New Nuclear Weapons Employment Guidance Puts Obama’s Fingerprint on Nuclear Weapons Policy and Strategy

汉斯·克里斯滕森（Hans M. Kristensen）

巴拉克·奥巴马总统的柏林演讲四年前未能捕捉布拉格演讲的核裁军精神。难怪。当时，奥巴马不得不与布什政府的核政策形成对比。这次，奥巴马不得不登上自己的唱片。

柏林演讲中唯一真正的核武器新闻是一个决定以前由公共诚信中心报道政府正在追求在新起点建立的部署核武器中“最多减少三分之一”。

取而代之的是，当天真正的核新闻是奥巴马政府期待已久的核武器就业政策的新指南的结果fact sheet和更多深入的报告向国会。

从核武器控制的角度来看，新的指导是一个混合的袋子。

一方面,指导指导的追求additional reductions in deployed strategic warheads and less reliance on preparing for a surprise nuclear attack. On the other hand, the guidance reaffirms a commitment to core Cold War posture characteristics such as counterforce targeting, retaining a triad of strategic nuclear forces, and retaining non-strategic nuclear weapons forward deployed in Europe.

追求其他减少

首要的消息是，政府已决定，它可以履行其安全义务，而“最多三分之一”的部署战略弹头在新的起步条约下被允许。这意味着指南审查得出的结论是，美国需要1,000-1,100枚弹头，该弹头在新的起点条约下允许的1,550个弹头上部署在陆地和海上战略弹头上。

从公共语言中并不完全清楚，但似乎是这样，这些额外的减少将在与俄罗斯的谈判中进行，而不是互惠单方面的减少。

Even though the nuclear weapons employment policy would allow for reductions below the New START Treaty levels, it does not direct any changes to the currently deployed forces of the United States. That is up to the follow-on process of the Secretary of Defense producing an updated Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP) appendix to the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then producing an update to the nuclear supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP-N).

这些更新将告知Stratcom指挥官有关如何指导联合功能组件命令全局罢工（JFCC-GS）更新战略战争计划（OPLAN 8010-12），以及地理战斗机指挥官，例如欧洲司令部的指挥官来更新他们的区域计划。

因此，如果俄罗斯同意将其部署的战略弹头减少到三分之一时，可能需要几年在奥巴马总统的指导之前，实际上影响了核就业计划。

Already now, many news articles covering the Berlin speech misrepresent the “cut” by saying it would reduce the U.S. “arsenal” or “stockpile” by one third. But that is not accurate. The envisioned one-third reduction of deployed strategic warheads will not in and of itself destroy a single nuclear warhead or reduce the size of the bloated我们。和俄语核武库。

减少攻击的发射

The new guidance recognizes, which is important although late, that the possibility of a disarming surprise nuclear attack has diminished significantly since the Cold War. Therefore, the guidance “directs DoD to examine further options to reduce the role of Launch Under Attack plays in U.S. planning, while retaining the ability to Launch Under Attack if directed.”

在发现对手发起了重大核攻击后，受到攻击的发射是能够发射核力量的能力。由于洲际弹道导弹仅需30分钟即可从俄罗斯飞越北极，因此发射（LOA）意味着保持数百架武器保持警惕，并准备在收到发射订单后的几分钟内发射。

Barack Obama promised during his election campaign in 2007 that he would work with Russia to take nuclear weapons off “hair-trigger alert,” but the Nuclear Posture Review instead decided to continue the existing readiness of nuclear forces. Now the DOD is directed to study how to reduce LOA in nuclear strike planning but retain some LOA capability.

该指南并未明确地说 - 在国防部报告涵盖的范围内，核力量将保持警惕。NPR清楚地表达了这样的声明。国防部指南报告仅指出，应保留开放海洋目标的做法，以便错误地发射的武器将降落在敞开的海洋中。

尽管决定减少部署的战略弹头并减少受到攻击的发射，但指导对冲的对冲，反对这一变化的指导说：“三合会的维护以及上传弹头的能力确保，如果将来出现任何潜在的危机，那么对手，任何对手都无法做到结论是，攻击美国或其盟友和合作伙伴的任何感知益处都超过了我们的回应对他们所施加的费用。”

反石油重申

The new guidance reaffirms the Cold War practice of using nuclear forces to hold nuclear forces at risk. According to the DOD summary, the new guidance “requires the United States to maintain significant counterforce capabilities against potential adversaries” and explicitly “does not rely on a ‘counter-value’ or ‘minimum deterrence’ strategy.”

