to 10, with the rest undergoing maintenance (有关SSBN操作的文章,请参见此处)。Breckenridge说,这10个操作的SSBN(太平洋中有6个,在大西洋中有4个)“是为战斗人员提供不间断的警报覆盖范围所需的最低限度。”

He says that the current SSBN fleet is a “lean” force. But there is nothing lean about it: the fleet is bigger than that of any other country; each Ohio-class SSBN carries more missiles than any SSBN of any other country can carry; each Trident II D5 missile can be loaded with more warheads than SLBMs of any other country; each missile is more accurate, lethal, and reliable than any other country’s SLBM; and the U.S. SSBN fleet conducts three times more deterrent patrols than any other country. The force is bloated both in terms of size, loadout, capability, and operations.

英国和法国都设法确保他们的安全性各自四个SSBN从一个基​​地运行。相比之下,布雷肯里奇(Breckenridge)倡导10个可部署的下一代SSBN的“最低限度”力量将能够携带160个SLBM,最多可携带1,280枚弹头 - 比英国,法国,中国,巴基斯坦,印度和以色列更多,合并!实际上,奥巴马总统在最近的柏林演讲中提出的10 ssbn部队将能够超越整个部署的战略弹头级别。

Like Russia’s future SSBN fleet, the U.S. Navy could easily operate eight SSBNs from two bases. That would ensure that six next-generation SSBNs would always be deployed or ready to deploy on short notice. Combined they would be armed with nearly 100 long-range missiles capable of carrying up to 760 warheads that can hold a risk the full range of targets. Try to put 760 Xs – even 100 – on a map of Russia or China and tell me why that would be insufficient for deterrence in this day and age.

同样重要的是,在这样的量表上提供“不间断的警报覆盖”的要求来自何处?情况是什么?为什么有必要 - 在冷战结束后二十年来,“为战斗人员为战斗人员提供不间断的警报覆盖范围”?

要求来自核战略家,这些核战略家创造了军事规划者转化为“家庭”的目标和任务核打击计划面对六个对手。这些要求是布雷肯里奇(Breckenridge)试图与他的12个SSBN满足的要求。

但是,当今世界的战略威胁环境中没有什么要求美国SSBN在正常情况下“提供不间断的警报覆盖率”。确实,新的核武器就业政策issued by the White Houselast month concluded that “the potential for a surprise, disarming nuclear attack is exceedingly remote” and ordered DOD to “reduce the role of launch under attack” in nuclear planning.

因此,SSBN可以从警报中删除,其准备水平大大降低,同时仍为机组人员提供基本的运营培训。SSBN威慑巡逻的年度数量已经拒绝一半以上在过去的十年中,未来几年可能会进一步下降。

这Pentagon is already so confident in the capability of the SSBN fleet that it总结了that Russia “would not be able to achieve a militarily significant advantage by any plausible expansion of its nuclear forces” because it would have “little to no effect” on the U.S. ability to retaliate with a devastating strike.

尽管俄罗斯的现代化,其战略力量的规模仍在下降,并在未来十年内有或没有新的武器减少协议,将继续下降。而且没有迹象表明,尽管中国有自己的现代化,但仍计划将其战略核力量的规模增加与奥巴马总统提出的力量水平相提并论的任何事物。

然而,在接下来的二十年中,直到2031年第一个下一代SSBN计划在巡逻队上航行时,海军计划继续运营全部14个俄亥俄州SSBN。其中,这12艘运算船目前载有288艘Trident II D5导弹,根据《新起步条约》,到2018年将减少到不超过240枚导弹。但这比将在10个运营下一代SSBN上部署的160枚导弹高出80枚导弹(50%)。

为什么海军计划以比已经决定在下一代SSBN上可以使用的导弹多50%的速度航行二十年?

这更令人困惑,因为Stratcom司令罗伯特·基勒(Robert Kehler)在2011年11月在国会作证,针对12枚SSBN的计划和16枚导弹的计划“没有对目标或就业指导进行任何具体更改”。

再次阅读:针对部署的海上弹道导弹计划的重大减少不需要对目标或就业指导进行任何具体更改!

该声明表明SSBN机队的容量大量过剩。国会甚至没有注意到这一点。

Conclusions and Recommendations

I may not know much about geography but it appears the SSBN force is significantly in excess of what is required now or planned for later. A force of 8-10 SSBNs with six operational boats would provide more than enough capacity to perform adequate deterrence deployments in Pacific and Atlantic.

现在,减少超额SSBN的能力将节省数十亿美元的建设和运营成本,并使说服俄罗斯也更容易减少IT力量。这似乎是双重胜利。

Part of the problem with debating SSBN operations and the war plans they are tasked under is that everything is so secret that there essentially is no way to independently verify Breckenridge’s claims. All we have are bits a pieces and common sense.

And because of this secrecy, and the almost religious aura of legitimacy that the SSBN force enjoys, many lawmakers blindly accept the claims and do not question the size of the force or the assumptions for its operations. That ends up costing the U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars.

这issue facing us is not whether the SSBN force provides an important contribution to U.S. national security or not. It does. The issue is what composition it needs to have and how it needs to operate to provide sufficient security at an affordable price.

类别:核武器,United States