这种重申可能是布拉格演讲所设想的新指南未能“提出并结束冷战思想”的最重要指标。

因为“反债券是先发制人的或反感的”^英石世纪。这种情况加剧了，因为重申反对与保留（尽管水平降低的决定）的决定有关，但如果有指示，则在攻击下发射的能力（请参阅下文）。

的“战斗”性质nuclear counterforce推动对冷战姿势以及技术和运营要求的要求，这些姿势和技术和操作要求在主要核大国之间维持核竞争，以减少减少核武器的作用和数量的努力。

没有唯一的目的……但是

核态审查四年后决定美国无法采用核武器仅阻止核袭击的唯一目的，新的指导重申了这一拒绝，说“我们今天不能采取这样的政策”。

Even so, the guidance apparently reiterates the intention to work towards that goal over time. And it directs the DOD to undertake concrete steps to further reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

关于非战略核武器的决定令人失望，因为它们未能解决这个问题。实际上，白宫的情况说明书明确指出，该指南审查并未解决欧洲的非战略核武器。

Even so, the guidance decides to retain a forward-based posture in Europe until NATO agrees it is time to change the posture. The last four years have shown that NATO is incapable of doing so because a few eastern NATO countries cling to Cold War perceptions about nuclear weapons in Europe that blocks progress.

In effect, the lack of initiative now means countries like Lithuania now effectively dictate U.S. policy on non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Hedging Against Hedging

The guidance also directs that the United States will continue to retain a large reserve of non-deployed warheads to hedge against technical failures in deployed warheads.

这两者都意味着在每条腿上的足够额外的弹头类型，以对冲那只腿上的另一只弹头，并为每条腿留下足够的弹头，以对冲另一支弹头在另一只腿上的失败。

Now that warhead life-extension programs are underway, the guidance directs that DOD should only retain hedge warheads for those modified warheads until confidence is attained. This is a little cryptic because why would the DOD not do that, but the intension seems to be to avoid keeping the old hedge warheads longer than necessary.

此外，该指南还指出，所有针对技术问题的对冲将提供足够的储备弹头，以允许上传其他弹头（包括在新开始条约下被删除的弹头），以回应世界上某个地方的地缘政治发展。金博宝正规网址

这一切都表明，我们不应该期望在不久的将来会看到对冲的大幅减少，但是在接下来的十年半中，当前的套期保值策略将达到现行策略。

结论

The Obama administration deserves credit for seeking further reductions in nuclear forces and the role of Launch of Warning in nuclear weapons employment planning. A White House fact sheet and a DOD report provide important information about the new nuclear weapons employment guidance, a controversial issue on which previous administrations have largely failed to brief the public.

国防部关于新指南的报告重申，美国的政策是“寻求没有核武器的世界的和平与安全”，但有助于提醒“我们必须继续朝着它采取具体措施。”这很有帮助，因为奥巴马在布拉格的认可，即一个没有核武器的世界的目标可能无法实现他的一生，这已经被反对者减少和裁员的反对者扭曲了“不在我的一生中！”的意思。

The guidance directs that nuclear “planning should focus on only those objectives and missions that are necessary for deterrence in the 21st century.” The force should be flexible enough, the guidance says, to be able to respond to “a wide range of options” by being able to “threaten credibly a wide range of nuclear responses if deterrence should fail.”

不幸的是，公共文件并未阐明这些目标和任务是什么或不再被视为不再需要的。

取而代之的是，对新指南的官方描述表明，它保留了奥巴马总统在四年前在布拉格说他想结束的巴拉格说的许多冷战思想。重新确认欧洲核武器和保留核武器在欧洲尤其令人失望，这是保留大量非部署的弹头储备的决定，部分部分能够逆转新的起步条约下实现的部署战略弹头。

在接下来的几个月和几年中，这些决定可能被用来证明昂贵的核力量现代化合理性，并升级到核弹头，这将促使许多人问实际发生了什么变化。

背景：美国核力量，2013年–俄罗斯核力量，2013年–审查核指导–从反石头到最小威慑

This publication was made possible by grants from the New-Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.